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 Chinese economic reform and 
development: achievements, 
emerging challenges and 
unfinished tasks 1
Jane Golley and Ligang Song
The	 economic	 transformation	 that	 has	 taken	 place	 in	 China	 since	 the	 late	
1970s	is	now	regarded	as	one	of	the	most	significant	social	changes	in	human	
history.	 Within	 just	 three	 decades,	 China	 has	 succeeded	 in	 transforming	







income	 increased	 respectively	by	 factors	 of	 16,	 27,	 124	 and	12.1	As	 a	 result,	
the	 incidence	 and	 severity	 of	 poverty	 have	 declined	 dramatically	 in	 China.	







The	 fundamental	 causes	 of	 this	 remarkable	performance	 are	by	now	 familiar	





2	 The	 Millennium	 Poverty	 Reduction	 Target	 aims	 to	 halve	 the	 proportion	 of	 people	 living	 in	 absolute	
poverty	by	2015	compared	with	the	level	in	1990	(Thirlwall	2006).	
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(FDI)	 to	 flourish	 according	 to	 China’s	 underlying	 comparative	 advantage,	






















to	 economic	 development,	 China	 enjoyed	 the	 advantage	 of	 backwardness—
that	is,	the	ability	to	adopt	the	world’s	more-advanced	technologies	relatively	
rapidly.	
Externally,	 China’s	 reforms	 have	 coincided	 with	 a	 new	 era	 of	 globalisation,	
characterised	 by	 a	 more	 open	 global	 trading	 environment,	 resulting	 from	
significant	 reductions	 in	 tariffs	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 trade	 protection	 through	
various	rounds	of	multinational	trade	negotiations	in	the	post-war	period,	and	
from	 the	 mid-1980s	 through	 unilateral	 liberalisation	 in	 the	 Western	 Pacific	
region.		This	era	has	also	been	characterised	by	rapid	global	economic	structural	
adjustment	in	response	to	cross-border	flows	of	capital,	people	and	technology;	
and	 by	 rapid	 reductions	 in	 transaction	 costs	 stemming	 from	 substantial	
improvements	 in	 transport,	communication	and	 information	management.	 ‘As	













implementation	 and	 the	 rebalancing	 of	 economic	 growth,	 will	 enable	 China	















will	necessitate	changes	 in	the	 industrial	structure	and	composition	of	 trade,	
as	China	 loses	 its	 comparative	advantage	 in	 the	 labour-intensive	exports	 that	
have	been	an	engine	of	growth	in	the	past.	To	facilitate	these	changes,	building	
human	capital	 through	education,	 accelerating	 technological	 change	 through	
innovation	 and	 raising	 labour	 productivity	 through	 further	 labour-market	
reform	are	becoming	increasingly	urgent	national	priorities.	
Economic	 growth	 in	 the	 past	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	 extensive	 growth	
resulting	 in	 a	 number	 of	 structural	 imbalances,	 including	 highly	 resource-	
and	 energy-intensive	 production.	 Now	 China	 has	 entered	 a	 stage	 of	 growth	
in	which	metal	and	energy	intensities	(that	is,	consumption	per	unit	of	GDP)	
are	exceptionally	strong.	This	will	 significantly	add	to	 the	global	pressure	 to	
balance	 the	 supply	 of,	 and	 demand	 for,	 resources	 and	 energy	 products,	 and	
the	impact	on	world	markets	for	these	products	is	likely	to	be	intense	(Garnaut	
and	 Song	 2006).	 Confronting	 this	 challenge	 will	 require	 China	 to	 accelerate	
its	pace	of	structural	change	by	moving	more	quickly	towards	higher	valued-
added	industrial	production	and	the	service	sector	and	by	adopting	resource-	
and	 energy-saving	 technologies	 in	 all	 productive	 sectors.	 Reforming	 the	
pricing	systems	for	energy	and	resources	so	that	prices	truly	reflect	the	balance	
China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development
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between	supply	and	demand	will	be	critical	in	this	regard.	Such	pricing	reforms	
will	 enhance	 supply	 capacities	 and	 encourage	 resource-	 and	 energy-saving	
technological	change,	substitutions	for	resource	use	and	conservation.	
As	one	of	 the	 largest	economies	and	the	 largest	carbon	emitter	 in	 the	world,	
China	 needs	 to	 confront	 environmental	 degradation	 and	 climate	 change	
by	 moving	 more	 rapidly	 towards	 a	 low-carbon	 growth	 economy.	This	 is	 not	
only	for	the	health	and	welfare	of	China’s	own	population,	but	for	the	world	
to	 stand	 any	 chance	 of	 achieving	 the	 goal	 of	 significantly	 reducing	 global	
emissions	 before	 catastrophic	 problems	 occur	 (Stern	 2007;	 Garnaut	 2008).	 In	
so	 doing,	 China	 will	 need	 to	 overcome	 many	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 the	














output	 and	 carbon	 emissions	 through	 the	 absorption,	 mass	 production	 and	
improvement	of	green	technologies	from	the	developed	countries.	Government	






investment,	which	has	contributed	 to	 the	 rise	 in	global	 imbalances	 in	 recent	
decades	and	to	numerous	structural	problems	within	China	as	well.	While	not	
all	of	 the	remedies	 lie	 in	China’s	hands,	 there	 is	now	widespread	recognition	
that	 a	 rebalancing	of	 growth	 is	 called	 for,	 in	 the	direction	of	 a	 strategy	 that	
relies	more	heavily	on	the	growth	of	domestic	consumption	and	productivity.	
Boosting	domestic	consumption	will	take	time	but	there	are	some	clear	reform	
options	 that	will	play	a	positive	role.	Song	et	al.	 (forthcoming),	 for	example,	
show	 that	 an	effective	way	of	boosting	domestic	demand	 is	 to	 accelerate	 the	
pace	 of	 ‘urbanising’	migrant	 workers	 (estimated	 to	 have	 reached	 160	 million	
Chinese economic reform and development
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in	 China	 in	 2009)	 by	 granting	 these	 workers	 urban	 residency,	 which	 would	
change	their	consumption	behaviour.	This	particular	task	can	be	accomplished	
only	 by	 deepening	 institutional	 reforms	 affecting	 labour	 mobility	 and	 the	







a	 range	 of	 imbalance	 issues.	 Low	 domestic	 consumption	 is	 just	 one	 of	 many	
indicators	that	China’s	growth	strategy	needs	to	be	readjusted	as	far	as	its	social	
impact	 is	concerned.	For	example,	 the	World	Bank	(2009)	has	found	that	the	
responsiveness	of	poverty	 reduction	 to	 economic	growth	has	 fallen	 in	 recent	
years.	Rising	income	inequality	and	widening	regional	disparities,	along	with	
uneven	 access	 to	 health	 services	 and	 social	 welfare	 systems,	 are	 some	 of	 the	
most	 undesirable	 outcomes	 associated	 with	 the	 rapid	 economic	 growth	 of	








Strengthening	 local	 public	 finance	 through	 reforming	 the	 current	 system	 of	
intergovernmental	 transfer	 payments	 and	 improving	 the	 health	 system	 will	
also	be	critical	if	the	government	is	to	achieve	its	objective	of	more	equitable	
development.	
Finally,	China	 is	 likely	 to	become	 the	 largest	economy	 in	 the	world	by	2030,	
regardless	of	 the	measurement	used	 (Maddison	2001).	China’s	rise	as	a	global	
economic	 powerhouse	 will	 thrust	 on	 it	 increasing	 responsibilities	 in	 a	 range	
of	 global	 affairs—whether	 it	 wants	 those	 responsibilities	 or	 not.	 China	 will	
thus	be	expected,	and	will	surely	find	it	desirable,	to	contribute	positively	to	
global	stability,	progress	and	prosperity	through	cooperation	with	other	players	
in	 the	 global	 system.	 High	 on	 the	 agenda	 for	 China’s	 strategic	 engagement	
are	 reducing	global	 imbalances,	 reforming	 the	 international	financial	 system,	
















only	by	efficiency,	but	 also	 sustainability	 and	equity	 considerations.	 Indeed,	
the	overarching	challenge	for	China	in	the	decades	ahead	is	to	successfully	shift	
into	this	new	mode	of	growth.	This	will	not	be	possible	unless	China	tackles	
the	 overarching	 task	 that	 remains	 unfinished:	 completing	 the	 transition	 to	 a	
true	market	economy	by	further	reforming	the	country’s	 factors	markets	and	
carrying	 out	 more	 comprehensive	 institutional	 reforms—in	 the	 economic	







It	 begins	 with	 Ross	 Garnaut’s	 (Chapter	 2)	 analysis	 of	 the	 turning	 period	 in	
Chinese	development.	Garnaut	presents	a	new	conceptual	framework	based	on	
Arthur	Lewis’s	model	of	economic	development	in	a	labour-surplus	economy,	
which	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	 understanding	 China’s	 transition	 through	 the	
end	of	this	period	of	labour	surplus	and	beyond.	He	reflects	on	chapters	in	the	
2006	China	Update	book,	The Turning Point in China’s Economic Development,	
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reflected	in	the	discourse	about	the	‘Beijing	Consensus’	versus	the	‘Washington	






sees	China’s	 reform	and	development	 as	being	perfectly	 compatible	with	 the	
Washington	 Consensus,	 and	 the	 ‘China	 model’	 as	 a	 process	 of	 convergence	
towards	 neoclassical	 ideals.	 Yao	 describes	 the	 Chinese	 government	 as	 a	
‘disinterested’	government	that	has	managed	to	remain	detached	from	various	
social	 groups	 within	 China	 rather	 than	 being	 captured	 by	 exclusive	 interest	
groups.	 This	 ‘disinterest’—rather	 than	 its	 authoritarianism—has	 enabled	
growth-enhancing	 policies,	 which,	 while	 creating	 winners	 as	 well	 as	 losers,	
have	collectively	delivered	higher	living	standards	across	the	nation	in	the	past	











wide	 range	 of	 intergovernmental	 relations	 can	 be	 categorised.	 Zhang	 argues	
that	 most	 industrialised	Western	 countries	 fall	 into	 Structure	 1,	 represented	
by	the	combination	of	bottom-up	personnel	relationships	and	top-down	fiscal	
relationships.	China’s	evolving	central–local	relations	during	the	reform	period	





be	 top-down	 personnel	 and	 top-down	 fiscal	 (Structure	 3),	 while	 provincial–
local	 relations	 become	 increasingly	 bottom-down	 personnel,	 top-down	 fiscal	
(Structure	1).	For	the	successful	evolution	towards	Structure	1	for	all	levels	of	
intergovernmental	relations	in	China,	Zhang	sees	two	critical	requirements:	the	
strengthening	of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 the	deepening	 of	 grassroots	democracy	






that	 relates	 economic	 development	 to	 metal	 usage	 and	 shed	 light	 on	 China’s	
future	path	of	ferrous-metal	demand	by	referencing	the	experience	of	relevant	













Commonwealth	 of	 Independent	 States,	Western	 Europe,	 Japan	 and	 emerging	
Asia.	
The	global	and	local	environmental	consequences	of	China’s	rapid	growth	and	







them	 is	 another.	 On	 this	 front,	 he	 recognises	 that	 the	 (lack	 of)	 reliability	 of	
China’s	energy	and	GDP	statistics	makes	it	difficult	to	assess	real	progress	while	
raising	the	issue	of	credibility	as	well.	Moreover,	the	conflicting	objectives	of	
lower-level	 governments	 could	 result	 in	 actions	 that	 counteract	 rather	 than	
support	national-level	environmental	objectives.	These	issues	notwithstanding,	
he	 provides	 considerable	 and	 detailed	 evidence	 of	 the	 achievements	 to	 date	
in	 terms	 of	 energy	 conservation	 and	 carbon-intensity	 reductions.	 Zhang	
concludes	that	the	likelihood	of	China	achieving	its	environmental	goals	rests	
on	 the	 strengthening	of	 existing	policies,	 industrial	 restructuring	 away	 from	
highly	energy-consuming,	polluting	and	resource-intensive	industries	and	the	
cooperation	of	local	governments.





exist	 between	 western	 China	 and	 the	 other	 regions—most	 prominently,	 the	
east,	where	the	vast	share	of	China’s	industrialisation	has	occurred	throughout	
time,	 and	 in	 particular,	 throughout	 the	 reform	 period.	 Golley’s	 analysis	 of	









global	 	 integration.	 Xiao	 Geng	 (Chapter	 8),	 and	 Rod	 Tyers	 and	 Ying	 Zhang	
(Chapter	 9)	 contribute	 to	 the	 continuing	 renminbi	 exchange-rate	 debate.	
Both	 chapters	begin	by	 reflecting	on	 the	 international	pressure	 for	 renminbi	
appreciation,	 which	 stems	 from	 the	 expectations	 of	 the	 Balassa–Samuelson	
hypothesis	 (BSH):	 a	 developing	 country	 experiencing	 productivity	 catch-
up	 in	 its	 tradable	goods	sectors	 is	 likely	 to	experience	a	 rising	real	exchange	
rate	as	a	consequence	of	the	associated	rise	 in	wages	and	non-tradable	sector	
prices.	 Focusing	on	 the	problem	of	 global	 imbalances,	 Xiao	 takes	 it	 as	 given	




global	 imbalances:	 cheap	 money.	 This,	 he	 argues,	 has	 created	 property	 and	
stock-market	bubbles	all	over	the	world,	including	in	China,	and	has	also	had	a	
significant	impact	on	driving	down	the	prices	of	Chinese	goods	(thereby	keeping	
the	 real	 exchange	 rate	 low).	Xiao	 calls	 for	 a	higher	Chinese	 interest	 rate	 and	
improved	capital-control	mechanisms	to	combat	this,	by	ensuring	that	capital	
flows	 into	 efficient	 investments—whether	 domestic	 or	 international—rather	
than	towards	speculative	and	inefficient	investments.	He	closes	by	noting	that	
the	rise	in	Chinese	prices	in	the	future	can	achieve	the	necessary	real	exchange	
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along	 with	 the	 slowing	 of	 trade	 reforms.	They	 then	 explain	 clearly	 why	 the	
setting	of	the	renminbi	rate	is	not	as	discretionary	for	the	Chinese	authorities	as	
suggested	by	critics	and	that,	should	international	pressure	result	in	a	nominal	
appreciation	 either	 via	 a	 monetary	 contraction	 or	 via	 export	 disincentives,	
the	 consequences	 would	 be	 harmful	 for	 Chinese	 and	 global	 interests.	 Both	
this	 chapter	 and	 Xiao’s	 demonstrate	 the	 importance	 of	 understanding	 the	










during	 the	period	of	 analysis	 to	 the	 increased	 resource	demand	by	a	 rapidly	





attractive	 alternative	 locations	 for	 labour-intensive	 manufacturing,	 they	 are	
likely	to	be	the	destinations	of	choice	for	China’s	increasingly	large	FDI	outflows.	
For	developing	Asia,	on	average	at	least,	China’s	FDI	success	is	a	win-win	story.













East	 Asian	 policy	 response	 that	 emphasises	 rebalancing	 growth	 away	 from	
exports	and	towards	domestic	markets,	particularly	in	the	case	of	China.	Their	
findings	caution	against	a	possible	policy	backlash	against	openness	to	foreign	
Chinese economic reform and development
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trade	 arising	 from	 the	 newly	 found	 enthusiasm	 for	 rebalancing	 growth	 and	





orders	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2008,	 it	 was	 expected	 that	 the	 most	 significant	
impacts	would	fall	on	rural	migrants—in	terms	of	either	employment	or	wage	
reductions—and	 indeed	 millions	 of	 laid-off	 migrants	 lamented	 lost	 jobs	 and	
protested	over	closed	factories.	Drawing	on	the	panel	surveys	of	rural–urban	
migrants	 and	 rural	 households	 in	 the	 Rural-Urban	 Migration	 in	 China	 and	
Indonesia	(RUMiCI)	Project,	Kong,	Meng	and	Zhang	find,	however,	only	very	












Section	 III	 of	 the	 book	 focuses	 on	 ‘Policy	 and	 reforms:	 unfinished	 tasks’.	 It	
begins	with	Wing	Thye	Woo’s	depiction	(Chapter	13)	of	the	Chinese	economy	
as	 a	 speeding	car	 that	 is	 running	 the	 risk	of	 three	potential	 types	of	 failure.	
Fiscal	instability	and	a	slowdown	in	productivity	growth	are	discussed	as	two	
potential	 ‘hardware’	 failures—or	 breakdowns	 in	 a	 key	 economic	 mechanism.	

























for	 labour,	 land,	 capital,	 resources	 and	 the	 environment,	 which	 Huang	 and	
Wang	interpret	as	providing	subsidy	equivalents	for	producers,	exporters	and	
investors.	While	this	has	clearly	been	beneficial	for	China’s	economic	growth	in	









exhibited	uniquely	 ‘Chinese	 characteristics’	 and	Cai	 Fang	 and	Meiyan	Wang	
(Chapter	 15)	 show	 that	 urbanisation	 is	 no	 exception.	 Their	 chapter	 begins	
with	evidence	that	China	has	already	reached	the	Lewis	turning	‘point’,	which	
they	point	out	is	in	fact	more	a	transitional	‘period’,	beginning	in	2004.	Their	
investigation	 of	 recent	 trends	 in	 rural-to-urban	 migration	 and	 more	 general	
changes	in	the	labour	market	shows	that	agriculture	no	longer	serves	as	a	pool	
of	 surplus	 labour,	but	 rather	 that	 rural	workers’	migration	 to	and	settlement	




in	 the	 implementation	 of	 policies	 that	 control	 and	 even	 restrict	 the	 process	
of	 rural-to-urban	 migration—as	 exemplified	 by	 China’s	 hukou system.	While	
acknowledging	progress	in	reforming	the	hukou system	to	date,	Cai	and	Wang	
explain	that	impediments	in	the	system	have	resulted	in	the	transformation	of	
farmers	 into	 migrant	 workers	 without	 entitlement	 to	 crucial	 public	 services	
and	social	protection	in	their	urban	destinations,	thereby	driving	urbanisation	
Chinese economic reform and development
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with	 Chinese	 characteristics.	 Further	 hukou reforms	 are	 seen	 as	 critical	 for	
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 The turning period in China’s 
economic development: a 
conceptual framework and 










There	 is	 now	 compelling	 evidence	 that	 the	 period	 of	 labour	 surplus	 and	
reasonably	steady	real	wages	for	unskilled	workers—supported	by	continuing	





Four	years	ago,	 the	China	Update	book	carried	 the	 title	The Turning Point in 
China’s Economic Development (Garnaut	and	Song	2006).	This	volume	began	an	
intense	discussion	of	the	idea	that	China	was	at	or	close	to	the	important	transition	
point	from	a	labour-surplus	to	a	labour-scarce	economy	(Garnaut	2006;	Garnaut	





workshop	are	being	published	in	a	special	issue	of	the	China Economic Journal 
in	2010.	Cai	and	Wang	(in	this	volume)	suggest	a	precise	date—2004—for	the	
turning	point.
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Chapter	 2	 in	 the	 2006	 volume	 by	 Garnaut	 and	 Huang	 (2006),	 including	 the	
macroeconomic	survey	of	the	Chinese	economy,	summarised	the	accumulating	
evidence	of	labour	shortages	in	parts	of	the	country	and	accelerating	rates	of	
wage	 increases.	 It	 touched	 on	West	 Indian	 economist	 Arthur	 Lewis’s	 theory	






into	 membership	 of	 the	World	Trade	 Organisation	 (WTO)	 in	 2001—far	 from	
increasing	 problems	 of	 unemployment,	 as	 many	 had	 feared—contributed	 to	
an	 acceleration	 of	 internationally	 oriented	 growth.	 The	 continued	 strength	

















turning	 point	 in	 China	 and	 examines	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 current	 and	
prospective	tendencies.	The	conceptual	material	reproduces	the	main	content	
of	a	paper	that	will	be	published	in	the	special	issue	on	the	turning	point	in	
the	 China Economic Journal (Garnaut	 forthcoming).	The	 empirical	 content	 of	
the	chapter	updates	Garnaut	 and	Huang	 (2006)	 and	Cai	 and	Wang	 (2006)	by	
drawing	on	and	citing	mainly	other	papers	 in	 that	 special	 issue	of	 the	China 
Economic Journal.	


























in	 rural	 areas	with	migration	 (with	 the	 same	output	 and	 less	people).	 In	 the	
early	 stages	 of	 expansion	of	 the	modern	 economy,	however,	 and	perhaps	 for	
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return	on	investment	and	an	increasing	profit	share	of	modern-sector	income.	









treatments	 of	 the	 subject—and	 highly	 relevant	 to	 recent	 Chinese	 reality,	 an	
increasing	excess	of	savings	over	investment	causes	the	rate	of	growth	of	output	
to	be	unnecessarily	low.	In	the	labour-surplus	economy,	this	does	not	lead	to	
increasing	unemployment	of	domestic	 resources.	Rather,	 it	 leads	 to	economic	













With	 rising	 returns	 on	 investment	 and	 a	 rising	 profit	 and	 therefore	 savings	




In	 the	 rural	 sector,	 the	 marginal	 product	 of	 labour	 remains	 well	 below	 the	
customary	 minimum	 income	 level.	 Expansion	 of	 the	 modern	 sector	 and	
migration	 from	 the	village	 introduce	no	pressure	 to	 economise	on	 the	use	of	
labour	in	production.	Average	standards	of	 living	rise	 in	the	village,	without	
noticeably	 affecting	 the	 customary	 income	 levels	 of	 the	 low-income	 workers	
who	are	available	for	emigration	to	the	modern	sector.	
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In	 the	 labour-surplus	 economy,	 comparative	 advantage	 in	 international	 trade	
is	 initially	 in	 small	 volumes	 of	 commodity	 exports,	 before	 the	 emergence	 of	
a	dynamic	modern	sector.	Modern	economic	growth	and	the	development	of	














of	 increase	 in	 inequality.	The	 faster	 the	 rate	of	growth,	however,	 the	greater	
will	be	 the	 rate	of	 emigration	 from	rural	 to	urban	areas,	 the	quicker	will	be	















in	 labour-intensive	production	 in	 the	modern	sector	 to	 fall.	The	combination	
of	lower	profitability	of	investment,	and	of	lower	savings	accompanied	by	the	
usual	home	bias	in	investment,	is	likely	to	reduce	the	share	of	investment.	
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All	other	things	being	equal,	one	would	expect	the	rate	of	growth	of	output	
to	 fall	with	 the	 share	of	 investment	 in	expenditure.	This	 is	not,	however,	an	
inevitable	accompaniment	of	the	turning	point	in	economic	development.	There	
are	two	circumstances	 in	which	there	will	be	no	fall	 in	the	rate	of	growth	in	
output.	 One	 of	 these	 circumstances	 could	 arise	 if,	 before	 the	 turning	 point,	
savings	fell	short	of	investment,	giving	rise	to	a	surplus	in	external	trade	and	
current	 payments.	This	 would	 be	 a	 case	 in	 which	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 before	
the	 turning	 point	 was	 unnecessarily	 low	 and	 therefore	 the	 turning	 point	 of	
economic	development	was	unnecessarily	delayed.	In	this	case,	the	rebalancing	





growth	 increases	 to	 balance	 a	 reduced	 rate	 of	 investment	 and	 reduced	 rate	


















The	 critical	 contribution	 of	 rapid	 growth	 before	 the	 turning	 point	 to	 the	
reduction	in	inequality	is	its	bringing	forward	in	time	the	point	at	which	labour	
becomes	 scarce	 and	 labour	 incomes	 rise.	 The	 critical	 contribution	 of	 rapid	
growth	after	 the	 turning	point	 to	 the	reduction	 in	 inequality	 is	 to	accelerate	
the	increase	in	real	wages	and	rural	living	standards	relative	to	incomes	from	
ownership	of	capital.
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The	changes	in	labour’s	share	of	income	before	and	after	the	turning	point	are	
one	 explanation	 of	 the	 ‘Kuznets	 curve’—the	 observed	 tendency	 for	 modern	
economic	 growth	 to	 at	 first	 exacerbate	 and	 to	 later	 reduce	 inequality	 in	 the	





substantially	 more	 rapidly	 than	 it	 is	 augmented	 by	 natural	 increase.	 If	 the	
modern	 sector	 of	 the	 labour-surplus	 economy	 grows	 too	 slowly	 relative	 to	







strongly,	 the	 increase	 in	 real	 wages	 increases	 domestic	 costs	 relative	 to	 the	













whose	 competitiveness	 is	 declining),	 they	 could	 seek	 to	 tighten	 expenditure	
policy	in	an	attempt	to	hold	inflation	to	low	levels.	This	generates	a	tendency	
to	surplus	in	external	trade	and	payments.	For	a	while,	this	reduces	the	rate	of	




Any	protection	of	old,	 labour-intensive	 industries	 that	comes	with	avoidance	
of	appreciation	in	the	foreign	exchange	value	of	domestic	currency	turns	out	
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to	 be	 temporary.	 The	 temporary	 respite	 comes	 with	 potentially	 large	 costs:	
the	economy	will	experience	unnecessary	inflation	and	needlessly	forgo	some	
increase	in	economic	output,	real	wages	and	living	standards.	In	the	worst	case,	
the	 inflation	 will	 destabilise	 aspects	 of	 political	 as	 well	 as	 economic	 life	 and	
indirectly	 lead	to	 larger	 losses	 in	economic	growth	and	potential	 increases	 in	
living	standards.
Comparative	 advantage	 in	 foreign	 trade	 after	 the	 turning	 point	 shifts	 out	 of	
labour-intensive	products	into	more	capital-intensive	and	technologically	more	
sophisticated	goods	and	services.	These	more	technologically	complex	products	
require	 higher-quality	 inputs	 of	 human	 resources	 (education	 and	 training)	
and	 infrastructure	 for	communications,	finance	and	regulatory	arrangements.	




Real-world variations of the stylised surplus-
labour model
Like	 any	 model,	 the	 Lewis	 model	 of	 the	 labour-surplus	 economy	 embodies	
simplifications	 of	 reality.	 Some	 of	 these	 simplifications	 materially	 affect	 its	
application	to	analysis	of	contemporary	Chinese	economic	development.	This	





differentiated	 barriers	 to	 movement	 between	 various	 rural	 areas	 and	 cities.	





has	 been	 absorbed	 fully	 into	 the	 modern	 economy	 and	 that	 the	 real	 wages	
demanded	by	potential	immigrants	from	that	rural	region	begin	to	rise	strongly,	
while	 there	 is	 surplus	 labour	 and	 availability	of	 labour	 at	 ‘traditional’	wages	
elsewhere.	Relatively	low-skilled	labour	could	become	relatively	scarce	and	real	
wages	could	rise	in	some	cities,	while	it	is	available	at	lower	costs	in	others.






change	out	of	 simple,	 labour-intensive	products	 and	 techniques,	while	 lower	
wages	persist	and	labour-intensive	production	continues	to	prosper	and	expand	
elsewhere.	 Similarly	 in	 the	 rural	 economy,	 labour	 becomes	 relatively	 scarce,	
living	 standards	 rise	 rapidly	 and	 production	 shifts	 out	 of	 labour-intensive	
activities	in	some	villages	while	labour	remains	abundant	in	others.	
The	 surplus-labour	 model’s	 second	 major	 departure	 from	 reality	 is	 the	
assumption	that	there	is	a	stable	conventional	standard	of	living	for	potential	
migrants	 among	 rural	 residents	 until	 there	 has	 been	 sufficient	 emigration	 to	
raise	the	marginal	product	of	rural	labour	above	that	standard.	Even	in	the	early	
















available	 to	 the	urban	economy.	This	has	been	bringing	 forward	 the	 turning	
period	in	China’s	economic	development.	In	combination	with	the	demographic	




The	 fourth	 major	 departure	 is	 that	 the	 real	 economy	 does	 not	 contain	 only	
‘traditional’	and	‘modern’	sectors.	There	is	also	a	government	sector	that	provides	
services	and	modifies	demand	and	supply	for	various	types	of	labour,	and	affects	
living	 standards	 in	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas.	 The	 government	 sector	 supplies	
inputs	that	are	critical	to	economic	growth.	The	government	sector’s	command	
over	resources	and	also	its	role	in	providing	essential	inputs	for	development	




















turning	 period.	 Its	 effects	 are,	 however,	 larger	 during	 and	 after	 the	 turning	
period,	as	growth	comes	to	make	larger	demands	on	infrastructure,	education	
and	 skills,	 financial	 services	 and	 the	 sound	 regulation	 of	 private	 economic	
activity.	












large	 underemployment	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 and	 potential	 productivity	
gain	 from	 transferring	 workers	 from	 rural	 to	 urban	 employment	 created	 the	
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conditions	 for	 economic	 growth	 within	 the	 labour-surplus	 economy.	 For	 a	
couple	of	decades	after	the	start	of	reform,	real	wages	of	migrant	workers	had	







point	 in	 economic	 development.	 Rising	 food	 prices	 and	 various	 government	






















had	 lifted	 sharply	 from	 about	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 and	 had	 remained	 in	
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These	 generalisations	 were	 based	 on	 general	 wage	 data,	 mixing	 skilled	 and	
unskilled	 elements.	 A	 look	 at	 the	 forward-looking	 data	 for	 unskilled	 labour	
pointed	 to	 a	 likely	 special	 tightening	 of	 the	 market	 for	 unskilled	 migrant	
labour.	China’s	rapid	demographic	transformation	following	the	rapid	decline	
in	 fertility	 in	 the	 late	1970s	 and	1980s	meant	 that	 the	 total	 labour	 force	was	
now	 hardly	 growing	 at	 all,	 and	 any	 significant	 migration	 out	 of	 the	 villages	
caused	 the	 rural	 labour	 force	 to	 decline.	These	 tendencies	 would	 strengthen	
over	time.	The	general	decline	in	the	labour	force	would	be	especially	sharp	for	
unskilled	workers,	 as	 increasing	public	 investment	 in	 education	applied	 to	 a	
falling	number	of	children	was	increasing	the	proportion	of	new	members	of	the	
labour	force	whose	education	removed	them	from	the	pool	of	‘unskilled’	labour.	


















the	 proportion	 of	 that	 group	 available	 for	 unskilled	 work	 would	 fall	 rapidly	
with	expansion	and	improvement	of	the	quality	of	education.	
Cai	and	Wang	thought	that	China	had	reached	the	turning	point.
The evidence in 2010
The	 chapters	 in	 The Turning Point in China’s Economic Development	 in	 2006	
were	noting	early	and	partial	evidence	of	China’s	entry	into	the	turning	period.	
Data	and	analysis	presented	in	the	special	issue	of	the	China Economic Journal 











workers	 returned	 to	 the	 countryside.	When	 retrenched	 workers	 returned	 to	
work	in	2009,	there	were	reports	of	downward	revision	of	terms	of	employment.	
The	Chinese	Government	 responded	 to	 the	 recessionary	 impact	of	 the	global	
financial	 crisis	 by	 launching	 the	 world’s	 greatest	 exercise	 in	 Keynesian	
expansionary	policy,	to	counteract	the	effects	of	global	recession	(Garnaut	with	
Llewellyn-Smith	2009).	The	success	of	the	expansionary	policies	meant	that	by	






















the	 four	years.	Application	of	 employment	 elasticities	 of	growth	 to	plausible	
rates	of	expansion	of	the	secondary	and	tertiary	sectors	suggests	employment	





Will	 labour-market	 realities	 allow	 such	 strong	 employment	 growth?	 The	
average	annual	increase	in	the	working-age	population	is	expected	to	fall	from	
about	seven	million	per	annum	in	2006–10	to	about	3.1	million	per	annum	in	
2011–15,	 and	 then	 to	 decline	 absolutely	 by	 about	 one	 million	 per	 annum	 in	
2016–20	 and	 five	 million	 per	 annum	 in	 2021–25.	 The	 rapidly	 increasing	
investment	 per	 student	 in	 education	 means	 that	 the	 emerging	 labour-market	
squeeze	 is	 tightest	 for	 low-skilled	 labour.	The	 focus	of	government	policy	 in	
recent	years	on	raising	incomes	and	services	in	rural	areas,	along	with	the	rapid	





Cai	 Fang	 (forthcoming)	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	 bases	 of	 the	 Chinese	
demographic	 data	 and	 the	 answers	 all	 suggest	 risks	 of	 even	 greater	 labour-
market	 tightening	 in	 the	 period	 ahead.	 The	 periodic	 survey	 of	 agricultural	
costs	 suggests	 that	 the	 remaining	agricultural	 labour	potentially	available	 for	
migration	to	urban	employment	is	less	numerous	than	presumed	in	any	of	the	






fertility	 rates	 have	 fallen	 below	 those	 applied	 to	 the	 standard	 population	
projections.	
The	weight	of	the	evidence	points	to	a	reasonable	expectation	of	rapidly	rising	
real	 wages—and	 more	 rapidly	 for	 low-skilled	 workers—as	 the	 only	 means	
of	bringing	runaway	growth	 in	demand	for	 labour	back	 in	 line	with	 labour’s	
availability.
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policy?	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 four	 of	 the	 most	 important	 consequences,	 mention	 a	





since	 the	1980s	 towards	 increased	 inequality	 in	 income	distribution	 is	 likely	
to	be	reversed.	This	is	one	important	consequence.	The	rise	in	the	wage	share	
of	 income	is	 likely	to	be	reflected	in	an	increase	 in	the	consumption	share	of	
expenditure.	There	will	be	a	reduction	in	the	national	savings	rate.	
It	 is	 possible	 that,	 at	 least	 for	 a	 while,	 the	 investment	 rate	 will	 in	 fact	 rise.	
Whether	or	not	 this	 is	 the	case,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	China’s	 savings	 rate	will	 fall	
more	than	its	investment	rate.	This	will	reduce	the	external	surplus	in	trade	and	
current	 payments.	 It	 will	 therefore	 ease	 current	 international	 pressures	 over	
payments	imbalances	and	exchange	rates.	It	would	be	wise	for	China	to	ensure	
that	 total	 domestic	 demand—the	 sum	 of	 demand	 from	 private	 and	 public	
investment	and	consumption—expands	enough	to	ensure	that	this	is	the	case.	
The	 reduction	 in	 Chinese	 current	 external	 payments	 surpluses	 is	 therefore	 a	
second	 important	 consequence	 of	 moving	 through	 the	 turning	 period.	 This	
could	ease	tensions	with	other	countries—especially	the	United	States—which	
have	 identified	Chinese	surpluses	as	a	principal	cause	of	 their	own	economic	








The	 third	 important	 consequence	 of	 China	 moving	 through	 and	 beyond	 the	
turning	period	is	that	the	centre	of	China’s	comparative	advantage	in	international	
trade	will	shift	rapidly	from	a	fairly	narrow	range	of	labour-intensive	products	
to	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 more	 capital-intensive	 and	 technologically	 sophisticated	
products.	This	will	ease	some	dimensions	of	China’s	trade	problems	with	the	rest	
of	the	world	(perceptions	of	competitive	pressure	on	other	developing	countries	
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and	 heavily	 concentrated	 pressures	 for	 adjustment	 on	 particular	 sectors	 in	
industrialised	countries)	and	complicate	others	(competitive	pressures	will	be	




The	 fourth	 important	 consequence	of	 entering	 the	 turning	period	 involves	a	
policy	risk	to	economic	stability	and	growth	in	the	period	ahead.	Rising	real	
wages	 and	 the	 pressure	 of	 strong	 increases	 in	 demand	 for	 non-traded	 goods	
and	services	will	be	inflationary	unless	accompanied	by	a	combination	of	firm	
monetary	 policy	 and	 an	 appreciating	 renminbi.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Chinese	
authorities	might	be	tempted	to	maintain	the	fixed	exchange	rate	against	the	
US	 dollar	 to	 avoid	 adjustment	 pressures	 on	 export-oriented	 labour-intensive	
industries,	 which	 have	 played	 such	 an	 important	 part	 in	 Chinese	 economic	
growth	since	the	mid	1980s.	




to	 sterilise	 their	 monetary	 effects.	 The	 adjustments	 would	 occur	 through	
inflation.	
It	is	likely	that	the	authorities	would	respond	to	higher	inflation	by	tightening	
fiscal	 and	 monetary	 policies.	 This	 would	 unnecessarily	 reduce	 the	 rate	 of	
economic	growth	below	sustainable	levels	and	postpone	the	increase	in	Chinese	
living	standards	 that	can	come	 through	and	beyond	the	 turning	period.	The	
inflation	 and	 the	 delays	 in	 inequality	 reductions	 could	 be	 destabilising	 to	





there	 are	 mistakes	 in	 economic	 policy,	 and	 to	 one	 important	 implication	 for	
perceptions	of	the	growth	of	the	Chinese	economy.	
There	 is	 no	 basis	 for	 the	 expectation	 that	 China’s	 rate	 of	 growth	 in	 output	
per	worker	must	necessarily	fall	as	it	moves	through	and	beyond	the	turning	
period.	The	 rise	 in	 real	wages	 as	China	moves	 through	 the	 turning	period	 is	
likely	to	lead	to	an	increase	in	the	rate	of	total	factor	productivity	growth.	In	
the	nature	of	things,	this	will	be	concentrated	in	industries	producing	relatively	
sophisticated	 and	 capital-intensive	 products,	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 which	
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countries’	 frontiers	 of	 productivity	 and	 living	 standards	 reduces	 the	 scope	
of	 rapid	 productivity	 growth	 through	 ‘catching	 up’	 with	 the	 industrialised	
countries.	
Whether	 or	 not	 China	 succeeds	 in	 maintaining	 such	 high	 aggregate	 rates	 of	
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government	 is	 able	 to	mobilise	 large	amounts	of	 resources	 to	 tackle	 the	most	
urgent	 bottlenecks	 blocking	 growth	 and	 institutional	 transition.	 Indeed,	
the	issue	is	often	framed	in	the	context	of	the	‘Beijing	Consensus’	versus	the	




into Power: The Communist Party’s embrace of China’s private sector	and	‘Red	
capitalists	in	China:	the	party,	private	entrepreneurs,	and	prospects	for	political	












China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development
40
that	authoritarian	rule	is	necessary	to	sustain	these	pro-growth	policies	
and	 limit	 demands	 for	 greater	 equity	 and	 social	 welfare.	The	 Beijing	
Consensus	 therefore	 is	 antithetical	 to	 the	Washington	 Consensus	 and	
has	so	far	defied	the	logic	that	economic	development	inevitably	leads	
to	political	change	(Dickson,	2010:	i)	
This	 characterisation,	 however,	 neither	 captures	 the	 original	 meaning	 of	 the	
Beijing	Consensus	and	the	Washington	Consensus	nor	stands	the	test	of	reality.	
In	 Joshua	Ramo’s	 (2004)	 original	 formation,	 the	Beijing	Consensus	 comprises	
three	 elements—none	 of	 which	 is	 related	 to	 authoritarianism:	 1)	 innovation;	
2)	 equitable	 and	 sustainable	 development;	 and	 3)	 self-determination.3	 China’s	
own	history	also	rejects	the	thesis	of	pure	authoritarianism	and	high	levels	of	
government	involvement	in	regular	economic	activity.	The	Chinese	government	






by	 John	Williamson	 in	 1989.	When	 it	 comes	 to	 economic	 transition,	 one	 of	
the	 misinterpretations	 is	 to	 treat	 the	 Washington	 Consensus	 as	 advocating	
fast	 transition	 and	 to	 compare	 it	 with	 the	 Beijing	 Consensus,	 which	 is	 often	
regarded	 as	 a	 model	 of	 gradualism.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	Williamson	 (1990)	 did	
not	say	anything	about	the	speed	of	transition,	although	he	emphasised	market	










these	 features	 constitute	 a	 new	 model	 of	 economic	 growth	 or	 whether	 they	
are	 intermediate	yet	sometimes	necessary	steps	towards	the	traditional	model	
3	 Ramo’s	 ‘Beijing	 Consensus’	 itself	 can	 be	 debated.	 While	 self-determination	 can	 rightfully	 be	 used	 to	
describe	China’s	dealings	with	other	countries,	China’s	economic	growth	can	hardly	be	described	as	‘equitable’	
and	‘sustainable’—nor	is	it	driven	by	innovations.
China model and its future
41
of	 a	 market	 economy.	 The	 Chinese	 leadership	 adopted	 a	 gradual	 approach	
to	 transition	 because	 of	 its	 aversion	 to	 the	 serious	 risks	 associated	 with	 fast	
transition.	The	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party	 (CCP)	 made	 many	 serious	 mistakes	





can	be	understood	as	 reactions	 to	 the	unconventional	political	 and	economic	
circumstances	encountered	along	its	transitional	path.	For	example,	government	









the	 recommendations	 of	 the	 Washington	 Consensus—which	 in	 essence	 is	 a	
summary	of	policies	that	would	be	recommended	by	neoclassical	economics—
we	 might	 be	 surprised	 by	 the	 similarities	 in	 those	 two	 lists.	 In	Williamson’s	
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9.	 abolition	 of	 regulations	 that	 impede	 the	 entry	 of	 new	 firms	 or	 restrict	
competition
10.	provision	of	secure	property	rights.	















concern	 the	 government	 and	 the	 general	 population.	 The	 rate	 of	 corporate	





up.	 Its	 special	 economic	 zones	 have	 served	 as	 windows	 for	 China	 to	 reach	






Domestically,	 two	major	 themes	of	Chinese	reform	since	 the	1990s	have	been	
privatisation	 and	 deregulation.	 After	 15	 years	 of	 privatisation	 that	 started	
in	 the	 mid	 1990s,	 most	 of	 China’s	 state-owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs)	 have	 been	
released	into	private	hands	or	transformed	into	publicly	listed	companies.	Only	













is	 different	 from	 the	 so-called	 ‘neo-liberal	 doctrine’	 that	 adds	 to	 the	 list	 of	
capital	 account	 liberalisation,	 a	 floating	 exchange	 rate	 and,	 above	 all,	 the	
relentless	working	of	the	unbridled	market,	which	China	has	clearly	rejected.	
On	the	other	hand,	China	has	also	adopted	other	policies	frequently	prescribed	











The	 aim	 of	 China’s	 three-decade-long	 economic	 reform	 has	 been	 clear—that	
is,	to	establish	a	functioning	market	economy.	It	is	hard	to	imagine	that	China	
could	have	managed	to	grow	at	10	per	cent	per	annum	without	the	introduction	




a	mixture	of	military	rule	and	the	free	market.	At	 the	minimum,	 it	blurs	 the	
line	between	an	authoritarian	government	and	a	regulatory	government.	Many	
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The disinterested government





















because	 other	 groups,	 not	 similarly	 favoured,	 might	 be	 more	 productive.	 In	
contrast,	a	disinterested	government	is	autonomous	in	the	sense	that	it	is	free	








in	 the	 society.	Unless	 the	gaps	 lead	 to	 serious	 threats	 to	 its	 rule,	 however,	 a	
disinterested	government	will	have	little	incentive	to	correct	them.
The	Chinese	government	has	acted	as	though	it	has	been	disinterested	for	the	
past	 30	years.	This	 started	with	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 ‘growth	 consensus’	
4	 The	other	two	meanings,	according	to	Rind	(2002),	are	‘uninterested’	and	‘without	self	interests’	when	a	
person	examines	an	objective	existence.





in	 the	 mid	 1970s.	 The	 need	 was	 to	 discourage	 growing	 discontent	 and	 put	
economic	growth	at	the	centre	of	all	governmental	and	societal	endeavours.	
Looking	 back,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 Chinese	 government	 intentionally	 adopted	




the	 opportunity.	Yet	 that	 early	 adoption	 of	 the	 ‘Open-Door	 Policy’	 was	 not	
without	domestic	resistance.	The	special	economic	zones	enjoyed	an	abundance	
of	preferential	treatments	that	other	parts	of	the	country	envied.	The	export-




accession,	 it	 was	 widely	 believed	 that	 China	 would	 have	 to	 undergo	 painful	
structural	 adjustments	 in	 agriculture,	 automobile	 manufacturing,	 banking,	
telecommunications	and	retailing	if	it	were	to	join	the	WTO.	Amid	the	debate,	






























emerging	market	after	 they	 fulfilled	 their	planned	quotas.	While	 this	 system	
opened	up	a	wide	door	for	economic	incentives	to	play	a	role	in	SOE	decision	














Government	 policy	 towards	 migrant	 workers	 is	 another	 example	 of	 the	





end	of	 the	1990s,	however,	 it	had	become	clear	 that	 they	were	 indispensable	
in	 the	national	economy	as	China	became	 the	 ‘world’s	 factory’.	 It	 seems	 that	
urban	dwellers	had	gained	undue	benefits	with	the	government’s	suppression	
of	migrant	workers’	rights,	and	the	share	of	national	income	going	to	migrant	





The	 question	 remains	 why	 the	 Chinese	 government	 remained	 ‘disinterested’	
during	 the	 reform	 era?	 The	 CCP’s	 search	 for	 legitimacy	 is	 one	 of	 the	 major	
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reasons.	Despite	its	absolute	power,	the	CCP	has	never	been	free	to	ignore	the	
general	wishes	of	 the	people.	The	April	Fourth	Movement	 in	1976,	 the	June	
Fourth	 Movement	 in	 1989	 and	 numerous	 protests	 in	 subsequent	 years	 show	
that	people	are	quite	willing	 to	 stage	organised	 resistance.	 In	addition,	fiscal	
decentralisation	 during	 the	 1980s	 had	 considerably	 weakened	 the	 central	
government’s	 authority	 over	 local	 governments,	 making	 it	 more	 prudent	 in	
carrying	 out	 regional	 policies.	 International	 monitoring	 has	 also	 played	 an	
important	 role.	As	 it	has	 emerged	as	one	of	 the	 largest	 international	players,	









In	 societies	 with	 extreme	 social	 inequality—such	 as	 many	 of	 those	 with	
authoritarian	 regimes—forming	 an	 alliance	 with	 the	 strongest	 social	 groups	
provides	the	best	chance	for	the	government	to	survive	because	those	groups	










yet	 brutal	 land	 reform,	 the	 landed	 class	 was	 effectively	 eliminated	 and	 land	
distribution	became	equalised.	Large	businesses	originally	tied	to	the	nationalist	
government	were	nationalised.	By	the	early	1950s,	the	Mainland	and	Taiwan,	
despite	 their	 diametrically	 opposite	 ideological	 outlooks,	 were	 surprisingly	
similar	in	terms	of	social	structure	and	government	policies.	Like	the	communists	
on	 the	Mainland,	 the	nationalists	 in	Taiwan	carried	out	a	 thorough—though	
peaceful—land	 reform.	 Both	 governments	 established	 SOEs	 and	 extracted	
surpluses	 from	 agriculture	 in	 the	 hope	 of	 speeding	 up	 the	 industrialisation	
process.	Indeed,	the	Taiwanese	industrial	sector	extracted	more	surpluses	from	
agriculture	 through	 price	 cuts	 than	 its	 Mainland	 counterpart	 in	 the	 1950s.	
Between	1951	and	1960,	27	per	cent	of	Taiwan’s	capital	 formation	came	from	
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First,	 the	 government	 has	 delivered	 continuous	 economic	 growth	 and	 rising	
living	 standards	 to	 the	population.	One	of	 the	curious	 things	about	China	 is	
that	the	government	has	constantly	received	an	approval	rating	of	70	per	cent	
or	above,	no	matter	who	does	the	survey.7 		 The	reason	behind	this	 is	 that	the	
6	 Calculated	from	estimates	provided	by	Lee	(1971:Table	3,	p.	29).
7	 For	a	recent	independent	survey,	see	ISSS	(2009).





Second,	 the	 government	 has	 carried	 out	 specific	 programs	 that	 quickly	 and	







Third,	 the	 government	 has	 gradually	 begun	 to	 give	 more	 respect	 to	 people’s	
expressed	 interests	 in	 response	 to	 large-scale	protests.	The	policy	 change	 for	
migrant	 workers	 is	 but	 one	 example.	 Other	 examples	 include	 the	 passage	 of	





in	the	 long	run	favours	are	 likely	to	be	distributed	roughly	equally—at	 least	





down	 the	 institutional	 barriers	 and	 correct	 market	 imperfections	 that	 might	
stimulate	 new	 and	 threatening	 social	 groups.	 While	 the	 private	 business	
community	is	realising	the	importance	of	cultivating	the	government	for	larger	
profits,	it	is	the	government	itself,	its	cronies	and	government-controlled	SOEs	
that	 are	 quickly	 forming	 strong	 and	 exclusive	 interest	 groups.	 This	 is	 the	
result	of	the	CCP’s	two	political	strategies	to	improve	its	chances	of	continuous	
control	of	the	society.	One	is	its	transformation	to	become	an	all-people’s	party	
and	the	other	 is	 its	 intention	to	follow	the	Singaporean	model	to	merge	itself	
with	 the	 government.	 The	 first	 strategy	 is	 aimed	 at	 broadening	 its	 power	
base,	while	the	second	is	aimed	at	controlling	the	country	in	the	‘shell’	of	the	
government.	China	is,	however,	too	big	for	the	CCP	to	follow	the	Singaporean	
model	even	 if	 it	 is	a	model	worth	pursuing.	Being	an	all-people	party	means	
that	 the	CCP	gives	up	 its	political	 conviction	 to	 represent	 the	working	class.	
Since	there	are	no	other	major	political	organisations	in	the	country,	society	is	
left	alone	to	develop	along	the	trajectory	dictated	by	a	‘natural’	process—that	
















among	 major	 trading	 partners.	 Savings	 account	 for	 52	 per	 cent	 of	 GDP	 and	
consumption	 has	 dropped	 to	 a	 historic	 low.	 Whereas	 governments	 in	 most	





for	 the	 CCP	 to	 contain	 or	 discourage	 social	 discontent	 by	 administering	 the	
medicine	of	economic	growth	alone	.8	
More	 importantly,	 the	 government	 in	 its	 current	 form	 is	 cumbersome	 when	
dealing	with	multiple	goals	that	are	 increasingly	being	demanded	by	society.	
Concerted	 efforts	 to	 promote	 GDP	 growth	 will	 still	 result	 in	 infringements	
to	people’s	 economic	 and	political	 rights,	which	 in	 turn	will	 arouse	periodic	









to	 counterbalance	 the	 formation	 of	 strong	 and	 exclusive	 interest	 groups,	 to	
allow	 the	 government	 to	 deal	 with	 multiple	 goals	 and	 even	 to	 enhance	 the	
8	 The	figures	quoted	in	this	paragraph	are	from	the	NBS	website:	<www.stats.gov.cn>
China model and its future
51
CCP’s	own	rule.	While	the	prospect	of	a	multiparty	and	competitive	democracy	
is	not	 so	clear	at	 the	moment,	 societal	pressures	are	 forcing	 the	CCP	 to	open	
up	 the	 political	 process.	 There	 is	 a	 silent	 yet	 steadily	 growing	 civil	 society	
movement	pressing	the	government	to	show	greater	respect	for	people’s	rights.	
The	 Internet	 is	 serving	as	a	platform	not	 just	 for	 information	sharing	among	
concerned	citizens,	but	for	them	to	coordinate	public	protests	against	perceived	
government	 wrongdoing.	 The	 most	 powerful	 resistance,	 however,	 is	 likely	
to	 come	 from	 marginalised	 people	 and	 the	 ‘rights	 movements’	 representing	





of	 the	 benefits	 of	 economic	 growth	 in	 society,	 which	 will	 then	 render	 futile	
the	 CCP’s	 strategy	 of	 trading	 economic	 growth	 for	 people’s	 consent	 to	 its	
absolute	rule.	The	CCP	needs	to	act	now	to	enable	‘ordinary	people’	to	challenge	
privileged	 groups	 on	 an	 open	 and	 institutionalised	 platform.	 Indeed,	 this	
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How will China’s central–local 
governmental relationships 
evolve? An analytical 
framework and its implications 4
Yongsheng Zhang
Introduction
The	way	 in	which	 intergovernmental	 relationships	 evolve	 in	China	 is	 crucial	





From	 a	 fiscal	 perspective,	 decentralisation	 has	 three	 related	 dimensions:	




If	 decentralisation	 means	 an	 increase	 in	 own-source	 revenue	 (or	 taxation	




either	 through	 an	 increase	 in	 fiscal	 transfer	 payments	 or	 an	 increase	 in	 the	
taxation	autonomy	of	lower-level	governments.	In	the	former	case,	the	central	
government’s	controlling	capability	is	enhanced	with	decentralisation,	while	in	
the	 latter	 it	 is	 the	 local	government’s	controlling	capability	 that	 is	enhanced.	
Therefore,	different	forms	of	decentralisation	have	very	different	implications	
for	each	level	of	government	in	terms	of	controlling	capability.
The	 key	 principle	 of	 decentralisation	 is	 broadly	 accepted:	 jurisdiction	 over	
the	delivery	of	public	services	should	be	allocated	to	the	level	of	government	
closest	 to	 the	 citizen,	 unless	 such	 delivery	 can	 be	 taken	 on	 more	 effectively	
by	a	government	that	is	further	away.	Accordingly,	local	governments	should	
have	 more	 fiscal	 autonomy.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 has	 been	 a	 fact	 that,	 in	 most	
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countries,	 higher	 levels	 of	 government	 control	 most	 of	 the	 fiscal	 resources.	








Why	 do	 most	 countries—including	 Western	 countries	 (either	 unitary	 or	





























last	 section	 concludes	 the	 chapter	 and	 suggests	 how	 the	 framework	 can	 be	
applied	to	a	large	research	agenda	in	the	future.
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Intergovernmental relationships: a brief 
literature review
There	are	 three	 lines	of	research	on	 intergovernmental	relationships	 from	the	
perspective	of	vertical	fiscal	imbalances.	First,	according	to	classic	fiscal	theories	
(represented	by	Musgrave	1959	and	Oates	1972,	among	others),	a	strong	central	
government	 is	necessary	 to	achieve	 three	nationwide	goals:	 efficient	 resource	
allocation,	 equity	 and	 economic	 stability.	 These	 theories	 cannot,	 however,	
provide	 an	 accurate	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	 how	 much	 fiscal	 revenue	 the	
central	government	needs	to	control,	either	in	absolute	terms	or	as	a	proportion	
of	all	revenue.	It	seems,	according	to	these	theories,	that	either	unbalanced	or	






from	 a	 range	 of	 assumptions	 about	 incentive	 mechanisms,	 fiscal	 autonomy,	




inter-regional	 transfers	 of	 tax	 resources	 or	 increase	 the	 taxation	 costs.	There	
are,	 however,	 contradictory	 findings	 within	 this	 line	 of	 research,	 with	 some	
authors	emphasising	the	advantages	of	decentralisation	and	others	emphasising	
the	advantages	of	centralisation.
The	 third	 line	 comes	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 constitutional	 economics.	










governments	 through	 transfer	 payments.	 The	 second	 branch	 emphasises	 the	
1	 See,	for	instance,	Breton	(1996);	King	(1984);	Scott	(1952);	Hicks	(1984);	Courant	et	al.	(1979);	Boadway	
and	Tremblay	(2005).
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advantages	 of	 federal	 governments,	 as	 represented	by	Hamilton	 et	 al.	 (1787).	
In	Hamilton’s	 time,	 the	biggest	 challenge	 for	 the	American	 federalists	was	 to	
establish	a	 federal	government	from	the	confederation.	They	did	not	propose	
that	the	federal	government	control	most	of	the	nation’s	fiscal	revenue;	rather	
they	 repeatedly	 vowed	 that	 the	 power	 of	 the	 federal	 government	 should	 be	
strictly	limited.	Their	basic	position,	however,	was	to	emphasise	the	advantages	
of	 a	 strong	 federal	 government.	We	 treat	 their	 position,	 then,	 as	 being	 pro-
centralisation.
De	 Figureiredo	 and	Weingast	 (2005)	 and	Weingast	 (2005)	 represent	 the	 third	
branch.	They	emphasise	the	importance	of	the	power	balance	between	federal	
and	state	governments	for	a	self-enforcing	federalism.	They	begin	their	studies	
with	 two	 fundamental	 dilemmas	 of	 federalism:	 too	 strong	 a	 centre	 risks	
overwhelming	a	federation	by	acting	opportunistically	and	extracting	too	many	
rents;	 too	 weak	 a	 centre	 risks	 a	 federation’s	 collapse	 due	 to	 free-riding	 and	
insufficient	provision	of	public	goods.	The	twin	dilemmas	make	stable	federalism	







A new analytical framework and 
decentralisation
Based	on	the	theory	of	self-enforcing	federalism	(de	Figureiredo	and	Weingast	
2005),	Zhang	 (2005,	2008,	2009)	 further	develops	an	analytical	 framework	 to	
coordinate	the	three	branches	in	constitutional	economics.	He	further	divides	
governmental	controlling	capability	into	two	major	dimensions:	the	personnel	















Since	 both	 personnel	 and	 fiscal	 dimensions	 could	 be	 either	 bottom-up	 or	
top-down,	 the	 combinations	 of	 these	 two	 dimensions	 consist	 of	 four	 basic	
structures	 for	 vertical	 intergovernmental	 relationships	 (Table	 4.1).	 A	 vertical	
intergovernmental	 relationship	 will	 not	 be	 sustainable	 if	 it	 is	 unbalanced.	
Crisis	shocks	then	play	a	key	role	in	changing	the	structure	making	the	nation	
sustainable	 (Weingast	2005).	Vertical balance	can	be	achieved	through	a	 two-
way	 arrangement	 in	 personnel	 and	 fiscal	 dimensions.	Yet,	 vertical	 balance	 is	
not	sufficient	 for	a	nation	 to	achieve	good	economic	performance.	Horizontal 
balance	between	the	government	and	the	market	must	also	be	established,	which	
could	 be	 realised	 by	 checks	 and	 balances	 of	 a	 government’s	 power	 through	
constitutional	rule,	as	pointed	out	by	Buchanan	(1965),	Brennan	and	Buchanan	
(1980),	North	(1987)	and	North	and	Weingast	(1989).	






Structure 1 I . With good rule 
of law




II . Without good 
rule of law































In	Table	4.1,	Structure	1	 represents	 the	 combination	of	bottom-up	personnel	
relationships	 and	 top-down	 fiscal	 relationships.	 In	 the	 personnel	 dimension,	
the	 local	government	has	autonomy	(although	this	does	not	necessarily	mean	
‘election’;	autonomy	can	also	happen	in	a	feudal	or	authoritarian	regime),	while	











Soviet	 Union	 countries.	The	 central	 government	 is	 too	 powerful,	 controlling	
fiscal	 revenue	 and	 official	 appointments	 to	 lower-level	 governments.	 As	 de	
Figureiredo	 and	 Weingast	 (2005:127)	 indicate,	 ‘too	 strong	 a	 centre	 risks	
overwhelming	a	federation	by	acting	opportunistically	and	extracting	too	many	
rents’.	This	structure	is	neither	stable	nor	sustainable	in	the	long	run.	
Structure	 4	 is	 a	 relatively	 stable	 structure—such	 as	 fiscal	 federalism	 in	
China	 before	 1994	 or	 the	 UK–Hong	 Kong	 relationship	 before	 1997.	 To	 some	
extent,	 this	structure	has	established	a	vertical	balance	on	 intergovernmental	
relationships.	 Nonetheless,	 since	 the	 centre	 controls	 official	 appointments	 to	
local	governments,	local	governments	do	not	have	real	bargaining	power	against	
higher	levels	of	government.	The	central	government	might	easily	change	the	
fiscal	 arrangement.	 If	 the	 higher-level	 government	 was	 a	 democratic	 regime,	
or	 the	 higher-level	 government	 could	 not	 change	 its	 fiscal	 relationship,	 this	
structure	could	be	reasonably	sustainable.
Different	 structures	 have	 different	 effects	 on	 preventing	 governmental	
opportunistic	behaviour.	Correspondingly,	there	are	two	types	of	governmental	
opportunistic	 behaviour	 in	 the	 framework:	 vertical	 and	 horizontal.	 Vertical 
governmental opportunistic behaviour	 refers	 to	 the	 opportunistic	 behaviour	
between	 different	 levels	 of	 government.	 A	 balance	 of	 intergovernmental	
relationships	is	required	to	prevent	this.	Horizontal governmental opportunistic 
behaviour	refers	to	opportunistic	behaviour	in	the	market.	The	horizontal	checks	




the	 evolution	 of	 the	 division	 of	 labour	 was	 driven	 by	 increased	 transaction	
efficiency,	especially	related	to	institutions.	According	to	North	(1987),	economic	
performance	 is	 conditioned	 on	 the	 level	 of	 endogenous	 transaction	 costs	
resulting	from	governmental	opportunistic	behaviour.	His	idea	can	be	further	
extended	to	 two	types	of	vertical	and	horizontal	governmental	opportunistic	





the	 four	 structures,	 Structure	1	 is	 the	most	 self-enforcing	 structure	with	 the	
least	endogenous	transaction	costs.	Structures	2	and	3	are	not	self-enforcing	in	
the	long	run.	Structure	4	is	not	as	stable	as	Structure	1.
The	 framework	 developed	 in	 this	 chapter	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 explain	 the	
worldwide	decentralisation	trend	in	recent	decades.	There	are	good	examples	of	
decentralisation,	but	also	bad	ones	(Martinez-Vazquez	and	McNab	2003;	Fisman	
and	Gatti	2002).	Decentralisation	has	 resulted	 in	macroeconomic	volatility	 in	





there	 is	 a	 high	 correlation	 between	 decentralisation	 and	 corruption.	 Simply	
devolving	 fiscal	 power	 from	 central	 governments	 to	 regional	 elites	 without	
institutional	reforms	would	encourage	corruption.	Nonetheless,	Treisman	(2000)	
shows	no	 correlation	between	decentralisation	 and	corruption.	 Faguet	 (2004)	











Within	 Structure	 1(I),	 decentralisation	 would	 be	 effective.	 Nonetheless,	 if	
decentralisation	goes	too	far	and	the	local	government	has	too	much	taxation	
autonomy,	Structure	1(I)	will	jump	to	Structure	2.	Consequently,	decentralisation	
will	 cause	 more	 opportunistic	 behaviour	 from	 local	 governments	 and	 affect	
the	 stability	 and	 economic	 performance	 of	 the	 nation.	 Hence,	 no	 matter	
how	decentralised	 it	 is,	 remaining	within	Structure	1(I)	 is	 the	bottom	 line	of	
decentralisation	 for	 Western	 countries.	 Accordingly,	 the	 local	 government’s	
expenditure	should	be	expanded	mainly	through	fiscal	transfer	payments,	rather	
than	through	devolving	more	tax	autonomy.	Second,	government	power	must	








from	 a	 highly	 centralised	 starting	 point	 results	 in	 improved	 economic	
performance.	Further	decentralisation	beyond	a	certain	level,	however,	results	
in	negative	effects.	
This	 analytical	 framework	 can	 be	 used	 to	 understand	 a	 wide	 range	 of	




























1999).	 In	 this	 case,	 most	 people	 expected	 that	 the	 Australian Constitution 
provided	a	guarantee	to	make	the	states	financially	independent	of	the	federal	
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China’s vertical intergovernmental relations: 
past and current status 
Central–provincial government relations







local	authorities	 took	full	 responsibility	 for	 their	 revenues	and	expenditures,	
which	was	known	as	‘fenzaochifan’—that	is	‘each	province	eats	the	rice	in	its	
own	bowl’—or	fiscal	federalism	(Qian	and	Weingast	1997).	This	changed	China’s	
central–provincial	 relationship	 from	 Structure	 3	 to	 Structure	 4.	 In	 Structure	
4,	the	central	government	controlled	the	appointment	of	major	officials	in	the	
provinces,	but	no	longer	controlled	each	province’s	fiscal	revenue.	According	
to	 Qian	 and	 Roland	 (1998),	 Qian	 and	Weingast	 (1997)	 and	 Shirk	 (1993),	 the	
introduction	of	fiscal	 federalism	provided	strong	incentives	for	the	provinces	
to	 develop	 their	 economies.	 This	 resulted	 in	 most	 fiscal	 resources	 in	 China	
being	controlled	by	the	provinces.	The	fiscal	capability	of	the	Chinese	central	
government	 was	 insufficient.	 For	 instance,	 in	 1993,	 the	 share	 of	 central	
government	 revenue	 accounted	 for	 only	 22	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 nation’s	 total	 tax	
revenue	(Table	4.2).
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Table 4.2 Share of central and local governments in government revenue 
and expenditure (per cent)
Year Revenue Expenditure
Central Local Central Local
1978 15 .5 84 .5 47 .4 52 .6
1980 24 .5 75 .5 54 .3 45 .7
1985 38 .4 61 .6 39 .7 60 .3
1990 33 .8 66 .2 32 .6 67 .4
1991 29 .8 70 .2 32 .2 67 .8
1992 28 .1 71 .9 31 .3 68 .7
1993 22 .0 78 .0 28 .3 71 .7
1994 55 .7 44 .3 30 .3 69 .7
1995 52 .2 47 .8 29 .2 70 .8
1996 49 .4 50 .6 27 .1 72 .9
1997 48 .9 51 .1 27 .4 72 .6
1998 49 .5 50 .5 28 .9 71 .1
1999 51 .1 48 .9 31 .5 68 .5
2000 52 .2 47 .8 34 .7 65 .3
2001 52 .4 47 .6 30 .5 69 .5
2002 55 .0 45 .0 30 .7 69 .3
2003 54 .6 45 .4 30 .1 69 .9
2004 54 .9 45 .1 27 .7 72 .3
2005 52 .3 47 .7 25 .9 74 .1
2006 52 .8 47 .2 24 .7 75 .3
2007 54 .1 45 .9 23 .0 77 .0
2008 53 .3 46 .7 21 .3 78 .7
Source:	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2009,	China Statistical Yearbook 2009,	China	Statistics	Press,	
Beijing,	p.	263.




down	 fiscal	 grants	 from	 the	 central	 government	 to	 the	 provinces,	 but	 there	
were	also	bottom-up	‘transfer	payments’	from	the	provinces	to	the	centre.	In	
contrast	with	Western	national	governments,	 the	Chinese	central	government	
was	 somehow	financially	 reliant	 on	 the	provinces	 to	 support	 its	 expenditure	
before	1994.	
Structure	 4	 provided	 a	 relatively	 balanced	 vertical	 relationship	 between	 the	
centre	and	provinces,	in	which	the	provinces	had	more	autonomy	and	stronger	





Third,	 having	 experienced	 fiscal	 incapability	 for	 more	 than	 a	 decade,	 the	




growth	 of	 the	 central	 government’s	 revenue	 (Table	 4.2).	 The	 relationship	
between	 the	 central	government	 and	 the	provinces	 jumped	 from	Structure	4	




The	 rapid	 increase	 of	 the	 central	 government’s	 revenue	 came	 mainly	 from	









comes	 from	 the	 centrally	 controlled,	 large	 state-owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs),	







has	 converged	 with	 that	 of	 Western	 countries.	 The	 central	 government	
controls	 most	 of	 the	 nation’s	 fiscal	 resources	 and,	 financially,	 the	 provinces	
rely	heavily	on	transfer	payments.	The	difference	between	Structure	3	in	China	
and	Structure	1	in	Western	countries	is	in	the	personnel	dimension.	The	dual	
top-down	 arrangements	 in	 personnel	 and	 fiscal	 dimensions	 have	 produced	 a	
super	central	government	in	China.	Hence,	without	changing	the	status	of	the	
top-down	personnel	dimension,	simply	changing	China’s	fiscal	federalism	and	















The	 first	 is	 vertical	 governmental	 opportunistic	 behaviour	 of	 the	 provincial	
governments	over	the	local	governments.	Due	to	the	dual	top-down	arrangements	
in	the	two	dimensions,	local	governments	are	too	weak	to	play	games	with	the	
province.	 The	 second	 is	 horizontal	 governmental	 opportunistic	 behaviour.	
Since	 the	horizontal	 checks-and-balances	mechanism	 for	 the	government	has	
not	been	well	established	in	China,	to	solve	their	fiscal	 incapability	problems	
resulting	 from	 the	 opportunistic	 behaviour	 of	 the	 higher-level	 governments,	
local	governments	have	a	strong	incentive	to	act	opportunistically	and	extract	
rents	from	the	market.	This	in	turn	affects	economic	performance.
To	 solve	 the	fiscal	 incapability	problem	of	 local	 governments	 in	China,	 some	
have	 argued	 that	 local	 governments	 should	 have	 higher	 tax	 autonomy	 to	
match	 their	 expenditure.	 Nonetheless,	 as	 our	 analytical	 framework	 suggests,	
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term	 development.	 How	 will	 China’s	 vertical	 intergovernmental	 relationship	
evolve	in	the	future?	The	framework	developed	in	this	chapter	sees	four	major	
possible	scenarios.





the	 appointment	 of	 the	 major	 local	 officials	 and	 most	 of	 the	 province’s	 fiscal	
revenue.












two	 types	 of	 governmental	 opportunistic	 behaviour.	 Without	 development	
of	 grassroots	 democracy	 and	 improving	 the	 checks-and-balances	 mechanism	
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Scenario 2: Structure 1(I)—a good market economy
As	 far	 as	 we	 can	 see	 from	 the	 practices	 around	 the	 world,	 this	 structure	 is	
probably	the	most	stable	and	sustainable	one.	It	not	only	has	a	stable	vertical	
structure,	it	has	an	effective	horizontal	checks-and-balances	mechanism.	China	
already	 has	 some	 of	 the	 conditions	 in	 place	 required	 for	 evolution	 to	 this	
structure.
In	 the	 two	 vertical	 dimensions,	 China’s	 fiscal	 arrangement	 at	 the	 central–
provincial	 level	 is	already	very	similar	 to	 that	 in	Western	countries.	The	key	
for	China	to	shift	to	Structure	1(I)	is	to	reform	its	arrangement	in	the	personnel	
dimension,	 or	 to	 develop	 its	 democracy.	 Although	 grassroots	 elections	 are	
developing	steadily	in	China,	they	are	still	at	a	relatively	early	stage.	To	what	







Scenario 3: Structure 1(II)—a bad market economy




democracy.	 This	 would	 result	 in	 the	 prevalence	 of	 horizontal	 governmental	
opportunistic	behaviour	(Liu	and	Yang,	2001).	
At	 present,	 vested	 interests—instead	 of	 ideology—have	 become	 the	 biggest	
impediment	to	China	deepening	its	economic	and	political	reforms.	Corruption	
and	 social	 injustice	 are	 serious.	 The	 law	 has	 already	 institutionalised	 some	
privileges	 of	 interest	 groups	 and	 the	 market	 has	 some	 serious	 distortions.	 If	
this	 situation	 does	 not	 change,	 China	 is	 likely	 to	 evolve	 to	 this	 structure	 in	
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Scenario 4: Structure 3 at the central–provincial level and Structure 








in	 the	near	 future.	Another	 is	 that	 the	fiscal	 relationship	between	provincial	
and	local	governments	be	institutionalised	by	the	TSS	as	well.	If	this	were	to	
happen,	 the	 vertical	 intergovernmental	 relationships	 within	 each	 province	
would	be	Structure	1	and	substantially	similar	to	those	in	Western	countries.	
At	 the	 central–provincial	 level,	 the	 vertical	 relationship	 would	 not	 be	
substantially	 changed,	 but	 the	 horizontal	 checks-and-balances	 mechanism	
would	be	effectively	established	through	a	strengthening	of	the	rule	of	law.	This	
would	significantly	reduce	both	types	of	governmental	opportunistic	behaviour.












to	 prevent	 vertical	 governmental	 opportunistic	 behaviour	 between	 them.	
Different	 arrangements	 in	 the	 fiscal	 and	 personnel	 dimensions	 have	 different	
effects	 on	governmental	 opportunistic	behaviour	 and	 therefore	 on	whether	 a	
federal	nation	 is	 sustainable.	 In	a	democratic	nation,	fiscal	 transfer	payments	
make	 local	 governments	 hostages	 to	 federal/national	 government	 influence.	
Meanwhile,	it	is	equally	essential	to	establish	a	checks-and-balances	mechanism	
through	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 democracy	 to	 prevent	 horizontal	 governmental	












challenge	 for	China—and	 it	 is	not	 sufficient	 to	 simply	borrow	 the	 top-down	
fiscal	arrangement	from	the	West.
This	 chapter	 sees	 four	 major	 possible	 scenarios	 for	 the	 future	 evolution	
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In	 the	 past	 decade,	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 effort	 has	 gone	 into	 long-run	 forecasting	















This	 chapter	 takes	 as	 a	 starting	 point	 the	 observation	 that	 the	 style	 of	
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reflecting	 comparative	 advantage	or	politico-strategic	bias—empirical	 studies	
in	 the	 field	 seeking	 generality	 should	 recognise	 that	 the	 varied	 relationship	
between	 gross	 domestic	 product	 (GDP)	 per	 capita	 and	 metal	 consumption	 is	
reflecting	 these	 differences	 and	 broaden	 the	 boundaries	 of	 their	 empirical	
studies	accordingly.	Our	firm	belief	is	that	the	relationship	between	metal	use	






We	begin	by	 summarising	 the	 existing	 literature	on	 the	 association	between	
development	 level	and	metal	 intensity	and	explaining	where	our	approach	is	




sound	model	of	metal	demand,	whether	 it	 is	 focussed	on	metals	demand	per	
person	or	per	unit	of	economic	output,	must	simultaneously	capture	flow,	stock,	
cyclical	 and	 developmental/structural	 influences.	 Although	 incorporating	 all	
of	these	variables	into	a	model	is	a	formidable	task,	the	attempt	to	do	so	will	
increase	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 metal	 demand	 and	
economic	development.	
The	chapter	then	moves	on	to	discuss	the	China’s	demand	for	metals	in	particular.	
















Song	2009).	As	 a	 consequence,	China’s	final	path	 is	 likely	 to	 emulate	 certain	
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aspects	of	the	experiences	of	North	America,	the	Commonwealth	of	Independent	
States	 (CIS),	 Western	 Europe,	 Japan	 and	 emerging	 Asia,	 rather	 than	 merely	
reflecting	the	course	followed	by	one	specific	jurisdiction.	
The KCS and related theories
Extant theory and our extension
Before	1993,	the	literature	on	metal	usage	was	divided	into	two	distinct	schools:	
the	 consumer	preference	 school	 that	pioneered	 intensity-of-use	 (IU)	 analysis,	
and	 the	 leapfrogging	school.	The	consumer	preference	 school	argued	 that	 IU	
(defined	 as	 the	 volume	 of	 metal	 consumed	 per	 unit	 of	 output)	 increased	 in	
low-income	economies	over	time	as	demand	for	durable	goods	created	derived	
demand	 for	 metals	 (International	 Iron	 and	 Steel	 Institute	 1972;	 Malenbaum	
1973).	 In	 this	 view	 of	 the	 world,	 as	 economies	 make	 the	 transition	 towards	





The	 leapfrogging	 school	 argued	 that	 the	 ability	 of	 low-income	 economies	 to	
skip	whole	generations	of	technologies	gave	a	downward	bias	to	IU	over	time	
(Hwang	 and	 Tilton	 1990).	 Essentially,	 the	 leapfrogging	 school	 argued	 that	 a	
low-income	economy’s	ability	to	 import	technology	could	transplant	 it	 to	the	
same	 point	 on	 the	 hypothesised	 IU	 schedule	 as	 an	 advanced	 economy;	 or,	
alternatively,	they	were	able	to	navigate	to	lower	IU	schedules	relative	to	those	




The	difference	between	 the	 two	schools	 is	best	understood	by	reference	 to	a	
diagram	 (Figure	 5.1).	 The	 leapfrogging	 school	 argues	 that	 the	 underlying	
tendency	for	low-income	economies	is	to	move	onto	lower	IU	schedules	as	they	
import	more	advanced	technologies	(a	shift	from	A	on	IU2	to	B	on	IU3)	or	to	be	
conceived	 immaculately	beyond	 the	 turning	point	of	 the	 IU	schedule,	where	
the	parabola	is	downward	sloping.	Their	adversaries	argued	that	the	underlying	
tendency	 for	 low-income	economies	was	 to	 transit	 along	 the	upward-sloping	
portion	of	a	 single	parabola,	or	 in	extreme	 instances	 to	move	onto	higher	 IU	
schedules,	as	their	citizens	consumed	more	sophisticated	goods	and	services	(a	
shift	from	A	on	IU2	to	C	on	IU1).
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preferences,	 international	 trade	 and	 the	 intensity	 of	 metal	 use	 in	 less	 developed	 countries’,	 Resources 
Policy,	September,	p.	211.	
A	synthesis	was	achieved	by	the	work	of	Lohani	and	Tilton	(1993).	They	argued	







and	 time	 (change	 in	 the	 technological	 frontier).	 If	 the	extreme	version	of	 the	
leapfrogging	 school	 was	 correct,	 the	 coefficients	 derived	 from	 their	 cross-
sectional	regression	should	have	been	zero	for	income	per	capita	and	negatively	
related	to	position	on	the	time	trend.	If	 the	extreme	version	of	the	consumer	






























Beyond	 verifying	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 KCS,	 we	 estimate	 its	 turning	 point	 in	
income	per	capita	terms.	Second,	we	use	the	early	and	middle	industrialisation	
phases	of	currently	middle	and	high-income	economies	to	inform	the	analysis,	
not	 just	 the	 low-income	 economies	 of	 today.	 Third,	 we	 use	 long	 time-series	
data	at	five-yearly	 intervals,	rather	than	a	contemporary	cross-section	from	a	
selection	 of	 economies	 at	 various	 development	 levels.	We	 thereby	 avoid	 the	
problems	 inherent	 with	 cross-sectional	 analysis,	 particularly	 where	 there	 are	
data	 constraints	 (McKay	 2008).4	 Finally,	 we	 broaden	 our	 empirical	 analysis	
to	 incorporate	 macroeconomic	 variables	 such	 as	 investment	 propensity,	
3	 Given	 the	 leapfrogging	phenomenon	 relies	heavily	on	 foreign	 capital	flow,	 and	 economies	 that	do	not	
attract	 the	 interest	 of	 foreign	 investors	 tend	 to	 be	 slow	 growing,	 it	 is	 arguable	 whether	 leapfrogging	 is	 a	
terribly	strong	downward	force	on	IU	in	poorly	performed	jurisdictions.	Indeed,	a	shortage	of	capital	will	
limit	the	investment	share	of	GDP	in	these	economies,	and	if	investment	efficiency	is	low	(as	the	absence	of	










China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development
78
urbanisation	 rates,	 openness	 to	 trade	 and	 automobile	 penetration.	We	 apply	
this	 enhanced	 data-set	 in	 a	 simultaneous	 equation	 system,	 the	 estimation	 of	










































Therefore,	 metal	 demand	 can	 be	 altered	 by	 a	 change	 in	 income	 per	 capita,	
a	 change	 in	 domestic	 demand	 that	 is	 occasioned	 by	 changes	 in	 industrial	
structure	(inter-sectoral	and/or	intra-sectoral)	and	a	change	in	the	nature	of	a	
country’s	 international	 trade.	 A	 change	 in	 IU	 could	 still	 be	 achieved	 in	 the	
absence	of	structural	change	or	income	per	capita	gains	through	the	mechanism	
of	 technological	 change.6	 Following	 the	 leapfrogging	 school,	 we	 assume	 t	 is	
negatively	related	to	IU.7





countries	 (the	 United	 States,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 Germany/Prussia/
Saxony)	and	single	observations	of	a	few	countries	at	a	spread	of	lower-income	
levels	from	Latin	America	and	South	Asia.8	The	inverted	‘U’	was	formed	by	this	
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low	 and	 middle-income	 stages	 of	 development,	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 Latin	
American	and	South	Asian	paths	observed	by	Kuznets	are	idiosyncratic	rather	
than	general.	The	two	regions	followed	development	models	that	encouraged	





income	 levels	 can	 be	 readily	 assembled	 to	 show	 an	 apparent	 Kuznets-type	
relationship.	 The	 apex	 of	 the	 hump	 in	 the	 curve	 relating	 steel	 demand	 per	
person	to	per	capita	 income	is	provided	by	two	medium-sized	upper	middle-
income	 North	 Asian	 economies:	 Korea	 and	Taiwan.	They	 are	 both	 relatively	
new	entrants	to	industrialisation	with	their	engagement	occurring	within	the	
past	half-century.	Are	these	economies	typical	or	atypical?	This	judgment	could	
validate	 or	 invalidate	 the	 cross-section	 as	 representative,	 as	 we	 do	 not	 have	
readily	available	middle-income	alternatives	to	substitute	for	them.	
Preliminary	investigations	by	McKay	(2008)	document	the	existence	of	a	KCS	
relationship	 in	a	 long	time	series	of	steel	use	per	capita	 in	 the	United	States.	
The	 empirical	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 Kuznets	 relationship	 in	 the	 long-run	
steel	demand	per	capita	 in	 the	United	States	 is	 strong.	The	finding	that	steel	
use	per	capita	 in	the	United	States	during	the	twentieth	century	followed	an	
inverted	 ‘U’	shape	 ‘corroborates’	 the	cross-sectional	 ‘evidence’	available	 from	
a	 scatter	 plot,	 indicating	 that	 the	 Kuznets	 framework	 could	 be	 applicable	 to	
the	entire	field	of	metal	demand.	Development	is,	however,	a	complex	process	
conditioning	a	 rich	variety	of	urbanisation	processes,	 investment	 approaches	
and	 sectoral	 transformations	 (and	 in	China’s	 case,	 ownership	 transformations	
[Garnaut	et	al.	2006]	and	imperfections	in	the	markets	for	resources),	differing	
approaches	 to	 international	 trade,	 foreign	 investment,	 financial	 systems,	
institutional	reform,	and	so	on.	It	is	therefore	potentially	misleading	to	reduce	






In	 short,	 while	 the	 shortcut	 of	 generalising	 from	 a	 narrow	 potentially	
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per	 capita	 and	 	 and	 	the	 logarithm	 of	 GDP	 per	 capita	
and	 its	 square	 term	 of	 country	 i	 at	 time	 t	 respectively.	
is	 the	 control	 vector,	 accounting	 for	 the	 impact	 of	 automobile	 penetration	
(defined	as	the	logarithm	of	the	number	of	passenger	cars	per	1000	people)	and	
technological	 progress	 (defined	 as	 the	 time	 trend).	Thus,	 the	 null	 hypothesis	




provide	 support	 for	 the	 leapfrogging	 hypothesis.	 The	 degree	 of	 automobile	
penetration	 is	 a	 proxy	 variable	 for	 the	 consumer	 preference	 hypothesis.	 A	
positive	coefficient	is	expected	here.	
This	is	a	major	advance	on	the	work	of	Lohani	and	Tilton	(1993).	Positioned	in	











5.7	and	5.8),	with	steel	use	per	capita,	GDP	per	capita	and	 its	 squared	 term,	







strategies,	 the	 different	 states	 of	 local	 and	 global	 technological	 attainment	
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Second,	 when	 the	 simultaneous	 equation	 regression	 technique	 is	 adopted,	
the	potential	correlation	among	the	residuals	across	equations	 introduces	 the	
efficiency	problem	for	the	estimated	coefficients	(Zellner	1962).	In	other	words,	
if	 we	 assume	 that	 , 	 and		 	 are	 independently	 and	 identically	
distributed	(as	is	normally	assumed	in	statistics),	the	estimated	standard	error	



















and	 2008.	 The	 sample	 comprises	 Canada,	 the	 United	 States,	 Latin	 America,	
Africa,	European	members	of	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	
Development	 (OECD),	 the	 Commonwealth	 of	 Independent	 States	 countries	
(Russia	 after	 1990),	 the	 Middle	 East,	 India,	 China,	 South-East	 Asia,	 Oceania,	
Japan,	Korea	and	Taiwan.	To	reduce	year-to-year	fluctuations,	we	sampled	the	
data	 at	five-year	 intervals.	The	 regional	definitions	 are	 consistent	with	 those	
used	by	the	International	Steel	Association.










The	 data	 come	 from	 three	 principal	 sources.	 Crude	 steel	 production	 and	
consumption	come	from	the	International	Steel	Statistics;	population	data	come	
from	 Maddison	 (2003,	 2010;	 the	 Penn World Table (Centre	 for	 International	























of	 per	 capita	 steel	 production	 of	 China	 will	 rise	 and	 how	 long	 the	 phase	 of	
acceleration	will	last	is	significant	and	remains	to	be	addressed.
Figure	 5.3	 illustrates	 the	 relationship	 between	 steel	 output	 per	 capita	 and	
income	 per	 capita	 in	 the	 major	 countries	 and	 regions	 over	 the	 long	 period	
1890–2008.	The	figure	presents	three	features.	First,	the	trajectories	of	certain	
countries	 (especially	 in	 East	 Asia)	 seem	 to	 support	 the	 consumer	 preference	
view—namely,	that	steel	demand	continues	to	rise	along	with	increases	in	per	
capita	 income.	This	 process	 is	 extended	 even	 beyond	 the	 point	 where	 other	
industrialised	countries	have	reached	the	peak	in	their	steel	intensities.	Second,	
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Steel use per head
GDP Per Capita (1990 International dollars)
Source:	World	Metal	Statistics	Yearbook,	various	issues,	International	Steel	Association.
These	are	 the	basic	data	 that	provide	 the	dependent	variables	 for	 the	 formal	
econometric	exercise	detailed	in	sections	three	and	four	 in	which	we	test	the	
validity	of	 the	different	 theories	and	their	synthesis.	 It	 is	also	 the	context	 in	
which	the	future	trajectory	of	China’s	steel	demand	per	capita	is	projected.	
Figure 5.4 Urbanisation ratios of selected economies, 1890–2005 
Source:	 Center	 for	 International	 Comparisons	 n.d.,	 The Penn World Table,University	 of	 Pennsylvania,	
Philadelphia.
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The	difficulty	of	the	modelling	task	is	illustrated	with	reference	to	one	of	the	
explanatory	 variables:	 the	 urbanisation	 rate	 (Figure	 5.4).	 The	 urbanisation	
process	tends	to	be	associated	with	rising	steel	demand	per	capita	as	it	directly	
contributes	 to	 GDP	 growth	 through	 the	 well-known	 Lewisian	 dynamics	 of	
sectoral	transfer.	It	also	requires	a	dwelling	and	infrastructure-building	program	
to	accommodate	 the	population	shift.	The	benefits	of	agglomeration	drive	an	
increase	 in	 service	 sector	 activity,	 greater	 specialisation	 and	 the	 associated	






































Table 5.1 Major results from simultaneous equation estimation, 1890–2008 
Dependent variable: lnsteel Dependent variable: lngdp Dependent variable: lngdp_sq
lngdp 6 .299*** lnnewinv 0 .418*** lnnewinv 6 .664***
(1 .325) (0 .056) (0 .959)
lngdp_sq –0 .313*** urban_ratio 0 .018*** urban_ratio 0 .233**
(0 .078) (0 .006) (–0 .097)
Lncar 0 .118* open_ratio –0 .001 open_ratio 0 .001
(0 .057) (0 .003) (0 .049)
Time trend –0 .028*** Time trend 0 .009* Time trend 0 .145*








Constant 0 .495** Constant –0 .128 Constant –1 .853




























































imposed	 by	 policy.	 All	 these	 factors	 will	 contribute	 to	 the	 future	 course	 of	
income	 per	 capita	 and,	 combined	 with	 technological	 progress	 and	 changing	
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1980 0 .0435 809 25 .1 31 .5 19 .6 307 -
1985 0 .0555 985 34 .3 32 .2 23 374 0 .3
1990 0 .0644 1400 40 .8 25 .4 27 .4 565 0 .7
1995 0 .0789 1754 43 .6 32 .2 31 .4 842 2 .1
2000 0 .1002 2718 37 .1 41 .9 35 .8 1046 4 .9
2005 0 .2716 3297 51 .7 67 .3 40 .4 1131 14 .1

















To	begin,	we	present	 a	 scenario	 in	which	current	 trends	persist	 through	 the	
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GDP per capita (at 1990 international dollars)
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Source:	Authors’	own	projections.
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Chinese	 levels	 approach	 those	 of	 high-income	 economies,	 a	 reduced	 but	 still	
high	 emphasis	 on	 secondary	 industry	 in	 overall	 activity	 and	 a	 peak	 in	 steel	
demand	per	capita	about	630	kg	by	2030.	
Table 5.3 UN projection of China’s future development path
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Urbanisation rate (%) 43 48 56 62 66 70
Secondary industry 
share of GDP 48 49 48 46 42 38
Cars per 1000 people 24 70 190 300 356 400
Per capita GDP (spliced 
to 1990 int’l dollars)* 3297 4990 8868 14 450 22 151 32 079
GDP growth rate 
(decade average) - 9 .5 6 .6 5 .5 4 .5 3 .5
Population (millions) 1308 1360 1450 1520 1540 1500
GDP per capita growth 
rate (decade average)* - 8 .7 6 .0 5 .0 4 .4 3 .8
Power generation 
Terawatt hours (TWh) 
(business as usual)
2494 3830 6603 8880 10 937 12 360
Steel output (100 
million tonnes) 3 .5 5 .6 8 .6 9 .6 9 .1 8
Implied steel per capita 
(tonnes per capita)* 0 .27 0 .41 0 .59 0 .63 0 .59 0 .53
*	Calculated	by	the	authors	from	the	existing	information.
Source:	United	Nations	Development	Programme	(UNDP)	2010,	China Human Development Report 2009/10. 





period	 (at	 least	590	kg	per	capita	 from	2020	to	2040)	seems	reasonable.	Also,	
given	 that	 the	 turning	 point	 of	 China’s	 KCS	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 reached	 at	 a	
GDP	per	capita	of	US$15	449—a	level	that	we	can	deduce	the	United	Nations	
anticipates	being	achieved	in	2032—this	roughly	accords	with	their	assumed	
timing	of	 the	peak	 in	 steel	demand	per	 capita.	 In	 short,	 the	United	Nation’s	




economic	development	path.	 Its	 future	could	also	be	distinctive	 if	 it	were	 to	
define	a	path	with	respect	to	leapfrogging	and	consumer	preferences	that	is	out	
of	the	norm.	




of	 the	upper	or	 lower	confidence	 intervals	presents	 the	most	 likely	direction	
of	 error	 from	 the	 central	 tendency	 or	 whether	 China	 will	 or	 will	 not	 follow	
the	path	of	Korea	in	terms	of	its	long-term	path	of	steel	consumption,	we	need	
to	 leave	 aside	 empirics	 and	 trust	 judgment.	The	 question	 is	 whether	 China’s	
metal	consumption	will	be	influenced	more	by	the	consumer	preference	view	
or	behave	more	according	to	 the	predictions	of	 the	 leapfrogging	view.	 It	 is	a	
legitimate	question	as	our	model	provides	empirical	evidence	supporting	the	
mutual	inclusion	of	each	of	these	views.
If,	 for	 example,	 the	 consumer	 preference	 dynamic	 operates	 so	 strongly	 that	
technological	leapfrogging	is	hugely	outweighed	then	there	is	a	high	probability	
that	China	will	 either	prolong the period	 before	 it	 reaches	 the	peak	or	 it	will	








Figure 5.6 China’s consumption of crude steel, 1978–2008 (million tonnes)
Source:	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2009,	China Statistical Yearbook,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing;	
and	author’s	calculations.
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According	 to	 its	 current	 level	 of	 per	 capita	 income,	China	 is	 still	 at	 the	mid	
phase	 of	 industrialisation	 characterised	 by	 the	 relatively	 high	 proportion	
of	 manufacturing	 in	 the	 total	 economy	 and	 a	 relatively	 high	 share	 of	 heavy	
industries	in	total	industrial	output	(Chenery	et	al.	1986).	A	key	feature	of	this	
phase	 of	 industrialisation	 is	 the	pattern	of	 extensive	 growth	 in	which	 factor	
inputs—especially	physical	capital—play	an	important	role.	As	a	result,	metal	








On	 the	 other	 hand,	 looking	 beyond	 the	 immediate	 horizon,	 China	 is	 now	
approaching	the	end	of	a	long	period	of	extensive	growth	and	will	be	relying	








usual’	will	put	 immense	pressure	on	 the	biosphere	going	 forward.	Structural	
changes	 will	 be	 assisted	 by	 altered	 incentives	 brought	 about	 through	
institutional	 changes	 such	 as	 financial	 system	 reform	 and	 the	 reform	 of	 the	
pricing	system	for	resources	and	other	factors	of	production	(Huang	and	Tao	
2010).	The	implementation	of	these	new	strategies	will	accelerate	the	pace	of	
technological	 leapfrogging	 in	China,	moderating	 future	 increases	 in	 its	metal	
consumption	per	capita.	
While	the	desire	for	environmental	amenity	has	a	well-documented	relationship	
to	 per	 capita	 income	 that	 is	 ‘Kuznetsian’	 in	 shape,	 in	 China	 and	 elsewhere	
(Grossman	 and	 Krueger	 1995;	 Bao	 and	 Peng	 2006),	 no	 currently	 wealthy	
country	had	to	deal	with	a	global	environmental	backdrop	as	unpropitious	as	
that	 of	 today.	This	 implies	 that	 the	 imperative	 for	China	 to	pursue	 resource-
saving	technological	change	in	the	future	is	greater	than	that	of	the	individual	
economies	in	our	historical	sample.	
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The	objective	of	 this	 study	has	been	 to	define	a	 range	of	potential	outcomes	
for	 China’s	 steel	 demand,	 not	 to	 produce	 a	 precise	 forecast.	We	 believe	 that	
our	 confidence	 intervals	 are	 a	 reasonable	 approximation	 of	 the	 likely	 upside	
and	 downside	 risks	 to	 the	 central	 KCS	 tendency	 for	 China.	 Needless	 to	 say,	





analytical	 framework.	The	 second	was	 to	use	 those	 insights	 to	 shed	 light	on	
China’s	 future	 path	 of	 ferrous	 metal	 demand.	The	 outcomes	 were	 as	 follows.	
First,	 a	 new	 concept—the	 Kuznets	 curve	 for	 steel—was	 formally	 identified.	
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Assessing China’s energy 
conservation and carbon 
intensity: how will the future 
differ from the past? 6
ZhongXiang Zhang
Introduction
China’s	 spectacular	 economic	growth	 since	1978	has	been	heavily	dependent	
on	 burning	 dirty	 coal.	 This	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 unprecedented	 environmental	
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To	 reverse	 this	 trend,	China	has	 incorporated	 a	 requirement	 that	 energy	use	
per	unit	of	GDP	(energy	intensity)	be	cut	by	20	per	cent	during	the	eleventh	
five-year-plan	 period,	 running	 from	 2006	 to	 2010.	This	 is	 widely	 considered	
an	important	step	towards	building	a	‘harmonious	society’	through	‘scientific	
development’.	 Just	 before	 the	 Copenhagen	 climate	 summit,	 China	 further	






















national	 policy	 on	 the	 environment,	 and	 also	 that	 strict	 implementation	 and	
coordination	 of	 official	 policies	 and	 measures	 are	 of	 paramount	 importance	
in	 meeting	 China’s	 existing	 energy-saving	 goal	 in	 2010,	 its	 proposed	 carbon	
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Increasing energy efficiency and cutting 
pollutants
While	 China	 has	 been	 calling	 for	 energy	 savings	 since	 the	 early	 1980s,	 the	
quantitative	 target	 on	 energy	 efficiency	 in	 the	 current	 five-year	 (2006–10)	
economic	plan	is	an	important	new	development.	
China	 achieved	 a	 quadrupling	 of	 its	 GDP	 with	 only	 a	 doubling	 of	 energy	
consumption	between	1980	and	2000	(Figure	6.1).	However,	from	2002	China	
experienced	 faster	 growth	 of	 energy	 consumption	 than	 of	 economic	 output,	
which	 translates	 into	 rising	 energy	 intensity.	The	 changing	 trend	 on	 energy	
efficiency	 reflects	 the	 completion	 by	 about	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 of	 the	
reductions	of	energy	use	associated	with	the	movement	towards	market	pricing	




Industry	 accounts	 for	 about	 70	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 country’s	 total	 energy	















highly	 energy-consuming,	 highly-polluting	 and	 resource-intensive	 products,	
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On	 the	 energy-saving	 front,	 China	 established	 the	 ‘Top	 1000	 Enterprises	
Energy	Conservation	Action	Program’	in	April	2006.	This	program	covers	1008	
enterprises	 in	nine	key	energy	supply	and	consuming	 industrial	 sub-sectors.	
These	enterprises	each	consumed	at	least	180	000	tonnes	of	coal	equivalent	(tce)	




(NDRC	 2006a).	 In	 May	 2006,	 empowered	 by	 the	 State	 Council,	 the	 National	
Development	and	Reform	Commission	(NDRC),	China’s	top	economic	planning	
agency,	signed	energy-saving	responsibility	agreements	with	these	enterprises.	
To	 ensure	 that	 the	 goal	 is	 met,	 achieving	 energy	 efficiency	 improvements	
has	become	a	criterion	for	 job	performance	evaluations	of	 the	heads	of	 these	






Figure 6.1 Energy use per unit of GDP in China, 1990–2007 (tonnes  
of coal equivalent per US$1000 in 1980 prices)
Source:	 Based	 on	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 various	 years,	 China Statistical Yearbook,	
China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
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Power	generation	is	the	largest	coal	consumer,	currently	consuming	more	than	





those	below	50	megawatts	 (MW),	 those	below	100	MW	and	 in	operation	 for	
more	than	20	years,	those	below	200	MW	and	having	reached	the	end	of	their	
























































Table 6.1 Consumption tax rates for cars in China (per cent)
Engine size (litres) Excise tax since 
1 January 1994 
Excise tax since  
1 April 2006 
Excise tax since  
1 September 2008 
1 .0 or less
1 .0 < engine ≤ 1 .5
1 .5 < engine ≤ 2 .0
2 .0 < engine ≤ 2 .5
2 .5 < engine ≤ 3 .0
3 .0 < engine ≤ 4 .0






















Sources:	 ‘Special	 topic	 on	 paying	 close	 attention	 to	 adjustments	 in	 consumption	 tax	 policy,	 Sina Net,	






(Figure	6.2).	 Implemented	 in	 two	phases,	 the	 standards	 classify	vehicles	 into	
16	weight	classes,	covering	passenger	cars,	 sports	utility	vehicles	 (SUVs)	and	
multipurpose	 vans.	 Converted	 to	 the	 US	 Corporate	 Average	 Fuel	 Economy	





Figure 6.2 Comparison of fuel economy standards for vehicles
Notes:	Dotted	lines	denote	proposed	standards;	MPG	=	miles	per	gallon.
Source:	Adapted	from	An,	F.	and	Sauer,	A.	2004,	Comparison of Passenger Vehicle Fuel Economy and GHG 
Emission Standards Around the World,	December,	Pew	Center	on	Global	Climate	Change,	Arlington,	Va,	
<http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Fuel	 per	 cent20Economy	 per	 cent20and	 per	 cent20GHG	 per	
cent20Standards_010605_110719.pdf>
In	the	meantime,	growing	Chinese	cities	are	giving	priority	to	public	transport	
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III	vehicle	emission	standards’,	Xinhua Net,	7	July,	<http://auto.sina.com.cn/
news/2007-07-07/1015290457.shtml>).	 Clearly,	 vehicle	 emission	 standards	 in	
China	have	become	increasingly	stringent	over	time.	New	vehicles	that	do	not	
comply	with	the	new	standards	cannot	be	sold	in	China.	While	China	is	at	about	
the	 same	 levels	 of	 vehicle	 emission	 standards	 as	 India	 and	 most	 Association	




about	nine	years	 in	2001	 to	five	and	a	half	years	 in	2010.	Clearly,	 these	new	
standards	will	help	to	reduce	substantially	environmental	costs.
Table 6.2 Vehicle emission standards and the time to enter into force in 
China, ASEAN and the European Union


































Indonesia Early 2006 First quarter 
2007
2012














The use of renewable energy
Concerns	about	climate	change	and	other	environmental	problems	and	health	
risks	have	sparked	China’s	plans	to	pursue	alternative	energy	sources	to	meet	
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In	 addition	 to	 setting	 extremely	 ambitious	 renewable	 energy	 goals,	 China	
is	making	 large	efforts	 to	meet	 these	goals.	China	 invested	US$34.6	billion	 in	
renewable	 energy	 in	2009,	 causing	 the	United	States	 to	 lose	 the	 top	 spot	 for	
the	first	time	in	five	years,	coming	in	a	distant	second	with	a	total	investment	
of	 US$18.6	 billion.	 In	 terms	 of	 renewable	 energy	 investment	 as	 a	 percentage	
of	GDP,	China,	with	0.39	per	cent,	invested	three	times	more	than	the	United	
States,	with	0.13	per	cent,	in	2009.	With	an	installed	capacity	of	52.5	GW,	China	




favourable	 policies	 in	 recent	 years.	 In	 2003,	 China	 adopted	 the	Wind	 Power	
Concession	 Program	 as	 its	 primary	 strategy	 to	 further	 promote	 wind	 power	




















doubled	 between	 2003	 and	 2005,	 reaching	 1.3	 GW	 in	 2005.	 With	 China’s	








During	 this	 process,	 local	 wind	 turbine	 makers—such	 as	 Sinovel	 Wind,	
Goldwind	 Science	 and	Technology	 and	 Dongfang	 Electric—accounted	 for	 an	
increasing	share	of	total	new	installations.	Together,	they	now	supply	more	than	
50	 per	 cent	 of	 a	 market	 dominated	 by	 foreign	 firms	 until	 2008.	 Sinovel	 and	
Goldwind	are	now	among	the	world’s	top-five	turbine	manufacturers.	
In	 its	 response	 to	 the	economic	crisis,	 the	Chinese	government	has	 identified	
the	 development	 of	 wind	 power	 as	 an	 area	 of	 economic	 growth.	 With	 new	
installations	 of	 13.8	 GW	 in	 China—relative	 to	 that	 of	 10	 GW	 in	 the	 United	
States—China	overtook	the	United	States	as	the	world’s	top	wind	power	market	
in	2009.	With	a	total	installed	capacity	of	25.8	GW,	China	slipped	past	Germany	
to	 take	 second	 place	 in	 total	 wind	 power	 installations	 in	 2009	 (Global	Wind	
Energy	Council	2010).	While	the	United	States	continues	to	have	a	comfortable	
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Figure 6.3 Cumulative installed wind power capacity by country, 1980–2009
Sources:	Based	on	data	from	Global	Wind	Energy	Council	2010,	Global Wind 2009 Report,	March,	Global	
Wind	 Energy	 Council,	 Brussels,	 <http://www.gwec.net/fileadmin/documents/Publications/Global_
Wind_2007_report/GWEC_Global_Wind_2009_Report_LOWRES_15th.	 per	 cent20Apr..pdf>;	 Earth	
Policy	 Institute	 2008,	 Global Wind Power Capacity Reaches 100,000 Megawatts,	 4	 March,	 Earth	 Policy	
Institute,	Washington,	DC,	<http://www.earth-policy.org/Indicators/Wind/2008.htm>














are	 substantially	higher	 than	 those	 set	 through	bidding.	By	 letting	 investors	
know	the	expected	rate	of	return	on	their	projects	through	announcing	on-grid	
tariffs,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 aims	 to	 encourage	 the	 development	 of	 wind	
energy	 resources	of	good	quality.	 In	 the	meantime,	 this	will	 encourage	wind	
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power	plants	to	reduce	the	costs	of	investment	and	operation	and	increase	their	
economic	 efficiency,	 thus	 promoting	 the	 healthy	 development	 of	 the	 whole	
wind	industry	in	China.	

















percentage	 points	 lower	 than	 foreign	 models.	 This	 few	 percentage	 points	
difference	could	make	a	difference	between	a	wind	farm	that	 is	economically	
viable	and	one	that	is	not.	
China’s proposed carbon intensity target: 
ambitious or business as usual?
Just	before	 the	Copenhagen	climate	 summit,	China	pledged	 to	cut	 its	 carbon	
intensity	by	40–45	per	cent	by	2020	relative	to	its	2005	levels.	A	lot	of	discussion	





One	way	is	 to	see	whether	this	proposed	carbon	intensity	goal	 for	2020	 is	as	
challenging	 as	 the	 energy-saving	 goals	 set	 in	 the	 current	 eleventh	 five-year	
economic	blueprint.	This	 requires	first	 the	 establishment	 of	why	 the	 current	
20	 per	 cent	 energy-saving	 goal	 is	 considered	 very	 challenging.	 As	 discussed	
earlier,	China	set	a	goal	of	cutting	energy	use	per	unit	of	GDP	by	20	per	cent	by	
2010	relative	to	its	2005	levels.	In	2006—the	first	year	of	this	energy	efficiency	
















year	 in	which	China	exceeded	the	overall	annualised	target	 (4.4	per	cent)	 for	
energy	savings	was	2008,	when	it	cut	its	energy	intensity	by	4.6	per	cent	(NBS	
et	 al.	 2009).	This	 was	 due	 partly	 to	 the	 economic	 crisis	 that	 reduced	 overall	
demand—in	 particular,	 the	 demand	 for	 energy-intensive	 products.	 Overall,	















How	 far	 does	 this	 carbon	 intensity	 target	 drive	 China’s	 emissions	 below	 its	
projected	baseline	levels?	If	this	is	met,	does	China	play	its	proportionate	part	
in	a	coordinated	global	commitment	to	stabilise	the	concentration	of	greenhouse	
gas	 emissions	 in	 the	 atmosphere	 at	 the	 desirable	 level?	 The	 World Energy 
Outlook 2009 (IEA	 2009b)	 has	 incorporated	 many	 policies	 into	 the	 baseline	
projection	that	were	not	incorporated	in	the	World Energy Outlook 2007 (IEA	
2007).	This	projection	puts	China’s	baseline	carbon	emissions	at	9.6	gigatonnes	
3	 See	 Zhang	 (2007a,	 2007c,	 2007d)	 for	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 why	 Beijing	 recorded	 the	 most	 success	 in	
achieving	its	energy-saving	goals.









Energy Outlook 2009 baseline	 set	 for	 China	 in	 2020.	Two	 key	 points	 need	 to	
be	made.	First,	even	the	 lower	end	of	that	range	does	not	represent	business	
as	 usual,	 because	 it	 represents	 a	 deviation	 of	 4.8	 per	 cent	 below	 the	 World 








Arguably,	 China	 will	 claim	 to	 meet	 its	 carbon	 intensity	 target	 as	 long	 as	 it	
cuts	its	carbon	intensity	by	40	per	cent	in	the	period	2006–20.	This	raises	the	
stringency	issue	of	this	proposed	intensity	reduction.	The	IEA	(2009b)	estimates	
that	 national	 policies	 under	 consideration	 in	 China	 will	 bring	 reductions	 of	
about	1	GtCO2	in	2020.	This	suggests	a	carbon	intensity	reduction	of	43.6	per	
cent	 in	2020	 relative	 to	 its	2005	 levels,	 implying	 that	 the	 low	end	of	China’s	





many	of	the	policies	considered	in	the	World Energy Outlook 2009 that	will	cut	
emissions	of	1	GtCO2	in	2020	from	its	baseline	levels	are	not	particularly	climate	
motivated,	China	could	accelerate	the	speed,	and	scale	up	the	implementation,	




the	 Chinese	 economy	 in	 2020?	 Assuming	 that	 China’s	 economy	 grows	 at	 the	
annual	 average	 rate	 of	 7.6	 per	 cent	 used	 for	 the	 World Energy Outlook 2009 
and	that	China	is	able	to	limit	the	growth	of	energy	use	to	half	the	growth	rate	
of	 the	economy	between	2006	and	2020,	China’s	energy	use	per	unit	of	GDP	
would	be	 cut	by	42	per	 cent	by	2020,	 relative	 to	 its	 2005	 levels.	This	back-
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of-the-envelope	calculation	assumes	an	income	elasticity	of	energy	demand	of	




cut	 in	 China’s	 energy	 intensity	 by	 2020	 relative	 to	 2005	 levels	 is	 considered	








their	greenhouse	gas	 emissions	 to	15–30	per	 cent	below	 their	baseline	 levels	
by	2020.	This	46–50	per	cent	carbon	 intensity	reduction	will	 lead	 to	China’s	
emissions	 reductions	 of	 15–21	 per	 cent	 compared	 with	 its	 baseline	 levels	 in	
2020.	That	will	put	China’s	absolute	emissions	reductions	very	much	within	the	
IPCC’s	recommended	levels.
China’s energy and GDP statistics: reliability 
issues
Having	 an	 ambitious	 commitment	 is	 one	 thing.	 Fulfilling	 that	 commitment	




China	 is	 not	 known	 for	 the	 reliability	 of	 its	 statistics	 (for	 example,	 Rawski	





Assuming	 the	 fixed	 carbon	 dioxide	 emissions	 coefficients	 that	 convert	




after	 their	first	 appearance.	As	would	be	 expected,	 the	 adjustments	made	 to	
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production	statistics	are	far	smaller	than	those	made	to	consumption	statistics,	





early	 2000s.	The	 preliminary	 figures	 for	 total	 energy	 use	 in	 1999–2001	 were	
revised	upwards	by	8–10	per	cent.	In	all	three	years,	these	adjustments	were	
driven	 by	 upward	 revisions	 of	 8–13	 per	 cent	 made	 to	 the	 coal	 consumption	
figures	to	reflect	unreported	coal	production	mainly	from	small,	inefficient	and	
highly	polluting	coalmines.	These	coalmines	were	ordered	to	shut	down	in	a	
widely	 publicised	 nationwide	 campaign	 beginning	 in	 1998,	 although	 many	




Table 6.3 Preliminary and final values for total primary energy consumption 
and coal consumption in China, 1990–2008



















































































































































Source:	 Based	 on	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 various	 years, China Statistical Yearbook,	 China	
Statistics	Press,	Beijing.












Table 6.4 Reduction in China’s energy intensity: preliminary value versus 
final value (per cent)







1 .23 (March 2007)
3 .27 (March 2008)
4 .59 (June 2009)
3 .98b (March 2010)
1 .33 (July2007)
3 .66 (July 2008)
5 .2a (Dec 2009)

















has	 identified	 building	 a	 robust	 and	 transparent	 emissions	 and	 performance	
accounting	framework	as	a	key	element	of	implementing	the	Copenhagen Accord 
(European	Commission	2010).	How	all	 this	will	be	worked	out	 remains	 to	be	
seen.	China	has	not	agreed	to	open	its	GDP	figures	to	international	consultation	
and	analysis.	As	long	as	China’s	commitments	are	in	the	form	of	carbon	intensity,	




accuracy	 and	 reliability	 of	 China’s	 statistics	 on	 economic	 activity.	 They	 are	
certainly	not	being	calculated	to	make	the	energy	intensity	indicator	look	good	to	





Central–local relations, energy savings and 
emissions reductions
Given	China’s	vast	size	and	diversity,	it	is	impossible	for	the	central	government	
in	Beijing	 to	operate	 single-handedly	 in	pursuing	nationwide	energy	savings	
and	 environmental	 outcomes.	 The	 ability	 of,	 and	 incentives	 for,	 lower-level	












of	 the	 central	 and	 local	 governments	 (Zhang	2007c,	 2007d,	 2009a).	 Since	 the	
Tax	Sharing	System	(TSS)	was	adopted	in	China	in	1994,	taxes	are	grouped	into	
those	collected	by	the	central	government,	those	collected	by	local	governments	
and	those	shared	between	the	central	and	 local	governments.	All	 those	 taxes	



















is	 related	 to	differentiated	 tariffs.	The	NDRC	ordered	provincial	governments	






all	 of	 the	 revenue	collected	 from	 these	 additional	 charges	goes	 to	 the	central	
government.	To	provide	incentives	for	local	governments,	these	revenues	should	
be	assigned	to	local	governments,	with	the	central	government	requiring	local	
governments	 to	use	 the	 revenue	 specifically	 for	 industrial	upgrading,	 energy	
savings	and	emissions	cutting	(Zhang	2007c,	2007d,	2008,	2009a).	






















0 .05 0 .10 0 .15 0 .20
Restrained 
types
0 .02 0 .03 0 .04 0 .05
Source:	 National	 Development	 and	 Reform	 Commission	 (NDRC)	 2006b,	 Suggestions	 for	 improving	 the	
policy	 on	 differentiated	 tariffs,	 September,	 National	 Development	 and	 Reform	 Commission,	 Beijing,	
<http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-09/22/content_396258.htm>
The	 evidence	 above	 suggests	 the	 need	 to	 carefully	 examine	 those	 objective	









based	 approach	 should	 be	 strengthened	 and	 extended	 to	 ensure	 that	 local	
officials	are	held	accountable	for	energy	savings	and	pollution	cutting	in	their	
























Thus,	broadening	 the	current	coverage	of	 resource	 taxation	and	significantly	
increasing	the	levied	level	based	on	revenues	rather	than	volumes	will	also	help	
to	 increase	 local	 governments’	 revenues	while	 contributing	 to	 environmental	
conservation.
Conclusions
China	 achieved	 a	 quadrupling	 of	 its	 GDP	 with	 only	 a	 doubling	 of	 energy	
consumption	 between	 1980	 and	 2000.	 Since	 2002,	 however,	 the	 country	 has	
experienced	 faster	 energy	 consumption	 growth	 than	 economic	 growth.	 To	


















represents	 a	 deviation	 of	 4.8	 per	 cent	 below	 the	 World Energy Outlook 2009 
baseline	 levels,	not	 to	mention	a	deviation	of	12.7	per	cent	below	the	World 





continues	 to	 rise,	 even	 a	 few	 additional	 percentage	 point	 reductions	 in	 its	
carbon	 intensity	 reduction	 have	 important	 implications	 for	 global	 emissions.	






but	more	 importantly	 it	needs	to	be	credible.	Ascertaining	whether	or	not	 it	











China’s	 statistics	 on	 economic	 activity	 and	 energy	 use.	 Such	 revisions	 show	
that	 GDP	 figures	 are	 even	 more	 crucial	 to	 the	 impacts	 on	 energy	 or	 carbon	
intensity	than	are	energy	consumption	and	emissions	data.	They	also	have	huge	
implications	 for	 meeting	 China’s	 existing	 energy-saving	 goal	 in	 2010	 and	 its	
proposed	carbon	intensity	target	in	2020.
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intensive	 industries	 under	 control.	 Moreover,	 given	 that	 China	 has	 shifted	
control	 over	 resources	 and	 decision	 making	 to	 local	 governments	 during	 the	
past	 three	 decades,	 it	 is	 also	 crucial	 to	 ensure	 that	 local	 governments	 act	 in	





of	China’s	 leaders.	To	 really	 achieve	 the	desired	outcomes,	however,	 requires	
strict	 implementation	and	coordination	of	these	policies	and	measures,	as	the	
aforementioned	 development	 of	 wind	 power	 and	 its	 coordination	 with	 the	
planning	 and	 construction	 of	 power	 grids	 have	 exemplified.	 This	 will	 be	 a	
decisive	 factor	 in	 determining	 the	 prospects	 for	 whether	 China	 will	 achieve	
its	carbon	intensity	target.	There	is	no	doubt	that	achieving	this	target	poses	
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In	 the	 three	 decades	 since	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 declared	 that	 China’s	 economic	
development	 would	 necessarily	 involve	 some	 people	 becoming	 rich	 before	





and,	 later,	 the	 Coastal	 Development	 Strategy,	 compounded	 these	 advantages	
with	a	range	of	preferential	policies	that	explicitly	promoted	the	development	
of	the	eastern	region	above	all	else.	Yet	Deng	insisted	that	there	would	be	‘no	





In	 late	 1999,	 Jiang	 Zemin	 announced	 the	 Western	 Regional	 Development	
Program	 (WRDP;	 ‘xibu da kai fa’),	 declaring	 that	 its	 implementation	 ‘is	 an	








and	 structural	 reform,	 encourage	 east–west	 cooperation	 and	 accelerate	
development	in	specific	industrial	sectors	and	key	projects	such	as	the	West–
East	Power	Transmission	Project	and	West–East	Gas	Pipeline	Project.For	further	
details,	 see	 the	 ‘Overall	 Plan’;	 Lai	 (2002);	 and	 Golley	 (2007).	The	 time	 frame	
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component	 of	 his	 drive	 for	 a	 ‘harmonious	 and	 balanced	 society’.	 As	 if	 this	
‘colossal	 systemic	 campaign’	 was	 not	 enough—and	 perhaps	 partly	 to	 ensure	
that	 he	 could	 lay	 claim	 to	 his	 own	 regional	 policy	 initiative	 as	 had	 his	
predecessors—Hu	and	his	team	formally	launched	the	‘Revive	the	North-East’	








for	a	 regime	whose	 legitimacy	has	 long	been	based	on	egalitarian	principles.	








complex	 interaction	of	 a	multitude	 of	 uncertain	market	 forces	 and	uncertain	








presented	 here	 suggests	 that	 by	 2030,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 significant	 policy	
adaptation,	disparities	between	the	western	and	other	regions	are	likely	to	have	
‘diminished	marginally’	at	best.
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Regional snapshot
At	 present,	 China	 comprises	 31	 ‘provincial	 units’,	 or	 provinces,	 centrally	
administered	municipalities	(CAMs)	and	autonomous	regions	(Figure	7.1).	The	
four	 centrally	 administered	 municipalities	 are	 Beijing,	Tianjin,	 Shanghai	 and	
Chongqing.	 The	 five	 (designated	 ethnic)	 autonomous	 regions	 are	 Guangxi	
(Zhuang),	 Inner	 Mongolia,	 Ningxia	 (Hui),	 Tibet	 and	 Xinjiang	 (Uighur).	 The	
term	 ‘province’	will	be	used	generically	 to	denote	 all	 of	 these.There	are	 also	




Tianjin,	 Hebei,	 Shandong,	 Jiangsu,	 Shanghai,	 Zhejiang,	 Fujian,	 Guangdong	
and	Hainan.	The	centre	comprises	Heilongjiang,	Jilin,	Shanxi,	Henan,	Anhui,	
Hubei,	Jiangxi	and	Hunan,	while	the	west	comprises	Xinjiang,	Gansu,	Ningxia,	
Shaanxi,	 Qinghai,	 Sichuan,	 Guizhou,	 Yunnan,	 Tibet,	 Inner	 Mongolia	 and	
Guangxi.Inner	Mongolia	and	Guangxi	were	reclassified	 into	 the	 ‘west’	at	 the	
start	 of	 the	 WRDP	 in	 late	 1999.	 All	 of	 the	 calculations	 below	 are	 based	 on	
this	new	classification.		Alternatively,	there	is	some	reference	to	‘the	coast’—
equivalent	to	the	east—and	‘the	interior’,	comprising	the	west	and	the	centre.	
Figure 7.1 Map of China




seen	here	 (and	virtually	any	other	 indicator	one	might	 choose).	The	 ranking	
from	east	to	centre	to	west	is	also	consistent,	with	the	west	home	to	the	least	
urbanised,	 least	 educated,	 poorest	 people	 with	 the	 lowest	 life	 expectancy.	 It	
is	also	the	region	most	dominated	by	state	ownership	of	 industry,	producing	
a	miniscule	 share	of	national	 exports	 and	with	 a	 tiny	 share	of	 foreign	direct	
investment	 (FDI)—three	 indicators	 that	 reveal	 it	 to	 be	 the	 least	 reformed	 of	
China’s	regions.	
Table 7.1 Regional snapshot, 2007
Indicator East Centre West
Population (million) 474 .8 461 .5 363 .0
Share of national population (%) 36 .5 35 .5 27 .9
Urban proportion of population (%) 55 .0 43 .3 37 .0
Percentage of population aged 6+ with:
Primary schooling or less 35 .8 36 .7 49 .0
Senior secondary schooling or higher 23 .0 20 .3 15 .6
Life expectancy (in 2000) 74 .3 71 .6 68 .4
Per capita GDP (RMB) 30 131 15 939 12 229
Regional share of industrial output produced by (%):
State-owned and shareholding enterprises 20 .3 44 .6 53 .0
Private enterprises 23 .7 23 .7 19 .5
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and foreign-funded 
enterprises 41 .1 14 .5 10 .0
Share of national exports produced in (%) 88 .2 8 .0 3 .8
Share of foreign direct investment going to (%) 77 .2 14 .5 6 .1
Share of national total budgetary revenue (%) 59 .6 23 .1 17 .3
Share of national total budgetary expenditure (%) 44 .2 30 .1 25 .7
Sources:	Author’s	 calculations	 and	National	Bureau	of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 2008,	China Industrial Economic 
Statistical Yearbook 2008,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.








the	 period	 1994–2007	 (and	 indeed	 during	 the	 first	 three	 decades	 of	 reform),	
with	the	exception	of	Xinjiang	and	Yunnan,	they	all	performed	above	average	
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during	 the	 period	 2000–07.	 Moreover,	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 west’s	 aggregate	
per	capita	GDP	growth—from	11.3	per	cent	to	15	per	cent—is	larger	than	the	
increase	for	the	other	two	regions,	although	on	average	this	resulted	in	virtually	






Table 7.2 Per capita GDP levels and growth rates
Region Per capita GDP 
(RMB) 2007
Average annual growth rates (current prices)
1994–2000 Rank 2000–07 Rank
East
Beijing 58 204 13 .9 7 14 .6 19
Tianjin 46 122 14 .1 4 14 .4 22
Hebei 19 877 14 .3 3 14 .6 18
Liaoning 25 729 10 .7 24 12 .6 24
Shanghai 66 367 14 .7 2 9 .8 31
Jiangsu 33 928 12 .6 13 16 .3 8
Zhejiang 37 411 13 .9 6 15 .7 12
Fujian 25 908 13 .6 8 12 .2 28
Shandong 27 807 13 .5 10 16 .5 6
Guangdong 33 151 12 .4 14 14 .5 20
Hainan 14 555 6 .1 30 11 .3 30
Centre
Shanxi 16 945 10 .5 25 18 .6 2
Jilin 19 383 10 .8 23 16 .0 10
Heilongjiang 18 478 11 .6 18 11 .6 29
Anhui 12 045 11 .6 19 13 .8 23
Jiangxi 12 633 12 .6 12 14 .7 16
Henan 16 012 14 .0 5 16 .7 5
Hubei 16 206 13 .6 9 12 .3 27
Hunan 14 492 13 .1 11 14 .4 21
West
Guangxi 12 555 7 .7 29 16 .5 7
Inner Mongolia 25 393 11 .8 16 23 .3 1
Chongqing 14 660 - - 16 .1 9
Sichuan 12 893 11 .3 20 15 .2 14
Guizhou 6915 9 .4 28 14 .6 17
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Yunnan 10 540 10 .9 22 12 .4 26
Tibet 12 109 14 .9 - 15 .0 15
Shaanxi 14 607 11 .7 17 18 .1 3
Gansu 10 346 12 .2 15 15 .2 13
Qinghai 14 257 9 .8 27 15 .9 11
Ningxia 14 649 10 .3 26 17 .1 4
Xinjiang 16 999 11 .2 21 12 .5 25
Average 18 934 12 .3 13 .4
-	zero











these	 average	 growth	 rates,	 by	 2030	 the	 west	 would	 still	 have	 a	 per	 capita	





Recent trends in industrial development





just	 36.4	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 population,	 this	 translates	 into	 significantly	 higher	
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The	 first	 term	 on	 the	 right-hand	 side	 of	 Equation	 7.2	 is	 called	 the	 national	
component	 of	 growth,	 as	 it	 shows	 the	 growth	 that	 would	 have	 resulted	 had	
sector	 i	 in	region	 j	exactly	matched	the	national	 trend	 (Rk).	The	second	term	
in	Equation	7.2	is	the	structural	component,	reflecting	the	extent	to	which	the	
change	in	sector	i	can	be	attributed	to	the	region’s	industry	mix;	if	a	region’s	
industrial	 structure	 is	 dominated	 by	 industries	 that	 are	 experiencing	 above-
average	 rates	 of	 growth	 (higher	 Rik	),	 it	 will	 experience	 faster	 output	 growth	
than	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country.	The	 third	 term	 in	 Equation	 7.2	 is	 the	 location	
(or	residual)	component,	as	it	measures	the	extent	to	which	sector	i	in	region	
j grew	faster	or	slower	 than	the	national	growth	rate	 for	 that	sector,	 thereby	
reflecting	how	the	local	characteristics	of	a	given	province	influenced	its	growth	















shows,	 the	 industry-wide	 NRC	 is	 accounted	 for	 entirely	 by	 the	 province’s	
industry-wide	 location	 component,	 since	 the	 structural	 component	 becomes	
zero.	Data	are	drawn	from	the	China Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook (NBS	
1995,	2001,	2008)	for	30	provincesBecause	Chongqing	became	an	independent	
provincial	unit	only	in	1997,	it	is	included	in	Sichuan	for	this	analysis	so	that	




each	province	 and	 region	during	 the	period	2000–07.	This	demonstrates	 the	
first	key	message	contained	in	shift-share	analysis:	a	positive	NRC	is	equivalent	
to	 a	 provincial	 growth	 rate	 that	 is	 above	 the	 national	 average	 annual	 rate	 of	
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Table 7.3 Industry-wide NRCs and growth rates of industrial output, 2000–07
Region NRC 
(RMB100 000)
Average annual growth rate (%)
East                                           2458.3                               22.4
Beijing –2526 .4 18 .9
Tianjin –2250 .5 19 .4
Hebei 876 .4 23 .0
Liaoning –1870 .0 20 .9
Shanghai –7043 .3 18 .3
Jiangsu 3920 .7 23 .3
Zhejiang 4533 .9 24 .2
Fujian 349 .4 22 .7
Shandong 10 426 .9 25 .6
Guangdong –3999 .8 21 .2
Hainan 41 .1 22 .9
Centre                                      -2968.0                               21.7
Shanxi 2125 .3 26 .8
Jilin –1324 .8 19 .6
Heilongjiang –5255 .8 13 .4
Anhui 69 .2 22 .4
Jiangxi 1783 .3 27 .1
Henan 3862 .7 25 .3
Hubei –4950 .8 16 .3
Hunan 722 .9 23 .5
West                                          509.6                                22.4
Guangxi –121 .2 21 .9
Inner Mongolia 2436 .0 30 .0
Sichuan 889 .1 23 .1
Guizhou –495 .1 19 .7
Yunnan –741 .6 20 .0
Tibet –38 .5 11 .9
Shaanxi 178 .5 22 .7
Gansu –674 .8 19 .5
Qinghai –106 .9 20 .5
Ningxia –65 .4 21 .4
Xinjiang –750 .2 19 .3
National total 0 .0 22 .3
Sources:	Author’s	 calculations	 and	National	Bureau	of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 2001,	China Industrial Economic 
Statistical Yearbook 2001,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing;	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2008,	China 
Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook 2008,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.	
Table	 7.4	 provides	 a	 different	 slant,	 by	 presenting	 the	 NRC	 and	 location	
components	for	the	east,	centre	and	west	for	each	of	the	36	industrial	sectors	
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for	 the	 period	 2000–07.	 Note	 that	 all	 regions	 can	 record	 a	 positive	 NRC	 for	
sectors	that	are	growing	above	the	national	average	rate	of	growth	of	industrial	




industrial	 sectors	 are	 performing	 above	 average	 in	 the	 region—and	 likewise	
the	 number	 of	 negative	 location	 components	 for	 the	 east,	 18,	 indicates	 that	
the	east	 is	not	completely	dominating	 in	every	sector.	The	18	and	15	sectors	















sectors	 in	which	 the	 region	produces	between	4.5	 and	15.7	per	 cent	of	 total	
output,	with	the	exception	of	leather	and	furs.	Notably,	none	of	these	sectors	
is	particularly	labour	intensive	but	rather	dominates	the	capital-intensive	end	









Table 7.4 Regional NRCs and location components by sector, 2000–07
East Centre West
Sector NRC Location NRC Location NRC Location
Prospects for diminishing regional disparities
137
Coal mining and dressing 425 .7 –660 .0 1618 .6 94 .1 1089 .6 565 .9
Petroleum and natural gas 
extraction
–2866 .9 –212 .7 –3045 .2 –614 .5 –646 .5 827 .2
Ferrous metal mining  
and dressing
812 .2 –0 .6 264 .4 –86 .4 264 .9 87 .0
Non-ferrous metal mining  
and dressing
–40 .7 –164 .4 305 .4 187 .8 98 .4 –23 .4
Non-metal mineral mining  
and dressing
–263 .3 –71 .8 10 .8 94 .8 –84 .9 –23 .0
Food processing –446 .5 –337 .7 89 .1 131 .9 181 .9 205 .8
Food manufacturing –1142 .2 –601 .2 120 .7 281 .8 244 .8 319 .4
Beverages –2312 .8 –407 .3 –589 .0 125 .3 –334 .2 282 .0
Tobacco –566 .3 321 .8 –857 .4 28 .1 –1689 .2 –349 .9
Textiles –3615 .1 896 .0 –1527 .8 –695 .8 –567 .5 –200 .1
Garments –3027 .1 –19 .4 –192 .3 28 .3 –56 .2 –8 .9
Leather, furs and down  
products
–1199 .7 –104 .1 –91 .6 16 .7 52 .3 87 .4
Wood products 96 .7 –201 .1 221 .7 144 .9 80 .4 56 .1
Furniture 657 .5 120 .2 –16 .8 –108 .7 26 .7 –11 .5
Paper making –728 .1 170 .6 –213 .1 –1 .3 –282 .9 –169 .2
Printing and recording 
medium production
–504 .4 67 .9 –128 .6 –6 .4 –177 .1 –61 .5
Cultural, educational  
and sports articles
–829 .3 –23 .2 –3 .4 22 .4 –1 .9 0 .8
Petroleum processing  
and coking
–2651 .8 –533 .1 –1479 .2 –701 .0 956 .7 1234 .1
Chemical materials 762 .4 1096 .0 –933 .8 –835 .6 –320 .4 –260 .3
Medical and pharmaceutical 
products
–1222 .8 24 .6 –448 .7 44 .0 –422 .8 –68 .6
Chemical fibres –1290 .7 198 .1 –405 .4 –169 .3 –95 .7 –28 .7
Rubber –215 .7 100 .9 –78 .0 –21 .4 –109 .6 –79 .5
Plastic –747 .6 19 .0 –83 .4 6 .8 –70 .0 –25 .8
Non-metal mineral products –1208 .9 57 .1 –284 .1 173 .8 –477 .4 –230 .9
Smelting and pressing  
of non-ferrous metals
8073 .5 857 .9 2184 .7 –120 .7 978 .7 –737 .3
Smelting and pressing of  
non-ferrous metals
3456 .2 –55 .0 2621 .6 534 .5 1604 .6 –479 .5
Metal products –415 .2 109 .6 –103 .1 –46 .7 –90 .6 –62 .9
Universal machines 3474 .3 367 .8 389 .2 –130 .0 88 .1 –237 .8
Special-purpose equipment –261 .3 –396 .5 117 .3 82 .2 327 .5 314 .4
Transportation equipment 2335 .0 1360 .8 –939 .8 –1423 .1 285 .4 62 .3
Electrical equipment  
and machinery
901 .0 –1 .4 120 .6 9 .7 47 .3 –8 .3





4950 .3 1907 .1 –603 .1 –750 .2 –967 .5 –1157 .0
Instruments and meters 228 .6 66 .1 11 .9 –1 .4 –53 .7 –64 .6
Electric power, steam  
and hot water 2344 .2 –332 .5 1212 .9 103 .5 1010 .6 229 .0
Production and supply  
of gas 35 .3 –93 .2 –2 .8 –33 .8 146 .3 127 .0
Production and supply  
of tap water –538 .1 27 .5 –230 .3 –33 .7 –109 .0 6 .2
Sources:	Author’s	 calculations	 and	National	Bureau	of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 2001,	China Industrial Economic 
Statistical Yearbook 2001,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing;	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2008,	China 
Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook 2008,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
Finally,	 Table	 7.6	 provides	 a	 comparison	 of	 provincial-level	 results	 for	 the	
two	 different	 periods:	 1994–2000	 and	 2000–07.	 Rather	 than	 presenting	 the	




generalisations	 given	 provincial-level	 variations	 in	 performance,	 it	 certainly	
appears	that	the	eastern	provinces	have	generally	recorded	fewer	positive	NRCs	
and	 positive	 location	 contributions	 to	 growth	 in	 the	 2000s	 compared	 with	











Table 7.5 Regional shares of industrial output, 2007 (per cent)
Sector East Centre West
Coal mining and dressing 27 .5 49 .7 22 .9
Petroleum and natural gas extraction 37 .9 29 .7 32 .4
Ferrous metal mining and dressing 60 .6 22 .1 17 .4
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Non-ferrous metal mining and dressing 26 .9 40 .6 32 .5
Non-metal mineral mining and dressing 51 .5 31 .9 16 .7
Food processing 60 .1 25 .1 14 .8
Food manufacturing 59 .8 25 .4 14 .9
Beverages 50 .9 24 .5 24 .6
Tobacco 37 .1 29 .2 33 .8
Textiles 83 .8 10 .9 5 .4
Garments 91 .6 7 .1 1 .3
Leather, furs and down products 86 .4 9 .1 4 .5
Wood products 68 .9 23 .4 7 .7
Furniture 85 .5 9 .3 5 .3
Paper making 76 .1 17 .3 6 .6
Printing and recording medium production 73 .9 14 .8 11 .4
Cultural, educational and sports articles 95 .5 4 .2 0 .4
Petroleum processing and coking 63 .8 20 .6 15 .7
Chemical materials 71 .9 16 .8 11 .2
Medical and pharmaceutical products 59 .9 24 .2 15 .8
Chemical fibres 87 .9 9 .1 3 .0
Rubber 81 .4 13 .4 5 .2
Plastic 85 .3 10 .1 4 .6
Non-metal mineral products 64 .6 24 .4 11 .0
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 66 .8 20 .2 13 .1
Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals 45 .4 30 .1 24 .5
Metal products 87 .1 8 .9 4 .0
Universal machines 80 .6 12 .4 7 .0
Special-purpose equipment 70 .0 19 .9 10 .1
Transportation equipment 63 .0 23 .5 13 .5
Electrical equipment and machinery 84 .4 10 .4 5 .2
Electronic and telecommunications equipment 94 .9 2 .4 2 .7
Instruments and meters 88 .5 7 .1 4 .3
Electric power, steam and hot water 57 .3 24 .7 18 .0
Production and supply of gas 62 .4 13 .9 23 .7
Production and supply of tap water 68 .6 17 .4 14 .1
Total industrial output 70 .4 18 .1 11 .5
Sources:	Author’s	 calculations	 and	National	Bureau	of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 2008,	China Industrial Economic 
Statistical Yearbook 2008,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
Table 7.6 Shift-share analysis of provincial industrial growth
Positive NRC Positive location
Region 1994–2000 2000–07 1994–2000 2000–07
East
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Beijing 12 7 11 8
Tianjin 18 6 22 8
Hebei 18 10 20 9
Liaoning 8 16 3 22
Shanghai 19 5 14 5
Jiangsu 16 15 16 19
Zhejiang 24 22 27 26
Fujian 21 21 22 22
Shandong 16 26 15 27
Guangdong 22 12 29 13
Hainan 18 8 18 6
Centre
Shanxi 6 13 7 13
Jilin 11 11 9 13
Heilongjiang 11 4 5 5
Anhui 9 15 5 12
Jiangxi 5 26 4 27
Henan 18 25 22 30
Hubei 18 2 17 2
Hunan 11 21 7 21
West
Guangxi 6 13 2 15
Inner Mongolia 9 21 6 26
Sichuan 11 21 8 27
Guizhou 13 10 13 10
Yunnan 11 11 9 11
Tibet 12 2 12 4
Shaanxi 9 12 8 14
Gansu 13 7 12 9
Qinghai 10 14 11 17
Ningxia 15 12 16 15
Xinjiang 13 13 13 13
Sources:	Author’s	 calculations	 and	National	Bureau	of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 2001,	China Industrial Economic 
Statistical Yearbook 2001,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing;	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2008,	China 













Guizhou	 and	 Ningxia	 all	 performed	 worse	 on	 both	 counts.	 Based	 on	 these	








of	 capital	 there	 and	 result	 in	 firms	 directing	 their	 investment	 elsewhere	 in	
China,	where	the	relative	rates	of	return	to	investment	will	be	higher.	Models	
of	 ‘new’	 economic	 geography,	 while	 underpinned	 by	 different	 mechanisms,	
tend	 to	 predict	 likewise	 that	 firms	 will	 eventually	 relocate	 to	 less-developed	
regions	 in	 order	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 lower	 costs	 there	 (as	 long	 as	 transport	
costs	between	regions	fall	below	a	certain	critical	level	and	there	is	some	labour	
immobility	between	regions)	(Krugman	1991;	Puga	and	Venables	1996).	These	
models	 are	 based	 on	 the	 more	 traditional	 arguments	 of	 Hirschman	 (1958)	
and	Myrdal	 (1957),	who	describe	 respectively	how	development	 in	 the	most	
industrialised	centres	will	ultimately	trickle	down	or	spread	to	less-developed	



































the	 reduction	 in	 labour	 costs	 in	 the	 centre	 and	west	 relative	 to	 the	 east	will	
enable	‘flying	geese	within	Chinese	borders’.
Linked	to	Cai	et	al.’s	(2009)	argument	that	labour-intensive	industries	will	soon	





The	 dynamic	 coastal	 regions	 will	 graduate	 surprisingly	 quickly	 from	
labour-intensive	 activities	 and	 re-specialise	 in	 capital	 or	 technology-
intensive	 sectors	 of	 the	 production	 process.	 Rising	 opportunity	 costs	
of	 labour	in	the	countryside	and	wages	in	towns	would	be	helpful	 in	
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Regional	 policies	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 make	 a	 positive	 contribution	 to	 the	
realisation	 of	 this	 outcome.	 As	 Lai	 (2002)	 notes,	 the	 Western	 Development	
Strategy	 was	 introduced	 not	 only	 to	 try	 to	 reduce	 regional	 inequality	 and	
discontent,	 but	 in	 order	 to	 support	 necessary	 state-owned	 enterprise	 (SOE)	
reforms	in	the	wake	of	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO)	entry	and	to	encourage	
the	 opening	 up	 of	 the	 west	 more	 generally.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 these	 efforts	
succeed,	in	combination	with	extensive	improvements	in	infrastructure	within	
the	west	and	between	regions,	 the	region	 is	 likely	to	become	an	 increasingly	
attractive	place	for	firms	to	locate	production.	The	Revive	the	North-East	policy	
can	equally—to	the	extent	that	it	succeeds	in	promoting	much	needed	enterprise	
reforms—make	 the	 north-eastern	 region	 increasingly	 attractive,	 while	 the	
central	provinces	could	benefit	naturally	 from	their	proximity	 to	 the	east,	as	
























productivity	 growth	 was	 the	 key	 determinant	 of	 China’s	 rapid	 economic	
growth—in	contrast	with	others,	such	as	Wu	(2003)	and	Chow	and	Lin	(2002),	
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who	 argued	 that	 capital	 investment	 was	 the	 dominant	 factor.	 	To	 the	 extent	
that	growth	is	driven	by	capital	investment,	standard	growth	theory	predicts	








that,	 contrary	 to	 the	 neoclassical	 prediction	 of	 capital	 flowing	 west,	 it	 will	
continue	to	flow	east.	Chi’s	evidence	demonstrates	that	tertiary-level	education	
is	the	most	important	determinant	of	this	skill–capital	link	and,	furthermore,	
provincial	 government	 expenditure	 on	 education	 has	 done	 little	 to	 increase	
tertiary-level	stocks	in	the	central	and	western	provinces	(while	having	some	
impact	 on	 reducing	 the	 percentage	 of	 primary-level	 attainment	 and	 raising	
secondary-level	 attainment).	 Essentially,	 the	 conclusion	 is	 that,	 until	 interior	

















these	 are	 the	 industries	 for	 which	 relocation	 first	 becomes	 profitable	 in	 the	
face	 of	 rising	 wages	 in	 the	 industrial	 core	 and	 improving	 transport	 linkages	
between	regions.	If	the	shift-share	analysis	for	2000–07	had	indicated	that	these	
were	the	types	of	industries	starting	to	perform	well	in	the	centre	and	west—
particularly	 industries	 that	 rank	highly	 in	 terms	of	 industrial	 output	 shares,	
such	as	electronic	and	telecommunication	equipment,	at	9.8	per	cent	of	 total	
industrial	output,	and	one	of	the	most	 labour-intensive	sectors—there	would	
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be	some	cause	for	optimism	that	this	process	had	started	in	China.	Instead,	as	
discussed	 above,	 the	 few	 sectors	 that	 were	 performing	 well	 in	 these	 regions	




term.This	 is	 an	 issue	 that	 remains	 open	 for	 further	 investigation—for	which	
there	is	no	space	to	expand	on	here.	See	Golley	(2007:Ch.	8)	for	further	details.
In	 reference	 to	 the	 theories	 mentioned	 above,	 another	 reason	 for	 pessimism,	

















at	 the	 disaggregate	 level	 suggest	 significant	 continuing	 duality	 and	 surplus	



















are	essentially	national	 and	not	 regional	goals	 and	are	unlikely	 to	be	 income	
equalising	in	any	significant	way,	if	at	all.	He	also	notes	the	incentive	problems	
inherent	in	a	centrally	directed	regional	strategy	that	lead	provincial	and	lower-
level	 leaders	 to	plead	poverty	and	appear	needy	 in	order	 to	 compete	 for	 the	




Chung	 et	 al.	 2009).	 Golley	 (2007)	 describes	 the	 WRDP	 as	 a	 ‘developmental	
state’	 approach	 to	 regional	policy,	 in	which	 the	central	government	 seems	 to	
be	 controlling	 development	 through	 state	 ownership	 and	 decree	 rather	 than	
by	 adopting	 policies	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 succeed	 in	 stimulating	 self-sustaining	
growth	in	the	region.	As	one	illustration	of	this	policy	approach,	a	white	paper	
released	 in	2003	states	 that	 large	numbers	of	university	graduates,	 scientists,	
technicians	and	highly	trained	professionals	have	been	‘assigned’	to	Xinjiang	
(‘White	 paper	 on	 “the	 important	 role	 of	 Xinjiang	 Production	 Construction	
Corps”’,	 Xinhua News,	 26	 May,	 viewed	 6	 September	 2003,	 <http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english>).	If	this	is	how	a	State	Council	member	can	claim	that	
the	‘phenomenon	of	the	peacock	flying	to	the	southeast	will	be	replaced	by	the	
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Conclusions
China	 has	 entered	 its	 fourth	 decade	 as	 a	 developing,	 market	 economy	 with	
significant	 and	 rising	 regional	 inequalities.	This	 chapter	has	 investigated	 the	













eastern	 region.	 Rising	 incomes	 in	 the	 east	 could	 provide	 a	 crucial	 source	 of	
demand	for	non-eastern	products,	with	the	east	possibly	becoming	for	western	









if	 rising	 costs	 in	 labour-intensive	manufacturing	 in	 the	 east	 led	 to	 industrial	
upgrading	 there,	 industrial	 relocation	could	occur	not	 inwards	 to	 the	 rest	of	
China	but	rather	would	occur	outwards	to	competitor	nations	such	as	India	and	
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China’s exchange rate policy and what it 
means for the dollar
The	debate	over	 the	 exchange	 rate	between	 the	 renminbi	 (RMB)	 and	 the	US	
dollar	is	usually	framed	in	terms	of	global	imbalances:	excessive	US	consumption	








leaders,	 however,	 regard	 the	 pressure	 to	 revalue	 the	 renminbi	 and	 various	
protectionist	trade	policies	from	the	West	as	unfair,	and	believe	they	threaten	
China’s	 development.2	 What	 accounts	 for	 this	 considerable	 gap	 between	 the	




term	trends	of	China’s	economic	 fundamentals,	 including	high	growth,	 rapid	














and	 investment	flows	with	US	and	world	markets.	China	 is	 concerned	 that	 a	
premature	end	to	this	nominal	link	with	the	dollar	would	bring	about	financial	








the	 United	 States	 dollar	 by	 over	 5	 per	 cent	 a	 year	 and	 China’s	 stock-market	
index	increased	from	about	1500	to	6000	before	falling	to	2000	because	of	large	




Another	 reason	 for	 not	 having	 predictable	 renminbi	 appreciation	 relates	 to	




to	buy	dollar	 assets	 if	 they	were	 likely	 to	 continually	depreciate	 in	 terms	of	
the	renminbi.	Because	fear	of	dollar	depreciation—and	the	near-zero	short-term	








appreciation	against	 the	dollar	and	China’s	extra	 inflation	above	US	 inflation.	
This	real	exchange	rate	is	determined	largely	by	China’s	productivity	growth.	
If	 China	 appreciates	 its	 currency	 in	 excess	 of	 its	 productivity	 gains,	 it	 will	
3	 See	 a	 series	 of	 articles	 by	 Ronald	 McKinnon	 about	 the	 exchange-rate	 policy	 in	 Japan	 and	 China—
particularly	McKinnon	et	al.	(2009).
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experience	deflation.	 If,	however,	China	 refuses	nominal	 appreciation	against	





Indeed,	 if	China	makes	 the	mistake	of	 continually	 appreciating	 the	 renminbi	
against	 the	 dollar—ostensibly	 to	 reflect	 its	 higher	 productivity	 growth	 in	
manufacturing—then	 wage	 growth	 could	 well	 slow	 by	 roughly	 the	 amount	




pace	 as	 domestic	 productivity	 growth	 in	 manufacturing.	 Then,	 when	 Japan	
was	 forced	by	the	US	government	 to	appreciate	 in	 the	1970s	and	afterwards,	
wage	growth	slumped	to	virtually	zero	and	remains	at	zero	today.4	China	does	




(2007)	 research	 is	 clearly	 consistent	 with	 Japan’s	 experiences	 and	 supports	
China’s	current	exchange-rate	policy.
When	 it	 comes	 to	 rebalancing,	what	 really	matters	 is	 the	 real	 exchange	 rate:	
the	 relative	 price	 levels	 between	 economies	 in	 international	 currency,	 which	






















by	 shifting	 disposable	 income	 to	 households,	 paying	 corporate	 dividends,	
increasing	 governments’	 fiscal	 spending,	 and	 so	 on—and	 not	 simply	 on	
adjusting	the	exchange	rate.
China	 is	 well	 known	 for	 its	 high	 savings	 rate,	 which	 reached	 about	 55	 per	
cent	of	gross	domestic	product	(GDP),	with	a	current	account	surplus	of	about	
10	per	 cent	of	GDP,	during	2007–08.	One	of	 the	key	 sources	of	China’s	high	
national	savings	rate	is	its	state-owned	enterprises	(SOEs),	as	corporate	savings	





private	 purchasing	 power	 when	 the	 prices	 of	 their	 shares	 increased,	 which	
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Addressing the West’s concerns
Chinese	and	foreign	observers	alike	have	expressed	concerns	about	inefficient	
investment	 in	 China’s	 export-manufacturing	 sector	 and	 in	 some	 local	
government-sponsored	 projects.	 As	 a	 result,	 China’s	 central	 government	 has	
recently	tightened	monitoring	and	control	of	all	new	projects,	especially	those	












accumulated	 expenditure	 for	 those	Chinese	 students	 going	 abroad	will	 reach	
US$606.8	billion—amounting	to	about	30	per	cent	of	China’s	current	 foreign	
exchange	 reserves.	 It	 is	no	 secret	 that	 even	high	and	middle-income	Chinese	
parents	 need	 to	 save	 for	 many	 years	 or	 decades	 to	 pay	 for	 their	 children’s	
expensive	overseas	education.	
Price distortions and global rebalancing
One	of	 the	key	 factors	driving	 the	global	 imbalances	has	been	cheap	money,	
which,	together	with	weak	regulation	of	high-risk	investment,	led	to	property	
and	 stock-market	 bubbles	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 other	 economies.	 The	
bubbles	brought	temporary	capital	gains	that	reduced	Americans’	savings	and	
increased	 their	 consumption	 to	 levels	 beyond	 their	 sustainable	 income.	This	
is	 well	 known	 now;	 but	 what	 has	 been	 overlooked	 in	 the	 public	 discussion	
is	 that	 this	 same	 cheap	money	 also	flowed	 into	China	 through	 foreign	direct	
investment	(FDI)	and	other	capital	flows.	Cheap	foreign	money,	combined	with	
cheap	Chinese	land,	energy	and	natural	resources,	has	led	to	huge	overcapacity	
in	 China’s	 manufacturing	 sector,	 driving	 down	 the	 prices	 of	 made-in-China	
products.	
The	 United	 States’	 current	 zero-interest-rate	 policy	 might	 be	 necessary	 for	
the	US	economy	now,	but	it	is	likely	to	create	a	carry	trade	as	a	by-product—
that	 is,	where	 investors	borrow	currencies	with	 low	 interest	 rates	and	 invest	
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in	 currencies	 with	 high	 interest	 rates	 to	 make	 profits	 when	 the	 interest	 rate	




higher	 levels	 of	 domestic	 investment	 for	 future	 domestic	 consumption.	 This	
would	certainly	help	global	rebalancing.
Rising	Chinese	household	income	and	large	official	reserves	mean	that	there	will	
be	 rising	demand	 for	diversification	by	Chinese	 investors	 into	 foreign	assets.	
Over	time,	the	amount	of	cross-border	capital	flows	could	be	much	larger	than	
the	amount	of	trade	flows.	To	facilitate	these	future	cross-border	capital	flows,	
it	 would	 be	 helpful	 for	 China	 to	 maintain	 a	 stable	 exchange	 rate	 and	 large	
foreign	exchange	reserves—both	of	which	are	critical	in	reducing	the	Chinese	
and	foreign	investors’	uncertainty	that	would	result	from	a	volatile	exchange	
rate.	 Having	 a	 stable	 exchange	 rate	 to	 facilitate	 cross-border	 investment	 is	
also	 important	 for	 the	 large	 number	 of	 US	 multinational	 corporations	 with	
extensive	 and	 growing	 investments	 in	 China	 that	 generate	 high	 value-added	
complementary	jobs	in	the	United	States.	
The future for China and the dollar 
The	biggest	challenge	 for	Chinese	policymakers	now	is	how	to	deal	with	 the	
property	 and	 stock-market	 bubbles	 being	 formed	 by	 cheap	 money	 in	 China	
and	 around	 the	 world.	 As	 asset	 prices	 and	 the	 consumer	 price	 index	 (CPI)	
rise,	it	is	important	for	China	to	raise	its	interest	rate—as	India	has	done	very	
successfully—to	 keep	 the	 real	 interest	 rate	 at	 a	 stable	 and	 positive	 level.	 A	
higher	interest	rate	would	attract	greater	capital	inflows.	It	is	therefore	necessary	
for	 China	 to	 improve	 its	 capital-control	 mechanisms,	 to	 allow	 orderly	 cross-





Given	 the	 institutional	 and	 structural	 constraints	 in	 China,	 it	 does	 not	 seem	
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Given	 the	 huge	 potential	 for	 cross-border	 investment	 and	 debt	 financing	
between	the	United	States	and	China,	a	stable	renminbi–dollar	exchange	rate	
seems	 to	 fit	 both	 countries’	 long-term	 national	 interest.	 If	 the	 United	 States	
and	China	can	cooperate	effectively	in	maintaining	the	stability	of	the	exchange	
rate	and	orderly	cross-border	flows	of	capital,	 there	 is	 little	reason	to	believe	
the	dollar-based	international	currency	system	will	collapse	in	the	foreseeable	
future.	








Rebalancing	 the	 world	 economy	 can	 be	 accomplished	 without	 revaluing	 the	
renminbi.	For	this	 to	happen	without	major	dislocations,	however,	structural	
and	 institutional	reforms	must	occur	both	 in	China	and	 in	 the	United	States.	
Higher	inflation	in	China	and	deflation	or	lower	inflation	in	the	United	States	
can	bring	about	the	needed	adjustment	in	real,	rather	than	nominal,	exchange	
rates.	 This	 implies	 a	 stronger	 dollar,	 but	 also	 requires	 de-leveraging	 in	 the	
United	States,	including	reduction	of	US	fiscal	deficits.	










decades	 if	 China	 continues	 its	 market-oriented	 reform	 and	 its	 trend	 of	 rapid	
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In	 the	next	 two	decades,	 rising	non-tradable	goods	prices	 in	China	will	 lead	
to	 a	 gradual	 but	 steady	 convergence	 of	 China’s	 price	 levels	 towards	 those	 in	
Hong	 Kong	 and	 the	 United	 States,	 through	 structural	 inflation	 or	 structural	
renminbi	 appreciation—or	 both.	 It	 is	 essential	 for	 China’s	 policymakers	 and	
Chinese	people	to	tolerate	the	structural	inflation	and/or	currency	appreciation	
associated	with	this	productivity	catch-up.	

















in	 the	 property	 sector	 are	 likely	 to	 continue,	 leading	 to	 serious	 inefficiency	
in	 investment	 as	 well	 as	 social	 instability.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 China	 does	
raise	interest	rates	to	a	level	higher	than	its	structural	inflation,	it	then	needs	
adequate	capital	control	to	deal	with	speculative	capital	inflows.	
The	 importance	 of	 keeping	 the	 real	 interest	 rate	 positive	 cannot	 be	
overemphasised	 for	 China	 in	 the	 next	 two	 decades,	 as	 China’s	 key	 challenge	
in	 macroeconomic	 adjustment	 is	 to	 improve	 its	 investment	 and	 consumption	
efficiency	so	that	it	can	absorb	more	of	its	current	account	surplus.	Otherwise,	
China	will	face	serious	international	trade	protection	pressure.
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 chapter	 shows	 that	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 for	 China	 to	
rely	only	on	nominal	exchange	rate	flexibility	to	facilitate	its	rising	price	level	
if	 it	 can	 instead	 tolerate	 higher	 structural	 inflation	 and	 the	 associated	 real	
appreciation.	In	fact,	it	is	much	easier	for	China	to	implement	a	flexible	exchange	
rate	regime	when	it	allows	reasonable	structural	inflation.	With	inflation,	there	
will	 be	 potential	 for	 the	 currency	 to	 depreciate	 when	 inflation	 runs	 beyond	
productivity	growth.	So,	a	mixture	of	inflation	and	nominal	appreciation	could	
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create	 a	 regime	 in	 which	 the	 market	 exchange	 rates	 could	 go	 up	 or	 down—
reducing	the	incentive	for	massive	speculative	holdings	of	the	renminbi,	which	
has	become	one	of	the	key	drivers	of	China’s	foreign	exchange	reserve	bubble.







As	 soon	 as	 China	 starts	 to	 tolerate	 reasonable	 structural	 inflation	 and	 the	
associated	 real	 appreciation,	 the	 pressure	 for	 nominal	 appreciation	 will	 be	
reduced.	
This	chapter	has	also	highlighted	the	fact	that	the	exchange	rate	is	a	price	not	
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The real exchange rate 
and the renminbi 9
 
Rod Tyers and Ying Zhang
Introduction
China’s	renminbi	(RMB)	has	been	at	the	centre	of	political	debates	over	current	
account	 imbalances	 for	more	than	a	decade.	 In	scholarly	circles,	while	a	 few,	
including	 McKinnon	 (2006),	 argue	 that	 a	 renminbi	 appreciation	 would	 not	
address	the	imbalances	of	concern	to	the	United	States,	numerous	studies	have	
supported	 the	 view	 that	 the	 currency	 is	 undervalued—by	 margins	 ranging	
from	 ‘small’	 to	 as	high	as	50	per	 cent1—and	some	conclude	 that	 a	unilateral	
appreciation	of	the	renminbi	is	essential	(for	example,	Cline	2005).	Expectations	
that	China’s	exchange	rate	should	be	appreciating	are	based	commonly	on	the	






































































2.	 	faster	wage	growth	 ! 	
3.	 	relative	service	price	inflation		 ! 	
4.	 	an	appreciating	real	exchange	rate	(	 !).
	The	hypothesis	then	implies	that,	if	developing	countries	are	poorer	because	
their	 tradable	 labour	productivity	 is	 lower,	 their	comparatively	rapid	growth	
should	 be	 associated	 with	 real	 appreciations	 against	 their	 richer	 trading	
partners.	Given	that	this	is	a	widely	discussed	theory	of	the	real	exchange	rate,	
it	 is	not	 surprising	 that	China’s	growth	 surge	 since	 the	early	1990s	has	been	
accompanied	by	the	widespread	anticipation	of	a	real	appreciation.
While	wider	empirical	evidence	 in	support	of	 the	BSH	 is	mixed,	when	price	
levels	are	compared	 through	 time	and	across	 large	numbers	of	countries,	 the	
pattern	 of	 real	 appreciation	 among	 the	 more	 rapidly	 growing	 countries	 is	
observed	(Cheung	et	al.	2007b;	Bergin	et	al.	2006).	For	the	case	of	China,	we	
observe	 convincing	 evidence	 of	 faster	 tradable	 productivity	 growth	 (Table	
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Table 9.1 Contributions to China’s real exchange rate change, 1997–2006 
(per cent)
Faster tradable productivity growth—Balassa Samuelson +1 .6
Faster skill growth –0 .6
WTO accession trade reforms –4 .2
Influx on the financial/capital account of North America –0 .4
Efflux on the financial/capital account (high saving rate) –4 .8
Net effect over 1997–2006 –8 .1
Source:	Tyers,	R.	and	Golley,	J.	2008,	‘China’s	real	exchange	rate	puzzle’,	Journal of Economic Integration,	
vol.	23,	no.	3,	pp.	547–74.
Figure 9.1 Chinese sectoral price indices, 1990–2009
  
  




2009,	China Statistical Yearbook 2009,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
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Note:	These	are	indices	of	nominal	bilateral	rates	between	Mainland	China	and	the	United	States,	deflated	
according	 to	 / USR Y Ye E P P= × 	,	where	E	 is	 the	nominal	 exchange	 rate	 in	US	dollars	per	unit	of	 local	
currency,	
YP 		is	the	local	GDP	price	and		 YP 	is	the	corresponding	US	GDP	price.
Source:	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF)	 2009a,	 International Financial Statistics,	 International	
Monetary	Fund,	Washington,	DC.















Notes:	 Here	 the	 home	 prices	 are,	 for	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 producer	 price	 index	 and,	 for	 China,	 the	
corporate	goods	price	index.	The	Chinese	index	has	more	coverage	of	commodities	and	services,	so	this	is	
a	less	than	perfect	comparison.	The	implied	real	exchange	rate	is	in	black.
Sources:	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF)	 2009a,	 International Financial Statistics,	 International	
Monetary	 Fund,	Washington,	 DC;	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 2009,	 China Statistical Yearbook 
2009,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing;	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics,	USA.
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The law of one price for tradable goods 




























Using	 a	 multi-region,	 multi-product	 dynamic	 simulation	 model	 of	 the	 world	













force	 (relative	productivity	growth	 in	 tradable	 industries)	 is	 strong,	 as	 is	 the	
effect	of	trade	reforms	that	divert	domestic	demand	away	from	home	products	
and	 therefore	 depreciate	 the	 real	 exchange	 rate.	 In	 the	 long	 run,	 the	 real	
exchange	rate	depends	sensitively	on	factors	affecting	the	cost	of	non-traded	







inflows	on	 the	North	American	balance	of	payments	both	 tend	 to	depreciate	
the	Chinese	real	exchange	rate.	Similarly,	skill	acquisition	(which	reduces	the	
cost	 of	 supplying	 mainly	 skill-intensive	 services)	 and	 trade	 reform	 offer	 the	
expected	depreciating	forces.	In	combination,	the	current	account	imbalances	






saving–investment	 gap	 (the	 current	 account	 surplus)	 expanded	 substantially	
after	 the	 East	 Asian	 financial	 crisis.	This	 expansion	 in	 net	 outflows	 diverted	
domestic	demand	abroad	and	placed	downward	pressure	on	China’s	real	exchange	
rate.	To	see	this,	note	that	the	equality	of	net	inflows	of	payments	on	the	capital	
account	 (net	 outflows	on	 the	 current	 account)6	 to	 the	 investment–saving	gap	
follows	 from	 the	 standard	 aggregate	 expenditure	 and	 disposal	 identities.7	
Defining	net	inflows	as	positive,	the	capital	account	surplus	can	be	written	as:	
!	 ,	 in	which	I	 is	 investment,	SD	 is	total	domestic	saving,	
SNF	(net	foreign	saving)	is	net	private inflow	on	the	financial	account	and	 !	
is	 the	 annual	 addition	 to	 official	 foreign	 reserves.	 In	 the	 presence	 of	 capital	




7	 The	right-hand	side	of	this	identity	stems	from	the	combination	of	aggregate	expenditure	on	GDP,	Y = C + 
I + G + X + M;	the	fact	that	GNP	is	YN	=	Y + N,	where	N	is	net	factor	income	from	abroad;	the	GNP	disposal	
identity,	YN	=	C + T + S,	and	the	balance	of	payments,	BoP = 0 = KA + CA,	where	the	current	account	is	
CA = X – M + N.
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45	per	cent	of	China’s	GDP,	more	than	half	of	its	GDP	is	saved.	In	explaining	
the	real	depreciating	trend,	however,	 the	key	observation	 is	 that	 the	saving–
investment	gap	was	increasing	through	the	mid	2000s.























Sources:	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF),	 2009a,	 International Financial Statistics,	 International	
Monetary	Fund,	Washington,	DC;	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF),	2009b,	World Economic Outlook 
Database,	April,	International	Monetary	Fund,	Washington,	DC;	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2009,	
China Statistical Yearbook 2009,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
The real appreciation after 2004




20	per	cent	by	July	2008,	after	which	 the	global	financial	crisis	 induced	 the	
Chinese	government	to	return	to	the	de	facto	US	dollar	peg.	The	2004-2008	round	
of	revaluation	was	accompanied	by	significant	domestic	 inflation,	 implying	a	
substantially	 larger	appreciation	of	 the	underlying	real	exchange	rate	 (Figure	
9.2)—amounting	 to	 at	 least	 30	 per	 cent.	 As	 is	 evident	 from	 Figure	 9.3,	 the	
difference	between	the	bilateral	nominal	and	real	appreciations	was	associated	
with	faster	growth	of	China’s	producer	prices	than	those	of	the	United	States.	





Changes	 in	the	path	of	 the	real	exchange	rate	since	2004	are	 too	recent	 for	a	
detailed	decomposition.	The	GFC	aside,	a	clear	tendency	toward	real	appreciation	
is	 evident,	 however.	 	 In	 what	 follows,	 we	 discuss	 a	 number	 of	 alternative	
explanations	for	this	appreciating	trend.
Decreasing current account surplus 
After	 a	 rapid	 increase	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 household	 saving	 rates	 fluctuated	
between	20	and	25	per	cent	during	1997–2006	(Tyers	and	Lu	2009).	The	initial	
surge	in	household	saving	was	associated	with	the	1990s	round	of	privatisation	
and	 restructuring,	 which	 increased	 household	 funding	 responsibilities	
for	 health,	 education	 and	 retirement	 expenses.	 In	 more	 recent	 years,	 the	
government	 has	 embarked	 on	 national	 schemes	 for	 health	 and	 retirement	
insurance,	including	the	extension	of	medical	pension	insurance	to	cover	rural	




This	 reduced	 the	government’s	 contribution	 to	national	 saving.	As	 shown	 in	
Figure	9.5,	the	Chinese	current	account	surplus	has	stabilised	since	2005	and	





Lu	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 point	 out	 that	 Chinese	 state-owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs)	 still	
dominate	 industries	 such	 as	 metals,	 motor	 vehicles,	 aircraft,	 transport,	
telecommunication,	 finance	 and	 insurance	 and	 that	 they	 became	 extremely	






of	 corporate	 saving,	 which	 has	 tended	 to	 divert	 Chinese	 expenditure	 abroad	
and	 thus	 to	depreciate	 the	 real	 exchange	 rate.	As	Tyers	 and	Lu	 showed,	 the	
latter	effect	was	dominant	 to	2005.	The	more	 recent	decline	 in	 the	corporate	
saving	rate	 (Bayoumi	et	al.	2009)	could	have	shifted	this	balance	towards	the	
appreciating	effect	of	mark-ups.
China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development
172





















migration	of	 the	period	 (Chang	and	Tyers	2008;	Rees	 and	Tyers	2008).	 Since	
then	a	major	concern	of	the	central	government	has	been	the	welfare	of	farmers	
and	 other	 rural	 dwellers.	 Unlike	 the	 corresponding	 experiences	 of	 Japan,	
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under	 WTO	 rules	 for	 developing	 countries.9	 Beyond	 agriculture,	 a	 number	
of	 trade-biased	 policies	 have	 emerged	 that	 cut	 against	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 pre-
accession	reforms.	Since	2005,	the	value-added	tax	(VAT)	rebate	for	exporting	
firms	has	been	raised	nine	times—up	to	17	per	cent—covering	approximately	









since	 2004	 is	 not	 due	 to	 the	 BSH	 force	 (relatively	 high	 productivity	 growth	







Regression	 results	 suggest	 a	 structural	 change	 in	 real	 wage	 growth	 for	 the	
agricultural	 and	 construction	 sectors	 about	 2004,	 as	 indicated	 in	 Figure	 9.5.	





In	 their	 study	of	 the	 real	wages	of	unskilled	 factory	workers	 in	Guangdong,	
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take-off	in	rural	wages	after	that	time	suggests,	however,	that	real	non-hukou	
rates	have	 increased	 since	and	 this	 is	 to	be	expected	 from	 the	 improvements	
in	net	returns	from	agricultural	activity.	Increasingly,	it	is	likely	that	potential	
‘floating	workers’	are	choosing	to	continue	their	rural	employment.	Anecdotal	
indications	 of	 tightening	 labour	 markets	 have	 been	 abundant,	 including	













Macroeconomic policy and the renminbi
The	 real	 and	 nominal	 exchange	 rates	 are	 linked	 by	 definition	 as	
!	,	where	 E	 is	 the	 nominal	 exchange	 rate	 (in	 foreign	
currency	 per	 unit	 of	 home	 currency),	 PY	 is	 the	 price	 of	 the	 home	 product	







or,	 at	 another,	 as	 inflation	 (exchange	 rate	 targeting).	 This	 is	 complicated,	
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critique	 is	 misplaced.	The	 root	 of	 its	 unfairness	 is	 evident	 from	 the	 identity	












•	 government	 revenue	 is	 increasing	 so	 quickly	 that	 the	 government	 cannot	
easily	offset	private	saving	with	public	‘dis-saving’.
Consider	 each	 of	 these	 four	 conditions	 in	 turn.	 The	 capital	 controls	 are	
conceptually	simplest.	They	stem	from	‘fear	of	floating’	and	short	memories	of	
the	currency	run	with	which	China	was	threatened	in	the	late	1990s	during	the	
East	 Asian	 financial	 crisis.	 Moreover,	 some	 suspicions	 remain	 in	 the	 People’s	














cause	China’s	economy	to	adjust	with	a	 lag,	 implying	that	 the	current	account	surplus	 is	not	amenable	 to	
macroeconomic	policy	in	the	short	run.











service	 sector	 planning	 and	 facilitation	 constraints.13	 	 Moreover,	 China’s	 low	
official	domestic	financing	rates	notwithstanding,	recent	surveys	by	the	PBOC	
show	that	a	very	substantial	proportion	of	investment	still	takes	place	through	
the	 informal	 sector	 at	 rates	 that	 remain	 high	 by	 international	 standards.	 It	
















This	 support	of	 the	 ‘four	 ifs’	 suggests	 that	 the	Chinese	government	has	 little	
true	discretion	over	its	rate	of	reserve	accumulation	and	therefore	over	the	rate	
at	which	domestic	income	is	diverted	into	expenditure	abroad,	weighing	on	its	















Through	 2008	 at	 least,	 the	 PBOC	 absorbed	 foreign	 currency	 inflows	 (export	
revenue)	 net	 of	 import	 costs	 because—short	 of	 long-term	 reforms	 affecting	
financial	depth	and	while	capital	controls	remained—the	Chinese	commercial	
banks	could	not	move	the	required	volume	of	foreign	currency.	This	required	
acquisition	 of	 the	 foreign	 currency	 surplus	 with	 newly	 minted	 domestic	
currency.	To	avoid	excess	liquidity,	annual	reserve	increments	were	sterilised.	
PBOC	 holdings	 of	 domestic	 credit	 were	 insufficient	 for	 this	 sterilisation,	
however,	so	‘sterilisation	bonds’	were	issued	on	the	debit	side	of	the	balance	
sheet	shown	in	Table	9.2.
Table 9.2 The balance sheet of the People’s Bank of China, ca. 2009
Assets Liabilities
Domestic credit, DC Central bank 
claims on depository and other financial 
corporations and on the central 
government 13 per cent GDP
The monetary base, MBCurrency and bank 
reserves 43 per cent of GDP
Official foreign reserves, R55 per cent 
of GDP
Sterilisation bonds, SBDebt to the Chinese public
13 per cent of GDP
Other liabilities, OLIncludes government 
ownership 12 per cent of GDP






from	 abroad	 to	 revalue	 therefore	 creates	 two	 difficulties	 for	 the	 PBOC.	 First,	
since	the	assets	of	the	PBOC	are	primarily	in	US	dollars	and	its	liabilities	are	in	
renminbi,	too	prompt	an	appreciation	of	the	renminbi	would	result	in	substantial	
losses	 that	 would	 need	 to	 be	 covered	 in	 renminbi	 from	 the	 government	
budget.	This	concern	was	addressed	in	2007	with	the	issue	of	US$200	billion	
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interest	 rates.	The	 latter	 added	 to	 speculative	 (illegal)	 private	 inflows	 driven	
by	the	expectation	that	the	renminbi	would	be	allowed	to	appreciate	further,	
bringing	upward	pressure	on	the	real	exchange	rate	in	the	lead-up	to	the	global	
financial	 crisis	 and	 since.	 As	 Figures	 9.2	 and	 9.3	 show,	 however,	 during	 the	
crisis	 the	 drop	 in	 export	 demand	 caused	 a	 temporary	 real	 depreciation.	The	
return	to	the	de	facto	peg	then	necessitated	contractionary	monetary	policy	and	
temporary	deflation.
Figure 9.6 Dynamics of the PBOC’s balance sheet: assets and liabilities as 
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reserves	 are	 the	 equivalent	 of	 the	 private	 sector’s	 desired	 foreign	 holdings.	
A	 crude	 assessment	 of	 this	 can	be	made	by	 comparing	 the	 foreign	 shares	 of	
collective	portfolios	across	industrialised	and	developing	countries.	Assets	are,	
however,	 many	 and	 various	 and	 net	 positions	 are	 poorly	 documented.	 For	 a	
sample	 of	 countries,	 we	 have	 constructed	 a	 crude	 approximation	 of	 foreign	
shares	 in	 collective	 portfolios	 using	 estimates	 of	 capital	 stocks	 and	 recorded	
flows	on	balances	of	payments.	The	results	require	a	sceptical	eye	since	capital	
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Table 9.3 Estimates of the foreign share of total assets, selected countries
Country Ratio of foreign to total assets (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
China 10 9 9 12 14 18
Hong Kong 55 56 55 59 60 64
Japan 9 12 12 14 14 17
Taiwan 11 14 17 21 22 24
Korea 11 13 13 15 17 16
Malaysia 22 27 28 38 36 41
Singapore 48 50 51 57 57 58
Thailand 18 20 19 19 17 17
India 6 9 9 11 12 11
Brazil 5 6 8 8 7 5
Mexico 7 8 7 8 9 9
Chile 21 23 22 26 25 25
Australia 15 17 17 18 19 21
United States 22 19 18 22 25 35
European Union 15 30 33 30 34 36 47







Sources:	 For	most	 countries,	 foreign	 reserves,	money	 supplies,	gold	 stocks,	net	 factor	 income	flows	on	
current	account	balances	and	long-term	bond	rates	are	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	various	
issues, International Financial Statistics,	International	Monetary	Fund,	Washington,	DC.	For	Taiwan,	these	





Table 9.4 Country rankings on foreign shares of total assets





Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong United  
Kingdom
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States
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Australia Australia Australia Thailand Australia Australia
Korea Taiwan Taiwan Australia Korea China
Taiwan Korea Korea Korea Thailand Japan
China Japan Japan Japan China Thailand
Japan China India China Japan Korea
Mexico India China India India India
India Mexico Brazil Brazil Mexico Mexico
















US	 government—inciting	 the	 critical	 rhetoric	 (Bernanke	 2006)	 and	 the	 draft	
legislation	 to	 ‘punish’	 China	 (Callan	 2007)—it	 causes	 frustration	 in	 Europe,	
where	the	burden	of	appreciation	against	the	US	dollar	is	greatest.17
Ironically,	while	the	refusal	by	some	other	Asian	countries	to	appreciate	their	
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of	China’s	appreciation	against	the	US	dollar	is	motivated	internally.	The	sticking	
point	 is	 a	 fear	 of	 financial	 (including	 exchange	 rate)	 volatility,	 confirmed	 by	





Appreciation by monetary contraction






The	 defence	 of	 the	 stronger	 renminbi	 would	 require	 a	 contraction	 of	 the	
domestic	money	supply	(or	a	slowdown	in	its	growth)	and	a	boost	to	domestic	
short-term	interest	rates	and	other	financing	barriers.	If	the	revaluation	were	
large	 enough,	 the	 result	would	 likely	be	 a	 return	 to	 the	deflation	of	 the	 late	
1990s	 and	 this	would	hurt	 employment	 in	 the	 tradable-goods	 sector.	 Income	
would	decline	(or	grow	more	slowly),	as	would	consumption	and	saving.	Slower	
employment	growth	 in	 the	modern	 sector	would	 reduce	 capital	 returns	 and,	
combined	with	higher	financing	costs,	this	would	also	contract	investment	(or	





reduced	 current	 income,	 they	 would	 then	 smooth	 consumption	 by	 reducing	
current	 saving.	 Even	 with	 such	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 saving	 rate,	 however,	
simulations	presented	by	Tyers	and	Zhang	(2010)	show	that	the	effect	of	lower	
employment	 growth	 on	 capital	 returns	 also	 causes	 a	 fall	 in	 investment.	 The	
value	of	the	saving	decline	is	larger	in	magnitude,	however,	and	the	net	effect	is	
to	reduce	China’s	current	account	surplus.	There	is	therefore	a	real	appreciation	
against	 North	 America	 and	 a	 slight	 reduction	 in	 the	 latter’s	 current	 account	
deficit.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 a	 slight	 increase	 in	 North	 America’s	 politically	
sensitive	industrial	employment,	though	this	comes	at	the	expense	of	a	service-
sector	employment	contraction	due	to	North	America’s	real	depreciation	against	
China.	 Both	 China	 and	 North	 America	 suffer	 losses	 in	 overall	 GDP	 and	 real	
income	 per	 capita.	 The	 loss	 in	 China	 is	 substantial,	 however,	 amounting	 to	
almost	a	year’s	growth.
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A	 second	 possibility	 is	 that	 Chinese	 households	 are	 pessimistic	 and	 believe	
that	 the	 contraction	 is	 permanent.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 monetary	 contraction	
and	reduced	income,	they	would	then	exhibit	behaviour	seen	in	Japan	in	the	
1990s—smoothing	their	consumption	forward	and	raising	their	saving	rate.18	
This	 exacerbates	 the	 contraction	 in	 Chinese	 economic	 activity	 and	 income.	
Moreover,	 because	 saving	does	not	 fall	 and	 investment	 does,	China’s	 current	
account	 surplus	 is	 raised.	 The	 additional	 financial	 outflow	 causes	 a	 real	
depreciation,	 suggesting	 that,	 to	 achieve	 a	 particular	 nominal	 appreciation	
target,	 the	 monetary	 contraction	 in	 this	 case	 would	 need	 to	 deliver	 a	 larger	
deflation	than	before.	 Internationally,	 this	shock	reduces	global	 interest	rates	
and	raises	North	America’s	current	account	deficit.	Even	though	there	are	small	
gains	 in	North	America’s	 terms	of	 trade	and	real	 income,	the	exacerbation	of	
current	account	imbalances	and	the	associated	decline	in	industrial	employment	
would	further	frustrate	the	United	States	politically.	It	is	difficult	to	conclude	
other	 than	 that	 there	 is	 little	 to	 be	 gained	 from	 renminbi	 appreciation	 by	
monetary	contraction.
Taxing trade
The	 other	 ‘unhealthy’	 approach	 to	 a	 unilateral	 appreciation	 is	 via	 trade	
distortions.	We	can	dismiss	a	rise	in	import	tariffs	since	China’s	WTO	accession	
conditions	offer	very	little	room	between	applied	and	bound	tariff	rates.	Export	
restraints	 are	 possible,	 however—of	 the	 type	 followed	 by	 Japan	 in	 the	 late	





exchange	 rate.	 The	 downside	 is	 that	 they	 would	 also	 be	 a	 tax	 on	 the	 most	
rapidly	expanding	 sectors	 in	 the	economy	so	 they	would	 sacrifice	growth	 in	
urban	employment	and	income.
The	 corresponding	 Tyers	 and	 Zhang	 (2010)	 simulation	 is	 of	 the	 short-run	
impacts	 of	 an	 export	 tax	 of	 15	 per	 cent	 graduated	 over	 2007–09	 and	 levied	
only	 on	 industrial	 exports.	 As	 previously,	 they	 consider	 scenarios	 with	
optimistic	 and	 pessimistic	 households.	 Surprisingly,	 in	 both	 cases,	 China	




18	 Ito	 (2001:Ch.	 11,	 pp.	 329–33)	 shows	 that,	 in	 the	 post-Plaza	 Accord	 period,	 the	 yen	 appreciated	
substantially	against	the	US	dollar	and	Japan’s	current	account	surplus	rose	at	the	same	time,	even	while	real	
investment	also	rose.
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demand.	China’s	export-manufacturing	sector	relies	to	an	extraordinary	extent	






small	changes	 in	real	GDP	and	real	per	capita	 income.	 Importantly,	however,	
China’s	 export	 restraints	 do	 raise	 North	 American	 industrial	 employment—
again,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 services	 employment—even	 though	 North	 America	
experiences	a	real	appreciation	against	China	that	would	otherwise	advantage	









for	 tradable	 goods,	 open	 financial	 capital	 markets	 and	 a	 more	 sophisticated	
representation	of	the	labour	market.	This	opens	the	way	for	depreciating	forces	
that	 have	 offset	 the	 BSH,	 including	 net	 financial	 outflows	 on	 the	 balance	 of	
payments	 associated	 with	 China’s	 excess	 saving	 along	 with	 trade	 and	 other	













this	 intra-Asian	 trade	 is	 reducing	 the	bilateral	 surpluses	of	other	Asian	economies	with	 the	United	States	
while	it	exacerbates	that	of	China.	See,	for	example,	Athukorala	(2005,	2007).
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While	 much	 attention	 is	 paid	 in	 the	 literature	 to	 the	 past	 decade’s	
‘undervaluation’	of	the	renminbi,	 it	 is	 in	our	view	incorrect	to	blame	this	on	
China’s	monetary	policy—narrowly	defined	to	include	the	exchange	rate	target	
and	the	accumulation	of	foreign	exchange	reserves.	The	key	constraints	were	
capital	 controls,	 motivated	 by	 concern	 about	 financial	 (and	 exchange	 rate)	
stability	in	the	face	of	the	relative	immaturity	of	its	commercial	banking	sector,	






would	 most	 likely	 hurt	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world	 by	 tightening	 capital	 markets	







surplus	 by	 cutting	 imports	 in	 proportion	 with	 manufactured	 exports	 while	




in	 the	underlying	real	 exchange	rate,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 for	 the	central	bank	 to	
allow	 a	 unilateral	 nominal	 appreciation	 of	 the	 renminbi	 to	 ease	 domestic	
inflation	pressure.	To	the	extent	that	this	appreciating	trend	is	not	fast	enough	
for	 political	 equilibria	 in	 China’s	 trading	 partners,	 international	 pressure	




the	 relative	 strengths	 of	 appreciating	 forces,	 including	 tradable	 productivity	
growth,	 reduced	 savings	 and	 labour	 force	 decline,	 and	 depreciating	 forces,	
including	productivity	growth	in	its	services	sector.
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The	 ‘decoupling’	 thesis—the	 notion	 that	 the	 East	 Asian	 region	 has	 become	
a	 self-contained	 economic	 entity	 with	 the	 potential	 for	 maintaining	 its	 own	




patterns	 based	 on	 readily	 available	 trade	 data,	 which	 revealed	 a	 continuous	
increase	in	trade	among	the	countries	in	the	region	(intra-regional	trade)	since	
the	 late	 1980s—a	 process	 that	 received	 added	 impetus	 from	 the	 subsequent	
emergence	of	China	as	a	world	export	powerhouse.	A	few	studies	questioned	
the	validity	 of	 this	 inference	 in	 a	 context	 in	which	 international	 production	






































	 First,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 global	 production	 sharing,	 trade	 data	 are	 double-
counted	because	goods-in-process	 cross	multiple	 international	borders	before	
becoming	embodied	 in	 the	final	product.	Thus,	 the	 total	amount	of	recorded	
trade	could	be	a	multiple	of	the	value	of	final	goods.	Second,	and	perhaps	more	
importantly,	 trade	 shares	 calculated	 using	 reported	 data	 can	 lead	 to	 wrong	
inferences	as	to	the	relative	importance	of	the	‘region’	and	the	rest	of	the	world	
for	 the	 growth	 dynamism	 of	 a	 given	 country,	 even	 controlling	 for	 double-
counting	 in	 trade.	This	 is	because	 ‘fragmentation	 trade’	 and	 trade	 in	 related	





separation	of	parts	 and	 components	 (henceforth	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘components’)	
from	final	 (assembled)	products	 in	reported	trade	data.	We	do	this	through	a	
careful	disaggregation	of	 trade	data	based	on	Revision	Three	of	 the	Standard	
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For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter,	 East	 Asia	 is	 defined	 to	 include	 Japan	 and	
developing	East	Asia,	which	covers	the	newly	industrialised	economies	(NIEs)	
of	North	Asia	 (South	Korea,	Taiwan	and	Hong	Kong),	China	 and	members	of	
the	 Association	 of	 South-East	 Asian	 Nations	 (ASEAN).	 Among	 the	 ASEAN	










impact	of	 the	global	financial	 crisis	on	 the	export	performance	of	East	Asian	
economies.	The	next	section	deals	with	post-crisis	policy	challenges,	focusing	




Rapid	 export	 growth	 has	 been	 the	 hallmark	 of	 East	 Asia’s	 rise	 in	 the	 global	
economy.	The	combined	share	of	East	Asian	countries	in	world	non-oil	exports	
recorded	 a	 threefold	 increase	 between	 1969–70	 and	 2006–07—from	 11	 per	






these	 countries	 accounted	 for	 more	 than	 80	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 regional	 trade.	
The	 rise	of	China	has	been	 the	dominant	 factor	behind	 this	 structural	 shift,5	
but	the	other	countries		in	the	region	(Taiwan,	Korea,	Malaysia,	Singapore,	the	


























Table 10.1 Composition of manufacturing exports, 2006–07 (per cent)
Commodity 
group
EA Japan DEA China TW+K ASEAN NAFTA EU15 World
Chemicals
(SITC 5)
0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .0 0 .2 0 .2 0 .2
Resource-based 
products 
(SITC 6 – SITC 68)

























1 .3 1 .7 1 .2 1 .4 0 .9 1 .2 2 .4 3 .5 2 .3
ICT products 60 .5 33 .2 68 .9 69 .2 59 .7 78 .3 27 .6 22 .9 41 .1
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The	 best	 available	 indicator	 of	 the	 intensity	 of	 global	 production	 sharing	 is	
the	 share	 of	 parts	 and	 components	 in	 total	 manufacturing	 trade.6	 Reflecting	
6	 Henceforth,	for	the	sake	of	brevity,	we	use	the	term	‘components’	in	place	of	‘parts	and	components’.
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the	 rapid	 growth	 of	 global	 production	 sharing,	 the	 share	 of	 components	 in	
manufacturing	 trade	 has	 sharply	 increased	 across	 all	 major	 countries	 in	 the	
region	 (Table	 10.2).	 In	 2006–07,	 components	 accounted	 for	 34.1	 per	 cent	 of	
East	 Asian	 manufacturing	 exports	 (42.1	 per	 cent	 of	 manufacturing	 imports)	
compared	with	a	world	average	of	27.1	per	cent	(27.3	per	cent	of	imports).	The	
share	of	components	 is	particularly	high	among	the	ASEAN	countries.	There	
is	a	remarkable	similarity	 in	component	share	figures	 in	exports	and	 imports	
across	 countries,	 reflecting	 overlapping	 specialisation	 patterns	 in	 component	
assembly	among	countries	in	the	region.
Table 10.2 Share of parts and components in manufacturing trade, 1992–03 
and 2006–07 (per cent)
Exports Imports
Region 1992–93 2006–07 1992–93 2006–07
East Asia 20 .2 34 .1 27 .2 42 .1
Japan 23 .9 34 .4 19 .3 29 .9
Developing East Asia 17 .3 34 29 44 .2
China (PRC) 7 .4 25 .6 20 .4 44
Hong Kong, China 15 .8 33 .3 24 .1 48 .5
Taiwan 24 .7 44 .2 29 .5 38 .9
Republic of Korea 18 .1 47 .3 30 .1 31 .9
ASEAN 22 .7 44 .2 36 47 .9
Indonesia 3 .8 21 .5 27 21 .8
Malaysia 27 .7 53 .6 40 .5 50
The Philippines 32 .9 71 .7 32 .6 61 .3
Singapore 29 49 .3 39 .9 60 .4
Thailand 14 .1 29 .9 30 .6 36 .1
Vietnam n .a . 11 .0 n .a . 19 .1
South Asia 2 .3 8 .2 16 .6 23 .8
India 3 10 .4 17 .5 22 .9
NAFTA 28 .4 31 .2 37 .4 28 .8
Mexico 42 .1 34 .6 29 .4 36 .1
EU15 18 .3 22 .4 21 .2 23 .2
Industrialised countries 20 .4 25 .2 22 .6 23 .4
Developing countries 14 .6 29 .2 11 .9 33 .6
World 19 .3 27 .1 19 .6 27 .3
n.a.	not	available	
Source:	Compiled	from	United	Nations	(UN),	n.d.,	Comtrade database,	United	Nations,	New	York.
The	 rapid	 increase	 in	 component	 intensity	 (percentage	 shares	 of	 parts	 and	









for	 final	 goods	 than	 as	 a	 market	 for	 components.	Within	 East	 Asia,	 ASEAN	
countries	 stand	 out	 for	 the	 high	 share	 of	 components	 in	 their	 intra-regional	
trade	 flows	 (more	 than	 60	 per	 cent	 in	 2006–07).	 According	 to	 country-level	
data,	the	share	of	components	in	manufacturing	exports	and	imports	amounted	
to	more	than	four-fifths	in	Singapore,	Malaysia	and	the	Philippines	and	more	









EA Japan DEA PRC ASEAN NAFTA EU15 World
(a) Exports 
East Asia 47 .6 32 .9 50 .1 51 .6 54 .5 25 .1 24 .1 34 .1
Japan 42 .0 0 .0 42 .0 41 .5 47 .9 31 .5 30 .4 34 .4
Developing 
East Asia 
48 .1 33 .4 53 .9 0 .0 65 .2 22 .7 21 .6 34 .0
China (PRC) 36 .2 25 .2 40 .6 0 .0 49 .1 17 .1 16 .3 25 .6
Korea 61 .9 51 .5 63 .5 57 .3 63 .7 36 .6 26 .8 44 .2
Taiwan 51 .5 59 .0 50 .5 39 .5 61 .2 35 .0 37 .6 44 .2
ASEAN10 58 .2 39 .9 61 .4 64 .0 56 .0 32 .1 33 .9 44 .2
NAFTA 46 .7 36 .5 49 .8 34 .8 67 .9 28 .8 30 .6 31 .2
EU15 31 .4 18 .7 34 .8 30 .4 46 .5 22 .1 22 .0 22 .4
(b) Imports
East Asia 51 .7 48 .8 52 .8 34 .8 68 .3 54 .7 33 .1 42 .1
Japan 34 .2 0 .0 34 .2 23 .1 44 .9 41 .0 18 .9 29 .9
Developing 
East Asia 
55 .5 47 .7 59 .5 0 .0 74 .3 40 .3 31 .7 44 .2
China (PRC) 55 .2 47 .5 59 .2 0 .0 74 .0 40 .1 31 .6 44 .0
Korea 33 .0 26 .6 38 .1 26 .1 55 .7 38 .9 22 .9 31 .9
Taiwan 46 .7 33 .8 58 .3 44 .1 68 .8 40 .2 28 .0 38 .9
ASEAN10 50 .3 47 .2 51 .4 40 .1 55 .9 67 .5 41 .7 47 .9
NAFTA 29 .4 39 .3 26 .0 17 .7 40 .5 36 .3 25 .1 28 .8
EU15 25 .0 33 .6 22 .8 14 .9 37 .9 34 .1 22 .1 23 .4
Notes:	EA	=	East	Asia;	DEA	=	developing	East	Asia;	ASEAN6	=	 six	main	ASEAN	countries;	EU15	=	
15	 member	 countries	 of	 the	 European	 Union;	 NAFTA	 =	 countries	 in	 the	 North	 American	 Free	Trade	
Agreement	(United	States,	Canada	and	Mexico).
Source:	Compiled	from	United	Nations	(UN)	n.d.,	Comtrade database,	United	Nations,	New	York.
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China in East Asian trade
Manufacturing	 products	 dominate	 China–East	 Asia	 trade	 flows,	 accounting	
for	 nearly	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 imports	 and	 exports	 (Table	 10.4).	 In	 China’s	 total	
manufacturing	 imports	 from	 East	 Asia,	 the	 share	 of	 components	 increased	
from	 18	 per	 cent	 in	 1994–05	 to	 more	 than	 44	 per	 cent	 in	 2006–07.	 Within	
manufacturing,	 the	 share	 of	 components	 is	 much	 larger	 in	 machinery	 and	
transport	equipment	imports,	at	nearly	three-quarters	in	2006–07.	The	shares	
of	components	in	manufacturing	exports	also	have	increased	over	the	years,	but	







Table 10.4 China’s trade with the rest of East Asia (per cent)
Exports Imports
A: Commodity composition 1994–95 2006–07 1994–95 2006–07
A1: Total trade 100 100 100 100
Primary products 16 .2 10 .4 23 .5 13 .5
Manufacturing 83 .4 89 .2 76 .1 86 .3
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) 20 .8 46 .6 26 .4 49 .7
Electronics and electrical goods (75 + 76 + 77) 16 .7 40 .6 15 .0 43 .0
Miscellaneous manufacturing (SITC 8) 43 .3 25 .5 7 .7 12 .5
Apparel (84) 18 .5 10 .3 1 .3 0 .4
A2: Parts and components 100 100 100 100
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) 90 .2 95 .5 92 .1 95 .1
Electronic and electrical goods (75 + 76 + 77) 81 .0 87 .7 74 .6 85 .7
Transport equipment (78) 3 .7 2 .3 0 .7 1 .8
Other 9 .8 4 .5 3 .8 3 .3
B: Parts and component share in manufacturing trade
Total manufacturing 7 .5 25 .6 17 .9 44 .4
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) 6 .8 24 .4 46 .1 73 .3
Electronic and electrical goods (75 + 76 + 77) 30 .3 49 .3 73 .1 82 .5
Transport equipment 25 .4 50 .1 16 .3 79 .0
Other 1 .4 4 .0 18 .0 14 .4
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C: Trade with East Asia in China’s world trade
C1: Total trade 55 .8 33 .7 21 .3 28 .4
Primary products 74 .6 59 .2 27 .9 15 .5
Manufacturing 53 .3 32 .2 19 .9 32 .7
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) 53 .7 33 .1 13 .4 32 .0
Electronic and electrical goods (75 + 76 + 77) 60 .4 34 .6 53 .0 52 .0
Miscellaneous manufacturing (SITC 8) 50 .1 29 .1 27 .2 36 .0
Apparel (84) 59 .1 38 .1 45 .1 52 .9
C2: Parts and components 60 .1 44 .7 22 .4 38 .7
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) 59 .8 44 .6 21 .7 38 .6
Electronic and electrical goods (75 + 76 + 77) 61 .2 46 .0 68 .9 56 .2
Transport equipment 44 .2 23 .2 5 .6 21 .7
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Table 10.5 East Asia–China manufacturing trade
Region A: Geographic profile 
of China’s imports
B: Exports to China relative 
to total exports by country/
region
1994–95 2006–07 1994–95 2006–07
East Asia 58 .2 58 .6 7 .6 21 .2
Japan 20 .9 16 .4 5 .5 17 .3
Developing East Asia 37 .1 42 .2 8 .2 21 .6
Hong Kong 17 .3 2 .0 29 .6 19 .5
Korea 4 .3 13 .4 5 .8 27 .2
Taiwan 10 .7 14 .0 10 .3 32 .6
ASEAN 3 .7 13 .8 2 .5 13 .7
Indonesia 1 .0 1 .1 3 .3 8 .4
Malaysia 1 .1 3 .4 3 .2 13 .5
The Philippines 0 .2 2 .1 1 .5 21 .3
Singapore 0 .8 2 .3 1 .8 12 .2
Thailand 0 .7 2 .3 1 .8 11 .2
Vietnam 0 .1 0 .1 2 .5 4 .1
Other countries 41 .8 41 .4 1 .5 3 .7
World 100 100 2 .7 6 .7
Sources:	Compiled	 from	United	Nations	 (UN)	n.d.,	Comtrade database,	United	Nations,	New	York;	 and	
Council	 for	 Economic	 Planning	 and	 Development	 n.d.,	 Trade Data,	 CD-ROM,	 Council	 for	 Economic	
Planning	and	Development,	Taipei	(for	data	on	Taiwan).	
Intra-regional trade patterns
The	 previous	 section	 reveals	 three	 important	 features	 of	 the	 emerging	 trade	





networks;	 China’s	 trade	 links	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 East	 Asia	 are	 dominated	 by	
components	for	assembling	final	products,	which	are	destined	predominantly	
for	markets	in	the	rest	of	the	world.	Given	these	three	peculiarities,	conventional	
trade-flow	 analysis	 is	 bound	 to	 yield	 a	 misleading	 picture	 of	 the	 relative	
importance	of	 intra-regional	 trade—compared	with	global	 trade—for	growth	
in	East	Asia.
To	 illustrate	 this	 point,	 intra-regional	 trade	 shares	 are	 estimated	 separately	
for	 total	 manufacturing,	 components	 and	 final	 goods	 (total	 manufacturing	
net	of	components)	(Table	10.6).	The	table	covers	trade	in	East	Asia	and	three	
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sub-regions	 therein,	 which	 relate	 to	 contemporary	 Asian	 policy	 debates	 on	
regional	integration.	Data	for	NAFTA	and	the	European	Union	are	reported	for	
comparative	purposes.	Estimates	are	given	for	total	trade	(imports	plus	exports)	
as	 well	 as	 for	 exports	 and	 imports	 separately	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	 possible	
asymmetries	in	trade	patterns	resulting	from	East	Asia’s	increased	engagement	
in	fragmentation-based	international	exchange.7
Table 10.6 Intra-regional shares of manufacturing trade: total, parts and 
components and final trade, 1992–93 and 2006–07 (per cent)
        East Asia Developing
East Asia
ASEAN+31 ASEAN NAFTA EU15
Total trade
Exports
1986–97 28 .4 25 .1 17 .3 17 .4 49 .1 65 .5
1992–93 47 .2 38 .2 15 .3 20 .7 44 .4 61 .2
2006–07 43 .9 33 .4 21 .9 18 .4 48 .1 56 .9
Imports
1986–97 48 .6 22 .9 34 .4 11 .0 29 .9 69 .7
1992–93 58 .2 34 .9 43 .0 15 .5 36 .3 64 .1
2006–07 64 .4 46 .7 49 .3 20 .8 32 .0 57 .9
Trade (exports + imports)
1986–97 35 .8 24 .0 22 .9 13 .5 37 .1 67 .5
1992–93 53 .2 36 .5 27 .0 17 .8 39 .9 62 .6
2006–07 55 .1 40 .0 30 .4 20 .1 38 .4 57 .4
Parts and components 
Exports
1992–93 50 .2 42 .6 33 .7 30 .3 43 .5 62 .3
2006–07 61 .1 53 .9 35 .3 25 .4 46 .9 55 .9
Imports
1992–93 65 .9 35 .3 39 .6 20 .2 39 .5 58 .0
2006–07 66 .9 50 .9 47 .8 22 .9 39 .9 55 .2
Trade
1992–93 57 .0 38 .7 35 .4 24 .2 41 .4 60 .1
2006–07 62 .9 52 .1 40 .2 23 .1 43 .2 55 .5
Final goods2 
Exports
1992–93 46 .0 36 .8 11 .4 16 .1 44 .7 60 .9
2006–07 36 .9 28 .3 17 .0 15 .9 48 .7 57 .0
7	 Disaggregated	data	needed	for	separating	parts	and	components	from	total	(reported)	trade	are	available	
only	from	1992	(Athukorala	2009b).	
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Imports
1992–93 55 .4 34 .7 43 .4 12 .9 35 .3 65 .6
2006–07 63 .0 42 .8 50 .2 20 .6 30 .2 58 .5
Trade
1992–93 50 .3 35 .7 25 .4 14 .3 39 .4 63 .2





Sources:	Compiled	 from	United	Nations	 (UN)	n.d.,	Comtrade database,	United	Nations,	New	York;	 and	
Council	 for	 Economic	 Planning	 and	 Development	 n.d.,	 Trade Data,	 CD-ROM,	 Council	 for	 Economic	
Planning	and	Development,	Taipei	(for	data	on	Taiwan).
Trade	 patterns	 depicted	 by	 the	 unadjusted	 (standard)	 trade	 data	 affirm	 the	
perception	underlying	the	decoupling	thesis	that	Asia,	and	in	particular	East	
Asia,	has	become	increasingly	integrated	through	merchandise	trade.	In	2006–
07,	 intra-regional	 trade	 accounted	 for	 55.1	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 manufacturing	
trade—up	from	35.8	per	cent	in	1986–87.	The	level	of	intra-regional	trade	in	East	
Asia	was	higher	than	that	in	NAFTA	throughout	this	period	and	was	rapidly	




















sub-groups	therein)	on	extra-regional	markets	 (in	particular,	 those	 in	NAFTA	
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and	the	European	Union)	for	export-led	growth	is	far	greater	than	is	revealed	













In	sum,	these	data	support	 the	hypothesis	 that,	 in	a	context	 in	which	global	





is	 included.	Thus,	 the	 rising	 importance	 of	 global	 production	 sharing	 seems	
















China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development
206
Figure 10.1 Growth of merchandise trade: East Asia, developing East Asia, 
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Table 10.7 East Asia: growth of total merchandise exports and imports, 
2007Q1 – 2009Q3 (year-on-year percentage change)
2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3
Exports
East Asia 20 .6 21 .0 19 .3 –5 .6 –30 .1 –32 .5 –30 .2
Japan 22 .9 16 .4 15 .2 –8 .1 –42 .1 –41 .1 –38 .2
Developing 
East Asia
19 .0 21 .3 19 .9 –4 .7 –26 .6 –27 .2 –24 .2
Hong Kong 10 .5 8 .3 5 .7 –2 .1 –21 .0 –23 .4 –20 .1
China 21 .1 22 .4 23 .0 4 .6 –20 .1 –22 .7 –20 .3
Korea 17 .4 23 .2 27 .1 –9 .9 –24 .5 –20 .1 –20 .3
Taiwan 17 .4 18 .2 7 .6 –24 .6 –35 .9 –28 .3 –18 .5
ASEAN 18 .9 26 .9 22 .9 –10 .3 –36 .8 –39 .3 34 .2
Indonesia 31 .9 29 .4 27 .9 –5 .3 –32 .5 –33 .2 31 .1
Malaysia 19 .4 28 .5 21 .6 –12 .6 –27 .6 –28 .2 3 .8
Philippines –2 .0 –0 .6 2 .0 –22 .3 –33 .9 –36 .3 –37 .2
Singapore 21 .7 26 .4 21 .2 –12 .9 –30 .7 –31 .2 –33 .2
Thailand 25 .5 25 .5 27 .2 –10 .2 –23 .0 –24 .4 –26 .3
Vietnam 27 .7 31 .8 37 .5 6 .0 –14 .8 –11 .7 –7 .3
Imports
East Asia 29 .6 29 29 .8 –4 .1 –32 .5 –33 .1 30 .7
Japan 25 .6 26 .8 35 .8 8 .3 –29 .0 –28 .5 –28 .1
Developing 
East Asia
29 28 .9 26 .6 –8 .0 –32 .1 –34 .2 –33 .2
Hong Kong 12 .0 9 .6 7 .0 –4 .0 –20 .8 –22 .3 –25 .2
China 29 .4 32 .9 25 .9 –8 .0 –30 .8 –31 .7 –30 .3
Korea 29 .0 30 .5 42 .9 –8 .8 –32 .8 –35 .6 –11 .9
Taiwan 26 .1 19 .2 20 .3 –21 .9 –45 .9 –46 .3 –47 .2
ASEAN 37 .9 36 .2 32 .6 –5 .0 –37 .2 –36 .7 –35 .3
Indonesia 91 .6 96 .1 82 .3 33 .3 –35 .9 –36 .2 –34 .2
Malaysia 16 .1 17 .3 14 .5 –17 .1 –36 .8 –36 .1 4 .8
Philippines 22 .1 8 .4 4 .5 –23 .4 –30 .3 –31 .3 –32 .1
Singapore 32 .1 35 .4 32 .9 –9 .3 –30 .0 –28 .1 –29 .2
Thailand 39 .6 25 .7 37 .8 3 .8 –39 .7 –40 .5 –37 .3




(the	 rise	 of	 global	 production	 sharing)	 as	 a	 possible	 explanation	 for	 the	
surprisingly	large	trade	contraction	in	the	present	crisis	compared	with	that	in	the	
Great	Depression.	Vertical	integration	of	production	implies	that	a	given	degree	















contraction	 while	 appropriately	 controlling	 for	 these	 other	 possible	 factors.	
Instead,	this	section	puts	together	some	readily	available	data	that	have	some	
bearing	on	this	issue	in	order	to	set	the	stage	for	further	analysis.
All	 major	 East	 Asian	 countries—including	 China,	 which	 was	 expected	 by	
the	 decoupling	 enthusiasts	 to	 cushion	 the	 rest	 of	 East	 Asia	 against	 a	 global	
economic	collapse—experienced	a	precipitous	trade	contraction	from	about	the	
last	quarter	of	2008	 (Table	10.7).	The	remarkably	synchronised	nature	of	 the	




Among	 the	 East	 Asian	 countries,	 Japan	 has	 been	 by	 far	 the	 worst	 hit.	 A	
large	 share	of	Japan’s	exports	consists	of	 capital	goods	and	high-end	durable	
consumer	 goods,	 such	 as	 cars	 and	 electrical	 machinery,	 machine	 tools	 and	
their	 components.	Exports	 of	 capital	 goods	 and	high-end	consumer	durables	
are	concentrated	heavily	in	the	United	States	and	other	industrialised-country	










consumer	 preferences	 for	 price-competitive	 low-end	 products	 in	 the	 crisis	
context.
















countries.	 Overall,	 China’s	 intra-regional	 imports	 have	 contracted	 at	 a	 much	
faster	rate	than	imports	from	the	United	States	and	the	European	Union.	
Table 10.8 China: growth of total merchandise exports & imports by trading partner 


















East Asia 23 .7 25 .1 28 .2 4 .5 –23 .4 –24 .2 –18 .0 8 .2
Japan 12 .1 18 .0 18 .1 7 .9 –16 .7 –23 .8 –16 .3 –6 .7
Developing 
East Asia
31 .2 29 .2 33 .9 2 .7 –24 .1 –24 .5 –28 .7 7 .5
Korea 33 .1 38 .3 52 .9 7 .5 –29 .2 –36 .6 –35 .0 –3 .0
Taiwan 15 .4 21 .1 17 .3 –10 .4 –34 .5 –38 .8 –21 .4 20 .1
Hong Kong, 
China
10 .8 6 .5 11 .0 –9 .9 –24 .0 –21 .6 –16 .6 12 .2
ASEAN 34 .2 26 .0 27 .4 2 .8 –22 .6 –16 .8 –9 .6 23 .0
Indonesia 33 .2 41 .5 54 .8 20 .2 –26 .4 –21 .0 –24 .0 21 .3
Malaysia 33 .3 28 .2 20 .8 7 .1 –23 .9 –12 .2 –9 .1 9 .2
Philippines 30 .4 22 .8 34 .5 1 .3 –11 .8 –18 .7 –8 .5 18 .6
Singapore 15 .3 5 .9 17 .1 –0 .6 –17 .1 –12 .3 –16 .2 21 .4
Thailand 37 .2 42 .1 38 .3 5 .9 –27 .3 –29 .6 –14 .3 21 .1
Vietnam 88 .8 45 .1 16 .0 –11 .1 –30 .0 –15 .9 36 .3 58 .9
United 
States
5 .4 12 .2 15 .3 0 .7 –15 .4 –18 .5 –16 .7 1 .4
9	 This	inference	is	based	on	monthly	export	data	extracted	from	the	CEIC	Data	Company	(not	reported	here	
for	want	of	space).	




25 .0 29 .7 23 .5 4 .1 –22 .6 –26 .6 –23 .6 –4 .2
Total 
exports
16 .3 19 .0 20 .2 0 .9 –21 .1 –23 .5 –20 .3 7 .2
Imports
East Asia 18 .8 24 .1 13 .2 –18 .1 –33 .7 –23 .1 –12 .5 30 .2
Japan 17 .0 23 .7 18 .7 –5 .0 –29 .8 –21 .4 –13 .4 15 .6
Developing 
East Asia
19 .6 24 .3 10 .8 –23 .6 –35 .3 –23 .8 –12 .1 37 .7
Korea 14 .9 25 .0 14 .8 –18 .5 –26 .6 –18 .8 –10 .2 33 .6
Taiwan 24 .5 24 .2 5 .0 –33 .3 –43 .9 –29 .9 –14 .9 43 .8
Hong Kong 26 .0 –2 .5 11 .0 –21 .4 –49 .1 –32 .9 –33 .3 –7 .7
ASEAN 19 .9 23 .8 12 .7 –18 .9 –33 .8 –22 .1 –8 .9 12 .2
Indonesia 31 .7 30 .3 17 .3 –13 .5 –38 .0 –18 .4 –6 .3 69 .6
Malaysia 18 .4 29 .5 22 .4 –16 .1 –25 .0 –17 .0 –3 .5 60 .3
The 
Philippines
12 .7 5 .7 –23 .2 –48 .6 –61 .3 –51 .7 –30 .3 17 .6
Singapore 6 .7 35 .5 27 .4 –9 .3 –23 .7 –28 .2 –11 .9 27 .2
Thailand 26 .0 22 .9 15 .8 –5 .6 –29 .2 –6 .6 –0 .9 29 .7
Vietnam 64 .3 19 .0 69 .4 6 .8 –7 .9 23 .6 –8 .3 47 .7
United 
States
29 .7 23 .0 15 .7 3 .7 –17 .7 –13 .1 –6 .4 19 .3
European 
Union
25 .9 33 .0 22 .7 2 .3 –14 .7 –11 .2 –2 .2 14 .9
Total 
imports 











consumer	 durables,	 which,	 as	 already	 noted,	 are	 generally	 more	 susceptible	
to	 income	 contraction.	 In	 traditional	 labour-intensive	 products,	 developing-
country	producers	have	the	ability	to	perform	better	purely	on	the	basis	of	cost	
competitiveness	even	in	the	context	of	depressed	demand.	
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Table 10.9 China: growth of merchandise exports and imports by commodity 
















Total exports 16 .3 19 .0 20 .2 0 .9 –21 .1 –23 .5 –20 .3
Primary 16 .3 24 .9 29 .9 8 .6 –17 .9 –13 .6 –14 .2
Manufacturing 21 .2 23 .8 22 .0 2 .6 –20 .7 –18 .2 –17 .2
Products of chemical or 
allied industries
48 .5 54 .0 42 .2 3 .1 –25 .2 –24 .9 –23 .4
Plastics and articles 
thereof, rubber and rubber 
articles
13 .8 10 .1 16 .1 10 .7 –21 .1 –17 .1 –17 .3
Textiles and textile articles 22 .5 5 .3 4 .1 8 .0 –11 .4 2 .6 4 .2
Footwear, headgear, 
umbrellas, etc .
14 .7 14 .4 19 .7 21 .3 –1 .3 7 .2 8 .2
Base metals and articles 
of base metal
23 .3 18 .5 26 .4 22 .0 –9 .0 –1 .5 –4 .3
Machinery and mechanical 
appliances, etc . 
15 .9 –15 .7 20 .9 4 .3 –31 .6 –38 .8 –42 .1
Electronics 6 .2 12 .5 61 .5 17 .2 –33 .5 –36 .5 –37 .3
Electrical machinery and 
equipment
20 .3 27 .0 20 .4 –1 .1 –21 .5 –19 .5 –20 .2
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles















Total imports 21 .2 25 .0 15 .1 –12 .2 –28 .3 –19 .6 –11 .9
Primary 73 .5 74 .9 72 .5 5 .2 –40 .7 –35 .3 –27 .2
Manufacturing 16 .3 19 .1 11 .4 –12 .1 –26 .2 –21 .1 –19 .2
Products of chemical or allied 
industries
19 .6 23 .5 19 .6 –10 .5 –23 .9 –18 .2 –16 .3
Plastics and articles thereof, 
rubber and rubber articles
16 .3 22 .5 22 .7 –15 .6 –29 .2 –20 .1 15 .2
Textiles and textile articles 6 .3 2 .7 –3 .4 –9 .2 –22 .8 –22 .8 –23 .2
Footwear, headgear, 
umbrellas, etc .
47 .5 47 .7 24 .8 12 .6 –2 .8 –18 .7 –22 .2
Base metals and articles of 
base metal
14 .1 5 .8 8 .3 –15 .0 –26 .3 –16 .9 –2 .7
Machinery and mechanical 
appliances, etc .
11 .7 18 .0 9 .8 –10 .7 –24 .1 –17 .9 –8 .2
Electronics 16 .3 19 .9 15 .0 –1 .0 –19 .8 –19 .5 –3 .2
Electrical machinery and 
equipment
9 .5 17 .1 7 .4 –15 .2 –26 .3 –17 .4 –6 .7
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles
11 .6 20 .8 1 .4 –8 .1 –5 .4 1 .6 2 .2
Source:	Compiled	from	CEIM	database.
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Policy options
At	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 this	 chapter	 (mid	 June	 2010),	 ‘the	 global	 recovery	 is	
proceeding	 better	 than	 expected’	 (IMF	 2010:1).	 Industrial	 production	 in	 the	
United	States	and	other	major	industrialised	countries	has	begun	to	recover	and	
the	downward	spiral	 in	world	 trade	volume	has	abated.	The	economic	 forces	
unleashed	 by	 the	 crisis	 will,	 however,	 probably	 run	 rampant	 for	 years.	The	
recovery	has	so	far	been	driven	largely	by	unprecedented	fiscal	and	monetary	
stimulus	 and	 there	 is	 considerable	 downside	 risk	 to	 sustainability	 stemming	






























onset	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 (Roach	 2009:229–33).	 The	 eleventh	 Five-
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Year	 Plan	 enacted	 in	 March	 2006	 stressed	 the	 imperatives	 of	 an	 enhanced,	
broad-based	social	safety	net	(encompassing	not	just	social	security	but	rural	










regional	production	networks.	Even	after	 three	decades	of	 rapid	growth,	 the	
average	hourly	wage	rate	 for	Chinese	manufacturing	of	US$3.20	 is	 still	 (as	 in	
2007)	only	13	per	cent	of	 the	US	hourly	wage	rate	of	US$24.40.11	About	half	
of	 China’s	 massive	 labour	 force	 (about	 745	 million	 people)	 is	 still	 engaged	 in	
agriculture,	 where	 productivity	 is,	 on	 average,	 barely	 one-eighth	 of	 that	 in	
industry	and	about	one-quarter	of	that	in	the	service	sector.	This,	coupled	with	






protectionism	 (Bhagwati	 1988;	 Erixson	 and	 Razeen	 2009).	 Fortunately,	 there	
has	not	yet	been	a	protectionist	backlash	 in	 the	 form	of	erecting	tariff	walls,	
as	happened	during	 the	Great	Depression.	There	 are,	however,	 already	 signs	
that	countries	are	resorting	to	protection	‘disguises’	in	the	form	of	filing	anti-
dumping	 complaints	 and	 imposing	 stringent	 implementation	 of	 technical,	
sanitary	 and	 phyto-sanitary	 standards,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 massive	 financial	
support	extended	by	the	United	States	and	some	other	countries	to	automobile	
manufacturers	 (Gamberoni	 and	 Newfarmer	 2009).	 The	 number	 of	 legislative	
measures	 introduced	 in	 the	 US	 Congress	 that	 involve	 some	 form	 of	 sanction	








functioning	 labour	market.	These	cases	could	well	 reflect	 skill	mismatches	and	 frictional	dislocations	 in	a	
highly	imperfect	labour	market	rather	than	genuine	labour	shortages.
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therefore	a	strong	case	for	devising	strategies	to	fight	new	protectionism	as	part	
of	 a	 long-term	 commitment	 to	 non-discriminatory	 multilateral	 and	 unilateral	
liberalisation.	The	Information	Technology	Agreement,	which	came	into	force	
in	1997,	seems	to	be	a	promising	example	to	follow	(Elek	2008).	There	is	also	









wide	 free-trade	 agreement	 (FTA),	 encompassing	 ASEAN,	 China,	 Japan	 and	
Korea	 (and	possibly	 India)	 (Kawai	and	Wignaraja	2009;	ADB	2009).	The	 logic	
behind	this	proposal	in	relation	to	the	network	trade	in	the	region	is	that	trade	
within	 global	 production	 networks	 (both	 in	 components	 and	 final	 assembly)	
is	generally	more	sensitive	 to	 tariff	changes	 than	 is	final	 trade	 (or	 total	 trade	
as	 captured	 in	 published	 trade	 data)	 (Yi	 2003).	 Normally	 a	 tariff	 is	 incurred	
each	time	a	good-in-process	crosses	a	border.	Consequently,	a	1	percentage	point	
reduction	in	tariffs	leads	to	a	decline	in	the	cost	of	production	of	a	vertically	
integrated	 good	 by	 a	 multiple	 of	 this	 initial	 reduction—in	 contrast	 with	 a	 1	
per	cent	decline	in	the	cost	of	a	regular	traded	good.	Tariff	reductions	can	also	
make	it	more	profitable	for	goods	that	were	previously	produced	entirely	in	one	
country	 to	become	vertically	 specialised.	Consequently,	 in	 theory,	 the	 trade-
stimulating	effect	of	FTAs	would	be	higher	for	network	trade	than	for	normal	
trade,	other	things	remaining	unchanged.	












13	 See,	for	instance,	the	recent	article	written	by	the	Chinese	Minister	of	Trade	for	the	Wall Street Journal	
(Deming	2009).







of	 the	 rules-of-origin	 (ROO)	 built	 into	 it.	 In	 particular,	 there	 are	 three	 main	

















innovations	 naturally	 open	 up	 room	 for	 unnecessary	 administrative	 delays	
and/or	 the	 tweaking	of	 rules	 as	 a	means	of	disguised	protection	 (Elek	2008).	
Moreover,	given	 the	 importance	of	 extra-regional	markets	 for	final	goods	 for	
the	 growth	 dynamism	 of	 production	 networks	 in	 Asia,	 maintaining	 barriers	
to	trade	against	non-members	(while	allowing	free	trade	among	members)	can	
thwart	 the	 ‘natural’	 expansion	 of	 global	 production	 sharing.	Third,	 twisting	
ROOs	for	the	purpose	of	import-competing	industries	becomes	easier	when	the	
production	process	involves	procuring	components	from	a	number	of	sources;	
tightening	 ROOs	 on	 the	 procurement	 of	 one	 critical	 input	 would	 suffice	 to	
protect	competing	domestic	producers	of	the	final	(assembled)	product.15
14	 This	point	is	based	on	interviews	with	high-ranking	officials	in	the	Thai	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs.
15	 ROOs	 relating	 to	 television	 sets	 (HS852812)	 in	 the	Thailand–Australia	 Free	Trade	 Agreement	 (Annex	
4.1)	can	be	used	to	illustrate	this	point.	To	become	eligible	for	preferential	tariffs,	television	producers	must	
source	 three	 parts	 (HS701120,	 854011	 and	 854091)	 locally.	 Television	 picture	 tubes	 (HS854011)	 are	 not,	



















Intra-regional	 trade	 shares	 based	 on	 conventional	 trade	 data	 are	 generally	
consistent	 with	 the	 view	 that	 East	 Asia	 has	 become	 increasingly	 integrated	
through	merchandise	trade.	When	the	continuing	process	of	global	production	
sharing	and	East	Asia’s	unique	role	in	China-centred	global	production	networks	















rather	 than	 a	 regional,	 approach	 to	 trade	 policymaking.	 Given	 the	 global	
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The	 recent	 and	 prospective	 developments	 in	 the	 global	 economy	 since	 the	
global	financial	crisis	make	a	strong	case	for	China	to	go	ahead	with	the	speedy	
implementation	 of	 the	 growth-rebalancing	 policy	 embodied	 in	 its	 eleventh	
Five-Year	Plan.	Given	the	nature	of	domestic	factor-market	conditions	and	the	
continuing	 changes	 in	 the	 process	 of	 global	 production	 sharing,	 promoting	
domestic	 demand-oriented	 growth	 and	 engagement	 in	 global	 production	
sharing	 is	 not	 a	 mutually	 exclusive	 policy	 priority	 for	 China	 in	 the	 medium	
term.	Successful	growth	rebalancing	has	the	potential	to	facilitate	the	further	
expansion	 of	 network	 trade	 by	 averting	 trade	 friction	 and	 retaliation.	 An	
enlarged	 domestic	 market	 would	 also	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 improve	 the	
international	competitiveness	of	exporting	firms	within	production	networks	
by	 reducing	 unit	 costs	 of	 production.	 Looking	 further	 ahead,	 increases	 in	
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Asian foreign direct 





Since	 the	 1990s	 and	 especially	 after	 China’s	 accession	 to	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organisation	(WTO),	China	has	become	one	of	the	most-favoured	destinations	






There	 are,	 however,	 increasing	 concerns	 that	 China’s	 FDI	 success	 has	 been	





A	 growing	 China	 can	 add	 to	 other	 countries’	 FDI	 inflows	 by	 creating	 more	
opportunities	 for	production	networking	and	by	raising	 the	demand	for	 raw	
materials	 and	resources.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 low	Chinese	 labour	costs	 can	 lure	
multinational	enterprises	(MNEs)	away	from	other	Asian	economies	when	the	
MNEs	consider	alternative	locations	for	low-cost	export	platforms.	Theoretically,	
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This	 chapter	 examines	 empirically	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 success	 of	
China	 in	 attracting	 FDI	 inflows	 has	 diverted	 FDI	 away	 from—or	 has	 been	
complementary	to	FDI	inflows	into—other	Asian	economies.	The	next	section	
presents	an	overview	of	FDI	inflows	into	China	during	the	past	three	decades	
and	 discusses	 the	 current	 literature	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 FDI	 inflows	 into	 China	
on	FDI	 inflows	elsewhere.	The	 subsequent	 section	 sets	out	 the	 framework	of	
analysis,	 the	 hypotheses,	 the	 empirical	 model	 and	 the	 variable	 specification.	
Following	this	is	a	presentation	and	discussion	of	the	regression	results,	before	
some	conclusions	are	drawn.	
The growth of FDI inflows into China
As	shown	in	Figure	11.1,	 the	growth	of	FDI	 inflows	 into	China	 from	1982	to	





particularly	 in	 the	 four	 special	 economic	 zones	 (SEZs).2	 In	 the	 second	phase,	





in	 trade	 and	 investment,	 FDI	 inflows	 into	 China	 increased	 rapidly—from	








2008;	Mercereau	2005;	Zhou	and	Lall	 2005;	Wang	et	 al.	 2007).	These	 studies	
differ	in	the	measurement	of	FDIflows	and	in	estimation	techniques.	
Chantasasawat	 et	 al.	 (2004)	use	data	 for	 eight	Asian	economies—Hong	Kong,	
Taiwan,	 Republic	 of	 Korea,	 Singapore,	 Malaysia,	 Philippines,	 Indonesia	 and	
2	 The	four	special	economic	zones	are	Shenzhen,	Zhuhai,	Shantou	in	Guangdong	Province	and	Xiamen	in	
Fujian	Province.	
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Thailand—in	 addition	 to	 China	 for	 the	 period	 1985–2001.	 They	 estimate	
equations	for	China’s	FDI	inflows	and	other	Asian	economies’	FDI	inflows	using	
two-stage	 least	 squares.	They	 find	 that	 the	 level	 of	 China’s	 FDI	 is	 positively	










































fundamentals,	 such	 as	 healthy	 government	 balances	 and	 low	 inflation,	 help	
explain	the	allocation	of	FDI	inflows	among	Asian	economies.
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Eichengreen	 and	 Tong	 (2005)	 employ	 a	 gravity	 model	 and	 show	 that	 the	
emergence	of	China	as	a	leading	FDI	destination	has	encouraged	FDI	inflows	into	























been	complementary	to	FDI	 inflows	 into	other	host	countries,	especially	 into	
China’s	neighbouring	economies.	





FDI,	 many	 factors	 influence	 the	 flows	 of	 FDI.	 Since	 these	 factors	 are	 located	









Based	 on	 the	 gravity	 model	 and	 the	 OLI	 framework	 in	 explaining	 FDI,	 the	
fundamental	model	used	here	can	be	written	as	Equation	11.1.
Equation 11.1
lnFDI*j = β0 + β1lnX* + β2lnXj
In	Equation	 11.1,	 FDI*j	 is	 the	magnitude	of	 total	 FDI	 inflows	 from	all	 source	
countries	into	host	economy	j,	X*	are	the	aggregate	source	country	variables	and	
Xj	are	host	economy	variables.
Since	 source	 country	 i’s	 variables,	 Xi—which	 measure	 the	 overall	 outward	
investment	potential	of	source	country	i—are	determined	by	its	own	technological	
and	economic	development	levels,	the	key	feature	of	these	variables	is	that	they	
are	 common	 to	 all	 outward	 FDI	 of	 source	 country	 i	 and	 are	 independent	 of	
factors	 in	 the	 destination	 countries.	Therefore,	 the	 aggregate	 source-country	
variables,	X*	, become	a	constant	for	each	of	the	host	economies—although	one	
that	changes	over	time.	In	the	real	implementation,	we	use	the	world	total	FDI	
outflows	 (WFDIOUT)	 of	 all	 source	 countries	 to	 capture	 the	 effects	 of	 source-
country	 variables,	 X*.	 We	 adopt	 the	 log-linear	 form	 as	 the	 basic	 functional	
form	to	connect	the	magnitude	of	FDI	inflows	from	all	source	countries	to	host	
economy	 j	 to	 the	 relevant	 explanatory	 variables	 (aggregate	 source-country	
variables	and	host	economy	variables).
The hypotheses
As	shown	 in	many	studies,	 the	 location	 factors	determining	FDI	 inflows	 into	





Market size and economic growth of host economies
The	main	argument	for	the	importance	of	market	size	as	a	location	factor	in	the	
determination	of	inflows	of	FDI	is	based	primarily	on	economies	of	scale:	larger	
economies	 can	 provide	 more	 opportunities	 to	 realise	 and	 explore	 economies	
of	scale,	to	realise	the	specialisation	of	productive	factors	and	to	absorb	more	
China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development
226
efficiently	the	technology	that	foreign	investors	desire	to	introduce.	Therefore,	















higher	 level	of	 economic	growth	 implies	a	 fast	 expansion	of	 the	market	 size,	
a	rapid	rise	in	domestic	demand	and	a	growing	purchasing	power	of	the	host	
economies’	consumers,	which	is	an	important	determinant	of	market-oriented	






Factor costs in host economies
In	 the	 FDI	 literature,	 the	 most	 important	 factor	 cost	 in	 the	 determination	 of	
FDI	inflows	is	the	wage	rate,	especially	when	FDI	is	export	oriented.	Therefore,	
the	 relevant	 factor	 cost	 in	 the	 decision	 to	 locate	 FDI	 in	 the	 host	 economy	 is	































Country risk (country credit rating)




stability,	 such	as	policies	 towards	FDI,	 tax	regimes,	 the	 transparency	of	 legal	






Country	 credit	 ratings	 are	 developed	 by	 Institutional	 Investors,	 which	 has	
published	credit	ratings	twice	a	year	since	1979	to	assess	the	creditworthiness	
of	about	150	countries,	based	on	a	survey	of	some	100	international	bankers’	
perceptions	 of	 creditworthiness,	 including	 economic,	 financial	 and	 socio-
political	 stability	 criteria.	 The	 resulting	 score	 scales	 from	 zero	 (very	 high	
chance	of	default)	 to	100	(least	chance	of	default).	Participants’	responses	are	
adjusted	according	to	their	institutions’	assets,	with	heavier	weights	on	those	














The empirical model and variable specification




in	 which	 low-wage	 export	 platform	 to	 locate,	 MNEs	 can	 choose	 between	
investing	 in	 China	 versus	 investing	 in	 another	 developing	 Asian	 economy.	








processes.	 An	 investor	 sets	 up	 factories	 in	 both	 China	 and	 another	 Asian	
developing	economy	to	 take	advantage	of	 their	 respective	competitiveness	 in	
distinct	stages	of	the	production	process.	Components	and	parts	are	then	traded	
among	China	and	other	Asian	developing	economies.	An	increase	in	FDI	inflows	










To	 investigate	 the	 China	 effect	 on	 FDI	 inflows	 into	 other	 Asian	 developing	
economies,	we	use	Equation	11.3	as	the	empirical	model.
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Equation 11.3
lnFDI*j,t = β0 + β1lnFDICHN*,t-k + β2lnWFDIOUTt + β3lnGRj,t-k+ β4lnEWj,t-k 











assumes	 that	 the	effect	of	 the	 independent	variables	at	 time	 t-k	appears	only	




determinants;	 therefore,	 the	 current	 value	 (k	 =	 0)	 will	 be	 employed	 in	 the	
regression	equation.	The	estimated	coefficients	of	lnFDICHN* t-k,	lnWFDIOUT*t,	




Regression results and explanations
In	this	empirical	study,	there	are	12	Asian	developing	economies	in	the	sample	
and	the	 time	period	 is	 from	1992	to	2008.	The	12	economies	are	Bangladesh,	




As	 a	 robustness	 check,	 the	 regression	 is	 also	 run	 without	 the	 four	 South	
Asian	developing	economies:	Bangladesh,	India,	Pakistan	and	Sri	Lanka.	The	











those	 economies	 have	 increased	 as	 a	 result	 of	 DFI	 flows	 to	 China	 during	 the	
period	of	analysis.	
Table 11.1 Regression results of the effects of FDI inflows into China on 
FDI inflows into East, South and South-East Asian developing economies, 
1992–2008, fixed-effects (dependent variable FDI*j, t)
Variables (1) (2)
Constant
 . . .f
LFDICHN
l . . . . . .f . .
LWOFDI






























No . of observations























among	 the	 Asian	 economies.	 As	 Table	 11.2	 shows,	 Asian	 economies	 have	
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Table 11.2 China’s imports of raw materials from Asian economies (US$ million) 
1995 2000 2005 2008
All 12 Asian economies
Animal, vegetable fats and oils (HS 15) 
hj
Mineral products (HS 25, 26, 27) 
sdfs
Pulp of wood and paper products 
(HS 47, 48) 






































Animal and vegetable fats 
(HS 15)
Mineral products 
(HS 25, 26, 27)















































































































































Source:	 Author’s	 calculations	 using	 data	 from	 United	 Nations	 Statistics	 Division	 n.d.,	 COMTRADE,	
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in	the	same	industries	among	those	economies.	Many	of	the	Asian	economies—
particularly	 those	 in	 East	 and	 South-East	 Asia—are	 heavily	 involved	 in	











investment-creation	 effect	 has	 dominated	 the	 investment-diversion	 effect,	 so	
Chinese	and	Asian	FDI	inflows	have	been	complementary.	





A	 host	 economy’s	 efficiency	 wage	 (EW)—the	 proxy	 for	 labour	 cost—is	 a	
















these	Asian	 economies.	The	 empirical	 regression	 results	 suggest	 that,	 all	 else	
being	 equal,	 the	marginal	 effect	 of	 the	host	 economies’	 location	variables	 on	
FDI	inflows	into	their	economies	is	much	larger	than	that	of	the	China	effect.	





Table 11.3 Two-way trade between China and Asian economies in electric 



























































































































































































Source:	 Author’s	 calculations	 using	 data	 from	 United	 Nations	 Statistics	 Division	 n.d.,	 COMTRADE,	
Commodity	 Trade	 Statistics	 Database,	 United	 Nations,	 New	York	 and	 Geneva,	 <http://unstats.un.org/
unsd/comtrade/default.aspx>
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Implications for future FDI inflows into China 
and Asian economies
The	results	in	the	previous	section	imply	that	the	positive	impact	of	the	China	
effect	 on	 FDI	 inflows	 into	 Asian	 economies	 could	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 increased	
resource	demand	by	a	rapidly	growing	Chinese	economy	and	the	production-




First,	with	 the	creation	and	 implementation	of	 the	ASEAN–China	Free	Trade	
Area	(ACFTA)	on	1	January	2010,	the	economic	relationship	between	ASEAN	
and	 China	 entered	 a	 new	 era.	 The	 ACFTA	 covers	 agreements	 on	 trade	 in	




Pakistan,	 Thailand,	 Singapore,	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 Macao,	 and	 is	 proposing	 to	
negotiate	bilateral	free-trade	agreements	with	India,	South	Korea	and	Taiwan.	

























Third,	 with	 the	 fast	 and	 deep	 integration	 among	 the	 Chinese	 and	 other	
Asian	 economies,	 production-networking	 activities—particularly	 in	 vertical	
specialisation—will	 intensify	 with	 each	 of	 the	 economies	 specialising	 in	 the	
production	of	those	goods	in	which	it	has	a	comparative	advantage.	Currently,	
China	and	other	Asian	economies	have	already	developed	substantial	two-way	
trade	 in	the	electric	and	electronic	equipment	 industries.	 In	the	years	ahead,	
with	 the	 upgrading	 and	 restructuring	 of	 the	 industrial	 structures	 in	 China	
and	Asian	economies,	it	is	highly	likely	that	the	two-way	trade	between	China	
and	 other	 Asian	 economies	 will	 expand	 into	 other	 industries—for	 example,	
automobiles	 and	 machinery	 and	 equipment.	 This	 structural	 change	 and	
upgrading	of	 industries	 throughout	Asia	will	provide	huge	opportunities	 for	
MNEs	to	invest	in	China	and	other	Asian	economies	based	on	their	comparative	
advantages	and	competitiveness.	
Fourth,	 with	 rapid	 economic	 growth,	 a	 high	 rate	 of	 capital	 accumulation	
and	a	huge	accumulation	of	 foreign	reserves,	China	has	gradually	become	an	
increasingly	 important	 supplier	 of	 outward	FDI.	During	 the	period	2004–08,	
China’s	 outward	 FDI	 increased	 from	 US$5.5	 billion	 to	 US$55.9	 billion—
increasing	more	than	nine	times.	Most	of	China’s	outward	FDI	flowed	into	Asian	
economies—accounting	 for	 71.4	 per	 cent	 of	 China’s	 total	 outward	 FDI	 stock	
at	 the	 end	of	 2008.	With	 rapid	 economic	growth,	 the	next	 two	decades	will	
witness	a	rapid	increase	in	FDI	outflows	from	China.	On	the	one	hand,	China	
will	 accelerate	 industrial	 restructuring	and	upgrading.	Some	 labour-intensive	
manufacturing	 activities	 and	 industries	 will	 gradually	 lose	 competitiveness	
due	 to	 the	 combined	 effects	 of	 increasing	 labour	 costs	 and	 shrinking	 labour	
forces	with	an	ageing	population.	As	a	result,	these	labour-intensive	industries	





with	 rich	 resource	 endowments	 will	 be	 the	 primary	 destinations	 for	 China’s	
outward	investment,	with	China	becoming	an	increasingly	important	investor	
in	Asia	 as	 a	 consequence.	Overall,	 then,	 the	 relationship	between	China	 and	
Asian	economies	in	terms	of	FDI	is	likely	to	remain	complementary	in	the	next	
20	years.	




a	 source	 of	 celebration	 for	 some	 and	 of	 concern	 for	 others.	 Has	 China	 really	



















a	 combination	 of	 both,	 leading	 to	 the	 central	 result	 that	 this	 effect	 is	 about	
investment	 creation,	 not	 investment	 diversion.	This	 complementarity	 implies	
that	much	of	the	concern	about	Chinese	FDI	is	unfounded.	




effect	 of	 the	 host	 economies’	 location	 variables	 on	 FDI	 inflows	 into	 their	
economies	is	much	larger	than	that	of	the	China	effect.	Host	economies’	location	
variables—such	 as	 fast	 economic	 growth,	 lower	 labour	 costs	 accompanied	
with	higher	labour	productivity,	lower	country	risk	with	economic,	financial,	
institutional,	 social	 and	 political	 stability—play	 the	 fundamental	 role	 in	
attracting	FDI	inflows.	
In	 the	 next	 two	 decades,	 China’s	 economic	 growth	 and	 strong	 investment	
expansion	will	energise	the	region	and	will	provide	the	Asian	economies	and	
other	 countries	 with	 an	 expanding	 and	 diversified	 integrated	 Asian	 market.	
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Overall,	with	the	rapid	and	deepening	integration	among	the	Chinese	and	other	
Asian	 economies,	 the	 positive	 China	 effect	 on	 FDI	 inflows	 into	 other	 Asian	
economies	will	continue.	
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Appendix Table 11.A1 Variable list of the impact of FDI inflows into China 
on FDI inflows into other Asian developing host economies




Total FDI inflows from all source 
countries into Asian developing host 
economy j in year t (millions of US 
dollars at 1990 prices) .
sdfsd
Various issues of  
United Nations,  



















Total FDI inflows from all source 
countries into China in year t  
(millions of US dollars at 1990 prices) .
dsfsd
World total FDI outflows in year t 
(millions of US dollars at 1990 prices) .
dsfsdfsd
Annual real growth rate of GDP  
of Asian developing host economy 
 j in year t (per cent) .
sdfsdf
Efficiency wage of Asian developing 




Country credit rating index of Asian 
developing host economy j in year t 
(scale of 0–100, with 100 representing 
the least chance of 
default or the best credit worthiness) .
sdfsdfsd
Various issues of  
United Nations,  
World Investment Report .
sdfsdf
Same as above .
zfsddsf
sdfsdf
United Nations Statistical 
 Division  
(n .d ., National Accounts) 
Calculated from ILO  
(n .d .) and United Nations 
Statistical Division  
(n .d ., National Accounts) 
fff
Compiled from various 
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orders	 sharply	 and	 led	 to	 a	 decline	 in	 China’s	 economic	 growth.	 As	 China’s	
exporting	 industries	 are	 labour	 intensive	 and	 most	 likely	 to	 employ	 rural	
migrants,	it	is	widely	believed	that	the	global	financial	crisis	has	had	significant	







Update volume,	we	estimated	that	 the	total	employment	 impact	of	 the	global	
financial	crisis	was	between	13	and	19	per	cent.	We	also	emphasised,	however,	
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compares	the	 labour-market	outcomes	of	migrants	 in	cities	 in	2008	and	2009.	
Much	to	our	surprise,	we	observe	small	employment	effects	and	virtually	no	
reduction	in	working	hours	or	wages	for	migrants.	We	try	to	understand	the	
logic	 behind	 our	 findings.	We	 find	 that	 the	 real	 adverse	 effect	 of	 the	 global	
financial	 crisis	 is	 felt	 mainly	 by	 the	 rural	 sector—to	 where	 the	 unemployed	
migrant	workers	from	cities	returned—and	the	multiplier	effect	of	the	reduction	
in	 income	 of	 unemployed	 migrant	 workers,	 which	 suppressed	 demand	 in	
the	 rural	 sector,	which,	 in	 turn,	 further	 suppressed	 rural	 off-farm	 jobs.	This	
multiplier	effect	 is	very	 large	and	has	not	received	attention	 in	 the	 literature	
before.	

























moved	 from	 the	 city	 back	 to	 their	 home	 villages,	 including	 20	 million	 rural	
migrants	who	lost	their	jobs	in	cities	due	to	the	global	financial	crisis.	Among	
the	70	million	 returning	migrants,	 95	per	 cent	 obtained	new	employment	 in	



































in	China	 for	 the	 following	 reasons.	 First,	migrants	 often	 come	 to	 cities	 alone	
due	 to	 the	 restrictions	 on	 welfare	 access	 in	 cities	 for	 families	 and	 children.	




(housing	 and	 food).	The	 migrants	 might	 see	 this	 difference	 between	 the	 two	
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the	 effect	of	 any	economic	 shock	on	migrant	 labour-market	outcomes	 should	
be	 examined	 from	 two	 directions.	 First,	 when	 economic	 shocks	 come,	 many	
affected	migrant	workers	move	back	to	rural	hometowns	where	they	find	off-











The	 RUMiCI	 survey	 started	 in	 2008.	 The	 sampling	 strategy	 and	 survey	
instruments	 can	 be	 found	 on	 the	 Internet	 (<http://rumici.anu.edu.au>).	The	
uniqueness	of	the	survey	in	China	is	that	it	surveys	three	groups	of	households:	
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that	 in	 the	 rural	 survey,	 all	 household	 members	 are	 reported	 in	 the	 survey,	
including	those	who	were	not	present	at	the	time	of	the	survey.	For	individuals	
who	 were	 not	 present	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 survey,	 other	 household	 members	
who	 were	 present	 reported	 their	 information.	 In	 most	 cases,	 the	 respondent	
was	 the	 household	 head.	We	 are	 therefore	 able	 to	 examine	 the	 difference	 in	
characteristics	 between	 current	 migrants	 and	 non-migrants	 from	 the	 rural	
survey.	The	data	for	migrants	could	suffer,	however,	from	larger	measurement	










2	 An	 individual	 is	defined	 to	be	 in	 the	 labour	 force	 if	he/she	 is	between	sixteen	and	sixty-five	years	of	
age	and	is	stated	to	be	currently	working	(including	re-employed	retired	people),	an	unpaid	family	worker,	
unemployed	or	waiting	to	be	assigned	to	a	job.	This	definition	applies	to	migrant	and	rural	samples.	
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Table 12.1 Summary statistics for migrant and rural samples







2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Age 31 .3 32 .2 40 .0 40 .6 29 .3 29 .8 42 .9 43 .3
Percentage 
of males




62 .0 63 .9 77 .2 77 .3 54 .9 55 .8 83 .2 82 .7
Second 
marriage
0 .8 0 .9 2 .2 2 .8 1 .5 1 .8 2 .3 3 .0
Cohabitation 0 .3 0 .7 0 .4 0 .4 0 .1 0 .4 0 .5 0 .4
Divorced 1 .0 1 .2 0 .4 0 .5 0 .6 0 .7 0 .3 0 .4
Widowed 0 .4 0 .6 1 .0 1 .0 0 .3 0 .1 1 .2 1 .3
Single 35 .4 32 .7 18 .8 18 .0 42 .5 41 .3 12 .4 12 .2
Years of 
schooling
9 .1 9 .2 7 .5 7 .5 8 .5 8 .5 7 .2 7 .2
Level of schooling (%):
Illiterate 2 .1 4 .0 4 .9 4 .9 0 .7 0 .8 6 .1 6 .0
Primary 
school
12 .9 12 .1 17 .6 17 .7 7 .6 7 .4 20 .3 20 .3
Junior high 
school
55 .6 49 .7 63 .9 63 .4 75 .0 74 .9 60 .9 60 .5
Senior high 
school
25 .5 27 .6 13 .5 13 .9 16 .7 16 .8 12 .7 13 .1
Post-
secondary
4 .0 6 .6 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .1 0 .0 0 .0
Total no. of 
observations
7153 7563 20 451 20 408 4317 4110 16 134 16 298
Source:	Authors’	own	survey.
Compared	 with	 the	 migrant	 sample	 surveyed	 in	 urban	 cities,	 the	 rural	 total	
labour	force	(including	migrants	and	non-migrants)	is	much	older.	On	average,	
they	 were	 forty	 and	 forty-one	 years	 of	 age	 in	 2008	 and	 2009,	 respectively.	
Consistent	with	the	migrant	survey,	the	average	age	of	the	migrant	population	
is	about	thirty	years,	while	the	non-migrant	sample	is	much	older	(about	forty-
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The effect of the global financial crisis on 
labour-market outcomes: urban perspective
In	 this	 section,	we	 investigate	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	global	financial	 crisis	
affected	 the	 employment	 and	 wages	 of	 rural–urban	 migrants	 who	 stayed	 in	
cities	during	2009.	
Table	12.2	presents	summary	statistics	of	employment	and	wages	for	the	two	
years	as	well	as	 the	differences	 in	outcomes	between	the	 two	years.	The	first	
panel	 of	Table	 12.2	 shows	 that	 the	 employment	 rate	 for	 the	 total	 sample	 fell	
from	98.7	 in	2008	to	96.6	 in	2009—that	 is,	an	increase	 in	the	unemployment	
rate	by	2.1	percentage	points.	If	we	look	at	the	panel	sample,	the	increase	in	the	
unemployment	rate	is	marginally	higher—at	2.7	percentage	points.	Considering	
the	 huge	 reduction	 in	 exports	 during	 2009,	 this	 increase	 in	 unemployment	
looks	rather	trivial.	
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Table 12.2 Employment and earnings of migrants in cities (migrant sample)
Total  sample Panel sample
2008 2009 Difference 2008 2009 Difference
Panel 
1
Employed (%) 98 .7 96 .6 –2 .1 98 .8 96 .1 –2 .7
Self-employed (%) 22 .5 28 .1 5 .6 31 .6 38 .3 6 .7
Wage and salary 
earners (%)
72 .1 69 .7 –2 .4 61 .5 59 .3 –2 .2
Family workers(%) 5 .4 2 .2 –3 .2 6 .9 2 .4 –4 .5
Total no . of 
labour force 
7153 7567 414 2829 2714 –115
2008 2009 Percentage 
change (%)






63 .1 63 .1 0 .0 65 .8 65 .5 -0 .5
Wage and 
salary earners
58 .4 57 .3 -1 .9 58 .9 57 .7 -2 .0
Self-employed 78 .3 77 .6 -0 .9 79 .3 77 .7 -2 .0
Weekly hours worked by industry:
Construction 62 .2 61 .5 -1 .1 61 .7 61 .5 -0 .3
Manufacturing 54 .6 55 .2 1 .1 55 .7 55 .0 -1 .3
Retail/wholesale 
trade
59 .2 57 .7 -2 .5 59 .6 58 .2 -2 .3





or net revenue 
(RMB)




1411 1631 15 .6 1417 1661 17 .2








6 .2 7 .4 19 .4 6 .2 7 .6 22 .6





899 .6 978 .1 8 .7









2008 2009 Difference 2008 2009 Difference
Unemployment 
insurance
11 .9 12 .2 0 .3 11 .8 11 .9 0 .1
Pension 
insurance
18 .9 20 .6 1 .7 19 .7 20 .8 1 .1
Health 
insurance
55 .9 68 .2 12 .3 59 .8 67 .9 8 .1
Work injury 
insurance
17 .5 16 .8 -0 .7 16 .6 16 .8 0 .2
Housing fund 7 .0 7 .0 0 6 .5 7 .2 0 .7
Source:	Authors’	own	survey.
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situation	 in	 some	Western	 labour	markets.	This	 is	understandable	because	 in	
a	 country	 with	 an	 abundant	 labour	 supply	 at	 the	 unskilled	 level,	 employers	
would	not	have	been	worried	about	hiring	when	the	recession	was	over.	
Figure 12.2 Wage/salary workers’ log weekly hours worked by industry
Source:		Calculated	based	on	authors’	own	survey.
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Figure 12.3a Wage/salary earners’ log hourly earnings by industry (total sample)
Figure 12.3b Wage/salary earners’ log hourly earnings by industry (panel sample)
Source:		Calculated	based	on	authors’	own	survey.
We	also	examine	whether	monthly	earnings	for	new	arrivals	changed	between	
the	two	years	 in	Panel	3	of	Table	12.2.	This	 is	 interesting	because	this	group	
represents	 the	 most	 unskilled	 workers	 without	 any	 work	 experience.	 In	 the	












The	 above	 analysis	 examines	 only	 average	 unconditional	 hours	 and	 earnings	
changes.	 To	 ascertain	 whether	 these	 results	 are	 due	 to	 the	 change	 in	 the	
distribution	of	different	types	of	workers	and	their	working	locations	between	
the	 two	 years,	 we	 estimate	 hours	 and	 earnings	 equations,	 which	 control	 for	




Table 12.3 Results from the hours and hourly earnings equations for migrants 
in cities (migrant sample)







Age –0 .011 –0 .015 0 .010 0 .039 0 .044 0 .007



































































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City 
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obser-
vations
13 149 9777 3372 13 149 9777 3372







seem	 to	 exhibit	 normal	 patterns	 in	 both	 the	 hours	 and	 earnings	 equations.	
We	discuss	the	hours	equation	first.	For	the	total	sample,	age	has	a	U-shaped	
relationship	with	hours	worked.	This	 is	 the	 same	as	 for	wage/salary	 earners,	




employed.	 Married	 workers	 work	 slightly	 longer	 hours	 and	 the	 relationship	
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Moving	 to	 the	 log	 hourly	 earnings	 equations,	 we	 find	 the	 normal	 inverse	
U-shaped	relationship	between	age	and	earnings.	An	additional	year	of	schooling	




















The effect of the global financial crisis on 
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Of	 the	 total	 labour	 force,	 about	 25	 per	 cent	 in	 2008	 and	 23	 percent	 in	 2009	









Because	of	 the	panel	nature	of	our	data,	we	are	 able	 to	 examine	 the	number	





level.	 Note	 that	 in	 a	 normal	 year	 we	 would	 have	 observed	 a	 net	 increase	 in	
















Migration (1) (2) (3) = (1)–(2)
Frequency 1371 1189 182
As percentage of 2009 
migrated labour
32 .5 28 .2 4 .3
Off-farm
Frequency 2537 1431 1106
As percentage of 2009 off-
farm labour
53 .0 29 .9 23 .1
As percentage of 2009 total 
labour force




























What	 did	 these	 migrants	 do	 after	 they	 returned	 to	 the	 rural	 areas?	 Was	 it	
rural	 farming	 or	 off-farm	 employment	 that	 eventually	 absorbed	 these	 return	
migrants?	How	did	the	switching	from	out-migration	to	rural	off-farm	or	farm	
work	affect	their	earnings?






the	 total	 non-migrated	 labour	 force	 increased	 by	 7.27	 percentage	 points	 (or	
6.24	percentage	points	in	terms	of	the	total	labour	force	with	rural	hukou)	and	













This,	 however,	 might	 be	 a	 lower-bound	 estimate.	 Assuming	 that	 in	 the	 pre-
global	financial	crisis	period	rural	off-farm	employment	increased	annually	by	
2	percentage	points,	 the	 real	 effect	 of	 the	global	financial	 crisis	 on	 rural	 off-











38	 million	 switching	 from	 off-farm	 jobs	 to	 farming	 jobs)	 in	 2009.6	 This	 is	 a	
substantial	employment	effect.	
Next,	 we	 consider	 whether	 for	 rural	 off-farm	 jobs	 there	 were	 any	 hourly	
adjustments	(the	second	block	in	Panel	3	of	Table	12.4).	We	find	that	there	were	
slight	 reductions	 in	 the	 number	 of	 hours	 worked	 weekly	 in	 2009	 relative	 to	
2008	 for	 the	 wage/salary	 earners,	 but	 not	 for	 self-employed.	 For	 the	 former,	
the	reduction	was	about	2.3	hours,	or	4	per	cent.	This	slight	reduction	in	hours	
worked	for	wage/salary	earners	does	not,	however,	take	into	account	changes	
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Table 12.6 Results from hours and hourly earnings equations for rural off-farm 
work (rural sample)







Age –0 .004 –0 .006 0 .007 0 .037 0 .03 0 .073






























































































Observations 9508 7444 2064 9508 7444 2064






Considering	 that	 the	 land–labour	 ratio	 is	 very	 low	 in	 rural	 China	 and	 is	
probably	fixed	over	the	two-year	period,	an	increase	in	the	agricultural	labour	
force	 should	 imply	 an	 increase	 in	 under-employment.	 To	 illustrate	 the	 level	
of	 under-employment	 among	 agricultural	 labour,	 we	 utilise	 the	 2009	 survey	
question,	 ‘How	many	days	 in	2008	did	you	work	on	 the	 farm?’.	On	average,	
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Total households 7912 9428 1001 11 .9
Households with both 
off-farm and migrant 
workers (1)
657 10 688 2261 26 .8
Households with off-farm 
workers but no migrants (2)
2896 10 237 1810 21 .5
Households with migrants 
but no off-farm workers (3)
2004 9024 597 7 .1
Households with neither 




2008 household type Households 
with both off-

















Households with both 
off-farm and migrant 
workers (1)
237 106 249 69
Households with 
off-farm workers but no 
migrants (2)
104 1803 265 748
Households with migrants 
but no off-farm workers (3)
188 136 1353 367
Households with neither 
off-farm nor migrant 
workers (4)
30 430 174 1759
Total no . of 
households
559 2475 2041 2943
Percentage transited 
from other types of 
households




off-farm	 jobs,	 we	 also	 present	 the	 transition	 matrix	 between	 2008	 and	 2009	
across	the	four	types	of	households	(second	panel	of	Table	12.7).	The	bottom	
line	 is	 that	 in	2008,	2393	households	had	only	agricultural	workers	 and	 this	
figure	increased	to	2943	in	2009.	In	addition,	40	per	cent	(1184)	of	these	2943	






This	 chapter	 examines	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 on	 the	 labour-
market	outcomes	of	migrants	 from	the	perspective	of	 those	who	remained	 in	
cities	during	the	crisis	and	those	who	returned	to	their	rural	home	villages.	














employment	 during	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis.	 Because	 of	 this	 buffer	 effect,	
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Appendix Table 12.A1 Migrant survey timing distribution by survey year 
(migrant sample, per cent)
2008 2009
March 3 .4 18 .3
April 33 .1 35 .5
May 56 .7 19 .7
June 6 .8 8 .9
July 0 9 .4
August 0 8 .1
Total no . of observations 6687 7199
Appendix Table 12.A2 Occupational distribution of self-employed migrants 
by year (migrant sample)
2008 2009 Difference 
in %Frequency % Frequency %
Semi-professional 21 0 .01 27 0 .01 0 .00
Owners 968 0 .61 867 0 .42 –0 .19
Street vendors/garbage 
collectors
185 0 .12 357 0 .17 0 .06
Shop assistants 147 0 .09 394 0 .19 0 .10
Hospitality service workers 29 0 .02 104 0 .05 0 .03
Domestic helpers 4 0 .00 4 0 .00 0 .00
Hairdressers 39 0 .02 52 0 .03 0 .00
Repair/removal/transport 
workers
63 0 .04 84 0 .04 0 .00
Chefs/kitchen hands 36 0 .02 47 0 .02 0 .00
Drivers 30 0 .02 14 0 .01 –0 .01
Other services labourers 11 0 .01 8 0 .00 0 .00
Construction labourers 19 0 .01 38 0 .02 0 .01
Other labourers 38 0 .02 74 0 .04 0 .01
Total no . of observations 1590 2070
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Avoiding economic crashes 
on China’s road 
to prosperity 13
 Wing Thye Woo
Introduction
There	 is	 a	 long	 tradition	 of	 predictions	 of	 gloom	 and	 doom	 among	 China	




















dire	predictions	are	guaranteed	not	 to	happen	 in	 the	 future.	 It	 also	does	not	
mean	 that	 gloom	 and	 doom	 can	 be	 ruled	 out	 because	 the	 doomsayers	 could	
simply	have	been	wrong	in	their	specific	identifications	of	where	they	would	
come	from.	This	chapter	 is,	first,	an	assessment	of	 some	of	 the	obstacles	 that	
China	could	stumble	into	on	its	development	path;	and,	second,	a	proposal	for	
how	these	obstacles	could	be	overcome.	
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society	 by	 2020.	 The	 obvious	 implication	 is	 that	 the	 present	 major	 social,	
economic	 and	 political	 trends	 within	 China	 might	 not	 lead	 to	 a	 harmonious	
society	or,	at	least,	not	rapidly	enough.
Among	 the	disharmonious	 features	mentioned	 in	 the	 ‘resolutions	of	 the	CPC	
Central	 Committee	 on	 major	 issues	 regarding	 the	 building	 of	 a	 harmonious	
socialist	society’	were	serious	imbalances	in	social	and	economic	development	
across	 (and	 within	 each	 of)	 China’s	 31	 provinces;	 worsening	 population	 and	
environmental	problems;	grossly	 inadequate	social	safety	nets	and	healthcare	




China’s	economy	during	 the	past	 three	decades	can	be	 likened	 to	a	 speeding	




A	 hardware failure	 refers	 to	 the	 breakdown	 of	 an	 economic mechanism—a	
development	that	is	analogous	to	the	collapse	of	the	chassis	of	a	car.	Probable	
hardware	failures	include	a	banking	crisis	that	causes	a	credit	crunch,	a	budget	
crisis	 that	 necessitates	 reductions	 in	 important	 infrastructure	 and	 social	
1	 For	a	review	of	the	debate	on	how	to	interpret	China’s	high	growth	in	1978–2000	and	why	China—unlike	
the	economies	of	 the	 former	Soviet	bloc—did	not	experience	a	recession	when	 it	made	 the	switch	 from	a	
centrally	planned	economy	to	a	market	economy,	see	Sachs	and	Woo	(2000)	and	Woo	(2001).
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expenditure	 (and	 possibly	 generates	 high	 inflation	 and	 balance-of-payments	









A	 power supply failure	 refers	 to	 the	 economy	 being	 unable	 to	 move	 forward	
because	it	hits	either	a natural limit or	an externally imposed limit—a	situation	
that	is	akin	to	the	car	running	out	of	fuel	(a	natural	limit)	or	into	a	roadblock	
erected	by	 foreigners	 (an	 externally	 imposed	 constraint).	 Examples	 of	power	
supply	failures	are	an	environmental	collapse	and	a	collapse	in	China’s	exports	
because	of	a	trade	war.	
There	 are	 many	 events	 within	 each	 type	 of	 failure	 that	 could	 make	 China’s	





growth.	To	see	 the	source	of	our	concern,	we	have	 to	 recall,	first,	 the	nature	
of	 the	global	financial	 crisis	 and	 the	manner	 in	which	 it	 impacted	on	China;	
and	second,	the	kind	of	economic	mechanisms	that	were	used	to	generate	the	
stunning	8.7	per	cent	GDP	growth	rate	in	2009.	
The	global	financial	 crisis	burst	onto	 the	world	 scene	on	15	September	2008	
when	 investment	 bank	 Lehman	 Brothers	 filed	 for	 bankruptcy.	 This	 action	
sparked	 a	 wholesale	 flight	 to	 liquidity	 that	 caused	 a	 meltdown	 of	 financial	
markets	 globally.	 This	 widening	 financial	 crash,	 in	 turn,	 became	 a	 negative	
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feedback	 loop	 to	 the	 level	 of	 aggregate	 income.	 GDP	 growth	 (year-on-year)	
turned	negative	in	the	fourth	quarter	of	2008	in	the	United	States	(–1.9	per	cent)	
and	the	United	Kingdom	(–2.1	per	cent).
This	abrupt	decline	 in	GDP	of	 the	major	advanced	economies	 translated	 into	
a	 large,	 abrupt	 negative	 external	 shock	 to	 China	 that	 had	 two	 components:	
a	 negative	 export	 shock	 and	 a	 negative	 inward	 FDI	 shock.2	 This	 prolonged	

















per	 cent,	 ‘land	 prices…doubled	 in	 2009	 on	 a	 nationwide	 basis’	 (‘China	 tells	
banks	to	restrict	loans	to	local	governments’,	The New York Times,	25	February	
2010).	The	value	of	residential	property	transactions	in	2009	was	80	per	cent	







2	 On	 a	 year-on-year	 basis,	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 exports	 turned	 abruptly	 negative	 (–2.2	 per	 cent)	 in	 2008	
(11	months)	and	remained	negative	through	2009	(11	months).	The	growth	rate	of	FDI	also	turned	abruptly	
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China	has	to	address	in	order	to	sustain	growth	over	the	long	run.	Specifically,	
the	 real	 estate	 boom	 is	 part	 of	 a	 generalised	 investment	 boom	 unleashed	 by	
the	 RMB4	 trillion	 stimulus	 program	 implemented	 since	 November	 2008.	The	
fact	 that	 the	central	government	would	 fund	only	one-third	of	 the	proposed	
expenditure	 might	 prompt	 one	 to	 think	 of	 the	 stimulus	 program	 as	 a	 work	
agenda	 for	 the	 government	 to	 create	 the	 incentives	 to	 induce	 investment	 to	
reach	the	stated	level,	but	such	an	interpretation	would	be	wrong.	The	stimulus	




besides	 the	 ideal	 of	 profit	 maximisation.	 Because	 state-controlled	 enterprises	
(SCEs)	are	usually	bailed	out	when	their	investments	turn	out	to	be	based	on	
over-optimistic	 projections	 or	 are	 derailed	 by	 bad	 luck,	 the	 outcome	 is	 the	
well-known	interest-inelastic	phenomenon	of	a	‘thirst	for	investment’	by	SCEs	
and	 local	governments.	The	 state-appointed	SCE	manager	 is	 always	 in	 favour	
of	expanding	the	scale	and	range	of	the	operation	of	the	SCE	because	it	yields	
three	major	benefits	 to	him	or	her:	higher	 likelihood	of	promotion	based	on	
the	proven	ability	 to	handle	bigger	 things;	greater	patronage	power	 to	build	






SCEs	 and	 local	 governments,	 a	 ‘liquidity	 tango’	 is	 generated.	The	 inevitable	
outcome	 of	 a	 protracted	 liquidity	 tango	 is	 high	 inflation	 followed	 by	 non-
performing	loans	(NPLs).6	The	notable	period	when	such	liquidity	tangos	were	
rare	 was	 1996–2001	 when	 Zhu	 Rongji	 was	 prepared	 to	 punish	 the	 managers	
of	SCBs	 severely	 for	 the	 appearance	of	new	NPLs.	The	key	 is	 that	whenever	
a	 SCB	 manager	 feels	 they	 are	 operating	 under	 a	 soft-budget	 constraint,	 they	
extend	loans	readily	because	a	scaling-up	of	lending	brings	the	three	benefits	
mentioned	previously.	
At	 present,	 the	 central	 government	 has	 two	 lines	 of	 institutional	 defence	 to	
prevent	the	liquidity	tango	from	getting	out	of	hand	in	China’s	partially	reformed	
5	 State-controlled	 firms	 include	 state-owned	 firms	 and	 publicly	 listed	 firms	 in	 which	 the	 State	 and	 its	
intermediaries	hold	the	controlling	share.
6	 See	Woo	 (2006)	 for	 a	 more	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 how	 the	 frequent	 rescue	 of	 state	 firms	 (also	 known	
as	 the	 soft-budget	 practices	 of	 the	 government)	 has	 made	 the	 economy	 inflation	 prone	 since	 economic	
decentralisation	began	in	1978.
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economy.	The	first	line	is	that	all	large	projects	need	the	approval	of	the	National	
Development	 and	 Reform	 Commission	 (NDRC;	 formerly,	 the	 State	 Planning	
Commission).	The	second	line	is	that	all	banks	are	assigned	credit	quotas.









Not	 surprisingly,	 the	 public	 media	 carries	 occasional	 anecdotes	 about	 new	
investments	in	industries	plagued	by	overcapacity	(for	example,	steel,	cement	
and	aluminium),	 trophy	 investments	 (for	example,	grand	town	centres,	high-
speed	rail	and	stately	administrative	buildings)	and	spontaneous	privatisation	
of	 project	 funds	 (for	 example,	 massive	 purchases	 of	 cars	 by	 state	 bodies).7	

















finds	misuse	of	 funds	 tied	 to	 stimulus’,	Financial Chronicle,	29	December	2009,	<http://www.mydigitalfc.



















stimulus	program	 is	a	 slowdown	 in	 the	productivity	growth	of	 the	economy.	
Unless	the	2008–10	expansion	of	the	state	sector	 (sometimes	occurring	at	the	
expense	of	the	private	sector)	is	balanced	by	a	larger	expansion	in	the	private	
sector,	 the	 post-1949	 economic	 history	 of	 China	 does	 not	 give	 ground	 for	





The	 satisfactory	 functioning	 of	 a	 market	 economy	 requires	 a	 wide	 array	
of	 regulatory	 institutions	 that	 ranges	 from	 straightforward	 law-and-order	
administration	to	complicated	legal	adjudication.	China’s	strategy	of	incremental	
reform	combined	with	 the	 fact	 that	 institution	building	 is	 a	 time-consuming	
process	 means	 that	 many	 of	 its	 regulatory	 institutions	 are	 either	 absent	 or	







ability	 so	 much	 that	 large	 NPL	 ratios	 are	 a	 thing	 of	 the	 past.	We,	 however,	 think	 that	 it	 is	 premature	 to	
pronounce	victory	on	 state-owned	bank	 (SOB)	 reforms	because	 the	2003–09	period	has	been	one	of	high	
growth.	
10	 See	 Tong	 and	 Woo	 (2006)	 for	 an	 analytical	 discussion	 of	 the	 undermining	 of	 fiscal	 stability	 by	 the	
constant	recapitalisation	of	SCBs.
11	 This	 debate	 over	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 state	 firms	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 private	 ones	 is	 conducted	 over	 the	
heading	of	‘guojin mintui’	(the	state	sector	advances,	and	the	private	sector	withdraws).	
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costs	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 addition	 of	 poisonous	 substitutes	 to	 toothpaste	
(‘China	 investigates	 contaminated	 toothpaste’,	 The New York Times,	 22	 May	
2007;	 ‘China	 prohibits	 poisonous	 industrial	 solvent	 in	 toothpaste’,	 The New 
York Times,	12	July	2007),		cough	medicine	(‘From	China	to	Panama,	a	trail	of	
poisoned	medicine’,	The New York Times,	6	May	2007)	and	animal	feed	(‘Filler	
in	animal	 feed	 is	open	secret	 in	China’,	The New York Times,	20	April	2007;	
‘Another	chemical	emerges	in	pet	food	case’,	The New York Times,	9	May	2007);	
the	application	of	lead	paint	to	children’s	toys	(‘As	more	toys	are	recalled,	the	
trail	ends	in	China’,	The New York Times,	19	June	2007;	‘Train	wreck’,	The New 
York Times,	19	June	2007;	‘Fisher-Price	recalls	1.5m	China-made	toys’,	Financial 
Times,	2	August	2007);12	and	the	overuse	of	antifungals	and	antibacterials	in	fish	
farming	(‘FDA	curbs	sale	of	5	seafoods	farmed	in	China’,	The New York Times,	




accepting	bribes	 to	approve	production	 licences	 for	pharmaceutical	and	food	
companies	(‘Ex-chief	of	China	food	and	drug	unit	sentenced	to	death	for	graft’,	
The New York Times,	30	May	2007;	‘For	2	children,	ban	of	a	drug	came	too	late’,	
The New York Times,	13	July	2007).
There	have	also	been	significant	regulatory	failures	in	the	treatment	of	labour,	
especially	in	the	areas	of	occupational	safety	and	wage	payments.	One	of	the	most	
recent	horrifying	accounts	 involved	 the	 forced	 labour	of	kidnapped	children	






bribes	(‘Reports	of	forced	labour	unsettle	China’,	The New York Times,	16	June	
2007).	In	one	case,	the	son	of	the	village	party	secretary	owned	the	brick	kiln	






13	 The New York Times	 (‘China	slave	scandal	brings	resignation	calls’,	18	June	2007)	reported	that	‘[t]he	
workers	endured	prison-like	confinement	with	fierce	dogs	and	beatings…Released	workers	were	shown	on	
television	with	festering	wounds	and	emaciated	bodies.’	
14	 This	point	was	made	by	the	popular	tabloid	Southern Metropolis Daily;	see	The New York Times	(‘China	
slave	scandal	brings	resignation	calls’,	18	June	2007).





trafficking	 in	China,	 recognised	 a	 reason	 for	 the	negative	development	 to	be	
‘the	loopholes	in	the	legal	and	labour	systems…[Specifically,]	the	Criminal	Law	
on	human	trafficking	protects	women	and	children	only	and	leaves	out	grown-
up	and	 teen	males.	 It	doesn’t	have	provisions	 for	punishing	 those	 trafficking	
people	for	forced	labour	or	prostitution’	(‘More	forced	into	prostitution,	labour’,	






















Furthermore,	 the	 present	 mode	 of	 economic	 development	 also	 generates	
immense	opportunities	 for	embezzlement	of	 state	assets,	 seizure	of	 farmlands	
for	industrial	development	and	corruption	because	of	the	absence	of	effective	
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Clearly,	 the	 number	 of	 mass	 incidents	 would	 have	 been	 lower	 if	 China	 had	
better	governance.	There	would	have	been	more	pre-emptive	efforts	at	conflict	
mediation	by	the	government	and	less	abuse	of	power	by	government	officials	














adage	of	 ‘man	conquering	nature’	 is	 just	as	unrealistic	as	creating	prosperity	
through	central	planning.	There	is	no	doubt	that	China’s	rapid	growth	in	the	
past	 two	decades	has	done	substantial	damage	 to	 the	environment	 (Economy	
2004).










poison	spreads	amid	China’s	boom’,	The Wall Street Journal,	30	September	2006.
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Right	now,	about	 ‘400	of	China’s	660	cities	 face	water	shortages,	with	110	of	





sinking	as	water	table	falls’,	South China Morning Post,	11	August	2001;	Becker	
2003).	A	study	using	measurements	from	satellites	has	established	that	the	part	









hundred	kilometres’	 (‘China	may	be	 left	high	 and	dry’,	The Straits Times,	 3	
January	2004).
Water	shortages	and	the	increasing	pollution	of	water	are	not	the	only	serious	
environmental	 threats	 to	 the	 economy	 of	 northern	 China19.	 The	 desert	 is	
expanding	(possibly,	at	an	accelerating	pace)	and	humans	appear	to	be	the	chief	
culprits.	The	 State	 Forestry	 Administration	 reported	 that	 28	 per	 cent	 of	 the	
country’s	landmass	was	affected	by	desertification	in	1999	and	37	per	cent	was	
affected	by	soil	erosion.	The	report	 identified	about	65	per	cent	of	the	desert	
as	 having	 been	 created	 by	 ‘over-cultivation,	 overgrazing,	 deforestation	 and	
poor	 irrigation	 practices’	 (‘Quarter	 of	 land	 now	 desert—and	 man	 mostly	 to	
blame’,	 South China Morning Post,	 30	 January	 2002).	 One	 direct	 upshot	 is	 a	
great	 increase	 in	 the	 frequency	 of	 major	 sandstorms20	 that	 play	 ‘havoc	 with	




18	 According	 to	 Becker	 (2003):	 ‘Some	 60	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 land	 in	 Tianjin	 municipality	 is	 plagued	 by	
subsistence.’	
19	 Examples	 of	 reports	 about	 serious	 water	 pollution	 include:	 ‘Main	 rivers	 facing	 a	 “pollution	 crisis”’,	
South China Morning Post,	6	June	2003;	‘Booming	cities	polluting	scarce	water	supplies’,	The Straits Times,	
18	September	2003;	‘Rivers	run	black,	and	Chinese	die	of	cancer’,	The New York Times,	12	September	2004;	
‘“Cancer	villages”	pay	heavy	price	for	economic	progress’,	South China Morning Post,	8	May	2006;	and	‘Rules	
ignored,	toxic	sludge	sinks	Chinese	village’,	The New York Times,	4	September	2006.	
20	 The	number	of	major	sandstorms	in	China	was	five	in	the	period	1950–59,	eight	in	1960–69,	13	in	1970–
79,	14	in	1980–89,	23	in	1990–99,	14	in	2000,	26	in	2001,	16	in	2002	and	11	in	2003,	according	to	Yin	Pumin	
(‘Sands	 of	 time	 running	 out:	 desertification	 continues	 to	 swallow	 up	 “healthy”	 land	 at	 an	 alarming	 rate’,	
Beijing Review,	16	June	2005).
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in	the	desert’,	The New York Times,	11	April	2004).	In	the	assessment	of	Chen	
Lai,	Vice-Minister	of	Water	Resources:	 ‘It	will	 take	nearly	half	 a	 century	 for	
China	to	control	the	eroded	land	and	rehabilitate	their	damaged	ecosystems	in	
accordance	with	China’s	present	erosion-control	capabilities’	(‘Quarter	of	land	
now	desert—and	man	mostly	to	blame’,	South China Morning Post,	30	January	
2002).
While	northern	China	has	been	getting	drier	and	experiencing	desertification,	
nature—as	 if	 in	 compensation	 (or	 in	 mockery)—has	 been	 dousing	 southern	
China	with	heavier	rains,	causing	heavy	floods	that	have	brought	considerable	
deaths	 and	 property	 damage	 almost	 every	 summer	 since	 1998.21	 The	 sad	
possibility	 is	 that	 the	 northern	 droughts	 and	 southern	 floods	 might	 not	 be	
independent	events	but	a	combination	caused	by	pollution	that	originates	 in	
China.	We	will	have	more	to	say	about	this	possibility	later.




































reason	 for	 this	 inefficient	 use	 of	 water	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘China’s	 farmers,	
factories	 and	 householders	 enjoy	 some	 of	 the	 cheapest	 water	 in	 the	 world’	
(‘Water	wastage	will	soon	leave	China	high	and	dry’,	South China Morning Post,	
8	 March	 2006),	 even	 though	 China’s	 per	 capita	 endowment	 of	 water	 is	 one-
quarter	of	the	world	average	(‘Alert	sounded	over	looming	water	shortage’,	The 
Straits Times,	10	June	2004).	
There	 is,	however,	 the	unhappy	possibility	that	neither	 the	price	mechanism	
nor	 the	 three	 canals	 can	 solve	 China’s	 water	 problems,	 making	 its	 growth	
unsustainable	unless	the	present	mode	of	economic	development	is	drastically	
amended.	
A reform agenda for avoiding crashes on the 
road to prosperity
Dealing with potential hardware problems
We	 identified	 two	 potential	 hardware	 problems	 arising	 from	 the	 large	 dose	
of	 SCE–SCB-based	 macro-stimulus	 that	 Prime	 Minister,	 Wen	 Jiabao,	 has	











The	 State	 can	 partly	 offset	 the	 expanded	 state	 sector	 by	 mobilising	 inland	
migrant	 workers	 laid-off	 from	 the	 coastal	 provinces	 into	 an	 entrepreneurial	
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force.	Many	of	these	migrants	have	sufficient	work	experience	to	start	their	own	
factories/workshops	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 increased	 cost	 competitiveness	









private	 banks.	 As	 most	 of	 the	 migrants	 are	 from	 the	 western	 provinces,	 the	
government	could	unleash	this	first	driver	of	growth	in	the	western	provinces	
on	an	experimental	basis.





•	 these	small	and	medium	private	enterprises	will	be	more	 labour	 intensive	
than	SCEs.	











the	 new	 arrivals	 would	 rent	 homes	 for	 seven	 years	 and	 then	 have	 the	 first	
right	 to	 buy	 these	 units	 at	 a	 price	 based	 on	 construction	 costs.	This	 ‘future	
ownership’	form	of	urbanisation	would	prevent	the	problem	of	empty	housing	
22	 If	speculative	demand	had	been	the	overwhelmingly	dominant	cause	of	the	property	boom,	house	rents	








countries	 is	 the	cost	of	 land	and	not	 the	cost	of	 the	 structures—and	 land	 in	
China	is	mostly	owned	by	the	State.23
Our	proposed	form	of	urbanisation	will	support	China’s	growth	in	three	ways	
















The	 third	 interrelated	new	growth	driver	 is	 the	 true	 legalisation	of	privately	
owned	 financial	 institutions.24	 The	 emergence	 of	 a	 strong	 small–medium	
banking	sector	would	reduce	the	dominance	of	the	SCBs	and	hence	make	the	
economy	 less	 vulnerable	 to	 their	 collapse	 from	 potential	 NPLs.	The	 entry	 of	
private	banks	(domestic	and	foreign)	will	reduce	the	probability	that	any	one	
of	the	big	four	state	banks	would	remain	too	big	to	fail—and	hence	reduce	the	







24	 We	do	not	consider	 listed	banks	 in	which	 the	State	holds	 the	controlling	share	 (often	 through	state-
controlled	intermediaries—for	example,	‘legal	persons’)	to	be	private	banks	in	the	true	sense.
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along	with	the	increase	in	the	quantity	of	bank	loans—helping	to	reduce	the	
appearance	 of	 NPLs	 along	 with	 market-directed	 investments	 replacing	 the	
macro-stimulus	program.25
Dealing with potential software problems
The	 important	 realisation	 about	 hardcore	 poverty	 is	 that,	 in	 today’s	 China,	
introducing	 more	 of	 the	 same	 economic	 policies	 will	 not	 produce	 the	 same	
salubrious	 results	 on	 every	 front	 because	 the	 development	 problems	 have	








situation,	 the	 greater	 use	 of	 democratic	 procedures,	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	
independent	 judiciary	and	the	restoration	of	a	 free	press	might	be	 inevitable	




It	 is	 interesting	 therefore	 that	 the	 ‘No.	 1	 Document’	 issued	 in	 January	 2006	
jointly	 by	 the	 CPC	 Central	 Committee	 and	 the	 State	 Council	 pledged	 to	 not	
only	‘stabilise	and	regulate	the	transfer	of	land-use	rights	and	accelerate	land	
acquisition	 reforms’,	but	 ‘expand	channels	 to	express	public	opinions	 in	 the	
countryside	and	improve	the	mechanism	to	resolve	social	conflicts’	(‘New	pledge	
to	give	farmers	a	louder	voice’,	South China Morning Post,	30	January	2007).26
The	desire	by	the	Hu–Wen	leadership	to	improve	the	institutions	of	governance	







25	 The	management	of	 state	 assets	 and	 the	 regulation	of	 the	financial	 sector	 should	also	be	 reformed	 to	
eliminate	the	phenomenon	of	repeated	recapitalisation	of	the	SCBs.	
26	 The	No.	1	Document	designation	is	designed	to	show	that	this	is	the	most	important	task	in	the	new	year.
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about	what	he	says,	whether	 in	prepared	remarks	or	speaking	off	the	
cuff.	The	fact	 that	he	highlighted,	 in	 the	presence	of	Hong	Kong	and	
overseas	 journalists,	 the	 need	 for	 political	 reform	 is	 uncharacteristic	




for	reforms’,	South China Morning Post,	16	April	2007)
While	there	are	reasonable	grounds	for	an	analyst	to	doubt	either	the	sincerity	
of	Premier	Wen’s	words	or	his	ability	to	act	on	them,	the	analyst	cannot	doubt	
that	Premier	Wen	 is	at	 least	aware	 that	democracy	 is	one	way	 to	 solve	many	
of	 China’s	 problems	 of	 governance.	 The	 embrace	 of	 the	 harmonious	 society	






Warding	 off	 software	 failure	 is	 of	 course	 much	 more	 difficult	 than	 warding	
off	 hardware	 failure	 because	 political	 reforms	 lie	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 successful	
reconfiguration	 of	 the	 software	 of	 governance.	The	 modernisation	 of	 China’s	
administrative	software	will	require	the	adoption	of	free	elections,	a	free	press	
and	an	independent	judiciary.	
Dealing with power supply failure caused by environmental 
degradation
The	 general	 point	 is	 that	 effective	 policymaking	 on	 the	 environmental	 front	
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environmental	damage.	If	part	of	the	shift	in	China’s	climate	is	integral	to	global	
climate	 change,	 a	 sustainable	 development	 policy	 would	 require	 a	 complete	
rethinking	 of	 the	 location	 of	 population	 centres	 and	 the	 types	 of	 enhanced	
international	cooperation	on	global	environmental	management.
The	 uncomfortable	 reality	 for	 China	 is	 that	 unless	 ecological	 balance	 is	
restored	within	the	medium	term,	environmental	limits	could	choke	off	further	
economic	growth.	And	 the	uncomfortable	 reality	 for	 the	 rest	of	 the	world	 is	
that	 the	negative	consequences	of	 large-scale	environmental	damage	within	a	
geographically	large	country	are	seldom	confined	within	that	country’s	borders.	
The	 continued	 march	 of	 China’s	 desertification	 first	 brought	 more	 frequent	
sandstorms	 to	 Beijing	 and	 then,	 beginning	 in	 April	 2001,	 sent	 yellow	 dust	
clouds	not	only	across	the	sea	to	Japan	and	Korea	but	across	the	ocean	to	the	


















cleanly.	Furthermore,	given	 the	growing	water	 shortages	 in	China	 (especially	
in	the	north)	and	in	many	of	its	neighbouring	countries,	China	should	start	a	
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Dealing with power supply failure caused by trade protectionism
Finally,	 we	 consider	 briefly	 how	 to	 reduce	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 speeding	
car	 (that	 is,	 China)	 crashing	 into	 a	 roadblock	 that	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 trade	






listen?’,	The New York Times,	17	March	2010).
The	root	of	China’s	chronic	current	account	surplus	is	that	the	sum	of	savings	by	
SCEs	and	the	private	sector	exceeds	the	sum	of	their	investment	expenditures.	
This	 chronic	 large	 trade	 surplus	 reveals	 a	 deep-seated	 and	 serious	 problem	
in	 China’s	 economy:	 its	 dysfunctional	 financial	 system	 (Liu	 and	 Woo	 1994).	
China	 generates	 the	 current	 account	 surplus	 because	 of	 inadequate	 financial	
intermediation	 and	 the	 surplus	 grows	 over	 time	 because	 the	 dysfunctional	
financial	system	fails	to	pool	risks	to	reduce	uncertainty-induced	savings	and	
fails	 to	 provide	 loans	 to	 reduce	 investment-motivated	 saving.	 The	 optimal	
solution	 to	 China’s	 excess	 saving	 is	 to	 establish	 an	 improved	 intermediation	
mechanism	for	coordinating	private	savings	and	private	investments.	
It	must	be	mentioned	in	fairness,	however,	that	a	trade	imbalance	reflects	the	
economic	 situation	 in	 two	 countries:	 China	 could	 not	 have	 over-saved	 if	 the	
United	States	had	not	under-saved.	US	profligacy	is	to	be	blamed	for	the	trade	
tensions	 just	 as	much	as	Chinese	 thriftiness.	Furthermore,	 as	Woo	 (2008)	has	










28	 Nicholas	 Lardy	 has	 described	 China	 as	 being	 in	 a	 co-dependent	 relationship	 with	 the	 United	 States	
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that	upgrade	 the	 skills	 of	younger	workers.	The	 important	point	 is	 that	US–
China	 trade	 tensions	 would	 be	 lower	 if	 both	 countries	 undertook	 corrective	
policies	rather	than	if	China	acted	alone.	






Brazil	 and	 India	 have	 assumed	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 developing	 economies’	
camp	 in	 the	 trade	 negotiations.	 According	 to	 Susan	 Schwab,	 the	 US	 Trade	














deals	with	 rich	countries	 that	 are	 tailored	 to	 the	 two	parties’	needs’	 (‘Brazil,	











of	 economic	 management	 continue	 to	 wither.	 The	 1868	 insight	 of	 the	 Meiji	
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two	 major	 reasons.	The	 first	 is	 that	 development	 policymaking	 in	 China	 has	
become	 more	 challenging	 because	 popular	 expectations	 of	 administrative	
performance	have	risen	dramatically	with	income	growth	and,	more	importantly,	





The	 second	 reason	 is	 that	 successful	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 administrative	
software	 requires	 not	 just	 highly	 developed	 political	 skills	 but	 favourable	
circumstances	 in	 the	 domestic	 political	 arena	 and	 a	 benign	 international	
environment—both	of	which	are	normally	beyond	the	reach	of	most	politicians	
to	manipulate.	What	happens	 in	 the	 future	will	depend	on	whether	 the	CPC	
is	 sufficiently	confident	and	politically	 skilful	enough	 to	 lead	 the	democratic	
transition	and	emerge	afterwards	as	the	most	important	political	force.	History	








emission	 pact)	 or	 it	 involves	 working	 with	 powerful	 foreign	 partners	 where	
differentiation	 between	 cultural	misunderstanding	 (for	 example,	 a	bombastic	
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national	 but	 nevertheless	 well-meaning	 demeanour)	 and	 unstated	 national	
rivalry	(for	example,	keeping	shipping	lanes	open)	is	not	easy—or	it	involves	




China’s	 responsibilities	 in	 the	world	economy	before	 there	 can	be	 significant	
cooperation	on	common	problems.29
China’s	 economy	 has	 now	 become	 an	 important	 shaping	 force	 of	 the	 global	
economy	 and,	 along	 with	 it.	 Chinese	 civil	 society	 has	 come	 to	 possess	 more	
and	more	of	the	middle-class	aspirations	common	in	the	industrialised	world.	
China’s	continued	high	growth	now	necessitates	a	new	development	strategy	
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instance,	 the	over-investment	problem	was	probably	 caused	by	 the	 expected	
high	returns	to	investment.	Therefore,	unless	the	incentive	structure	is	corrected,	






liberalisation	 of	 product	 markets	 but	 with	 distortions	 remaining	 in	 factor	
markets.	 Such	 a	 reform	 approach	 generally	 represses	 prices	 for	 labour,	 land,	
capital,	 resources	 and	 the	 environment.	 These	 distortions	 have	 the	 effect	 of	
subsidy	 equivalents	 for	 producers,	 exporters	 and	 investors.	This	 is	 probably	
why	growth	has	been	so	strong	in	China,	but	exports	and	investment	have	been	
even	 stronger.	 If	 our	 analysis	 is	 right,	 correction	of	 the	 structural	 imbalance	
problems	in	China	is	dependent	on	the	liberalisation	of	factor	markets.







China’s growing imbalance problems
Structural	imbalance	is	a	broad	and	subjective	concept,	although	international	
experience	 provides	 some	 useful	 references.	 We	 focus	 our	 discussion	 on	
imbalance	problems	in	three	broad	areas:	shares	of	investment	and	consumption	
in	 GDP;	 income	 distribution	 among	 households;	 income	 distribution	 across	
households,	 the	 corporate	 sector	 and	 the	 government;	 and	 current	 account	
imbalances.
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Over-dependence on investment






A	 high	 and	 rising	 investment	 share	 in	 itself	 might	 not	 be	 a	 problem,	 as	
investment	is	a	necessary	driver	of	economic	growth.	A	very	high	investment	
share,	however,	increases	the	risk	of	excess	capacity	and	low	returns.	East	Asian	








Chinese	 economy	 should	 its	 investment	 share	 remain	 at	 extraordinarily	 high	
levels.	
We	are	not	certain	that	there	is	an	optimal	range	for	the	investment	share,	since	
it	 probably	 varies	 according	 to	 individual	 economies’	 particular	 conditions.	






Sources:	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 various	 years,	 China Statistical 
Yearbook,	 China	 Statistics	 Press,	 Beijing;	 Chenery,	 H.	 and	 Syrquin,	 M.	 1975,	
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Figure 14.1 Comparison of the investment rate and consumption rate 
between China and the Chenery Standard, 1990–2008
Sources:	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	various	years,	China Statistical Yearbook,	China	Statistics	Press,	













By	 definition,	 the	 current	 account	 surplus	 is	 equivalent	 to	 the	 excess	 of	 a	
country’s	 savings	 over	 its	 investment.	 A	 persistent	 current	 account	 surplus	
means	that	China,	as	a	low-income	economy,	has	been	exporting	capital	to	other	
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‘hard	 evidence’	 to	 support	 this	 argument.	 Large	 current	 account	 surpluses	
also	cause	economic	problems	domestically.	In	addition	to	exporting	capital	to	
rich	countries,	 the	 surpluses	 indicate	 the	degree	 to	which	Chinese	growth	 is	
dependent	on	external	demand.	This	was	precisely	why	Chinese	growth	was	
seriously	affected	by	the	US	sub-prime	crisis	nearly	two	years	ago.













however,	 also	 deteriorated	 sharply.	This	 change	 was	 understandable	 initially	
since	 the	 ‘very	 equal’	 income	 distribution	 pattern	 in	 the	 pre-reform	 period	
did	 not	 provide	 any	 incentives	 for	 hard	 work.	 Over	 time,	 however,	 income	
inequality	has	become	a	major	political	as	well	as	economic	concern.




The	 latest	 reading	 of	 the	 coefficient	 is	 among	 the	 highest	 in	 the	 world	 and	
probably	indicates	high	risks	of	social	and	economic	instability.
Figure 14.3 China’s saving and investment rate, 1978–2009 (per cent of GDP)
Source:	CEIC	Data	Company.
Figure 14.4 Gini coefficient among households and the urban–rural income gap
Source:	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	various	years,	China Statistical Yearbook,	China	Statistics	Press,	
Beijing.
A	 related	problem	 is	 the	widening	gap	between	 rural	 and	urban	 income.	At	








of	 rural–urban	 migration.	 In	 reality,	 it	 is	 probably	 the	 result	 of	 institutional	
restrictions	on	migration	and	faster	productivity	growth	in	the	urban	economy.
From	the	perspective	of	macroeconomic	imbalance,	one	of	the	most	important	






Figure 14.5 Proportion of residential, firms’ and government income in 
primary distribution and the urban–rural income gap
Sources:	Bai,	C.-E	and	Qian,	Z.	2009,	‘Factor	income	share	in	China:	stories	behind	statistics’,	Economic 
Research Journal	[Jing Ji Yan Jiu],	vol.	3;	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	various	years,	China Statistical 
Yearbook,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
Policy efforts to rebalance the economy















the	 growing	 imbalance	 problems.	 Premier	Wen	 and	 his	 government	 take	 the	
improvement	of	the	quality	of	growth	as	a	top	policy	priority,	and	during	the	
past	seven	years	they	have	adopted	various	measures	to	achieve	this	objective,	
including	 administrative	 controls,	 monetary	 instruments	 and	 fiscal	 tools	 (see	
Appendix	14	for	detailed	policy	measures	during	the	past	six	years).	
Industrial	policy	has	played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	government’s	 efforts	 to	
transform	the	growth	model.	The	idea	is	to	promote	high-tech,	high	value-added	
and	environmentally	friendly	industries.	This	has	been	done	in	various	ways,	
with	 the	 most	 important	 tools	 including	 fiscal	 subsidies	 and	 administrative	











the	 NDRC	 is	 responsible	 for	 optimising	 the	 industrial	 structure.	 It	 regularly	
publishes	lists	of	industries	with	high	overcapacity	risk	and	promotes	investment	
in	other	 industries.	 In	2009,	 for	 instance,	 the	NDRC	 stopped	approving	new	
projects	in	certain	industries,	including	the	hydropower	development	project	
on	 the	 Jinsha	 River	 and	 steel	 industry	 projects	 in	 Shandong	 Province.	 The	
NDRC	 also	 raised	 the	 capital	 requirement	 in	 2005	 for	 investment	 projects	 in	
iron	and	steel,	cement,	aluminium	and	real	estate	and	again	in	2009	for	energy-
intensive	industries.	
The	 government	 has	 also	 made	 efforts	 to	 promote	 industrial	 upgrading,	
such	as	 localising	 the	production	of	 large	nuclear	power	equipment	 in	2006,	
revitalising	the	equipment	manufacturing	industry	in	2007,	restructuring	the	
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in	2008	 to	31.8	per	cent	 in	2009.	 Indeed,	 the	new	 loans	extended	 in	2009—
RMB9.6	trillion—doubled	the	annual	target	for	that	year.





Council	 published	 ‘Regulations	 on	 strengthening	 control	 of	 investment	 in	
fixed	 assets	 and	 newly	 started	 projects’	 in	 June	 2006.	 This	 policy	 required	
the	commercial	banks	to	tighten	controls	over	loan	extensions	for	investment	
projects.	 Meanwhile,	 financing	 demands	 from	 strategic	 emerging	 industries,	
small	enterprises,	trade	and	residential	consumption	are	the	highest	priorities.	
Beside	these	areas,	loan	demands	from	newly	started	projects,	heavy	polluters,	
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wake	of	the	global	financial	crisis,	the	PBOC	lowered	the	reserve	requirement	
four	 times	 to	 ease	 liquidity	 conditions.	This	was	 an	 important	 factor	behind	
the	extraordinary	loan	growth	during	that	period.	On	the	other	hand,	between	





to	float	 the	rates	as	 long	as	they	observe	floors	for	 lending	rates	and	ceilings	
for	deposit	rates.	Adjustments	of	interest	rates,	though,	are	often	less	frequent,	
reflecting	the	policymakers’	greater	confidence	in	quantitative	measures.
The	 government	 has	 also	 adopted	 a	 number	 of	 other	 policies	 to	 reduce	 the	












saving	 and	 resource-efficient	 projects.	They	 required	 all	 provinces	 to	 reduce	
energy	intensity	annually	by	4	per	cent	and	the	discharge	of	major	pollutants	
by	 2	 per	 cent	 in	 2006.	 In	 2009,	 the	 government	 published	 a	 new	 policy	 on	
‘China’s	responses	to	climate	change:	policy	and	action’,	announcing	an	explicit	
target	of	reducing	the	carbon	intensity	of	GDP	by	40–45	per	cent	by	2020.
Asymmetrical market liberalisation 
Despite	the	government’s	deep	concerns	and	its	continuous	efforts,	the	imbalance	
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structure	that	caused	the	imbalance	problems—a	peculiar	incentive	structure	





at	 least	 three	 dimensions:	 1)	 creating	 autonomy	 and	 incentives	 at	 the	 micro	







supply	 in	 free	 markets.	The	 dual-track	 system	 served	 an	 important	 purpose	
in	 the	 reforms:	 allowing	 free	 markets	 to	 allocate	 resources	 without	 seriously	










to	 allocate	 consumer	 goods	 during	 the	 central	 planning	 system,	 was	 phased	
out	completely	in	the	early	1990s.	Free	markets	for	most	consumer	goods	came	
into	existence	during	 the	1980s.	By	 the	 late	1990s,	 transactions	of	 almost	all	
consumer	goods	were	completely	liberalised	with	prices	freely	determined	by	
the	market	mechanism.
Distortions of factor markets
Compared	with	product	markets,	factor	markets	have	not	yet	been	liberalised	
completely.	 From	 the	 production	 function,	 there	 are	 four	 major	 sources	 of	
output:	 labour,	 capital,	 natural	 resources	 and	 technology.	 Given	 technology,	
prices	for	the	other	three	factors	are	distorted.	



















been	working	 in	 cities	 for	years,	 they	 are	normally	not	 entitled	 to	pensions,	
medical	 care	 and	 housing	 subsidies,	 and	 their	 children	 cannot	 attend	 local	
public	 schools.	 In	 short,	 it	 is	very	difficult	 for	 them	 to	 settle	down.	For	 this	
reason,	migrant	workers’	pay	is	sometimes	only	half	the	pay	of	urban	residents,	
even	if	they	do	the	same	job.	







































years,	 the	 authorities	 frequently	 devalued	 the	 currency	 in	 order	 to	 promote	















Natural	 resources	 such	 as	 land,	 energy	 and	 the	 environment	 are	 important	
production	factors,	but	their	prices	are	also	distorted.	In	China,	land	is	owned	
by	the	State	in	the	cities	and	by	the	collectives	in	the	countryside.	The	Land	
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Administration	 Law,	 promulgated	 in	 1999,	 classifies	 land	 into	 agricultural,	
development	and	unutilised	land.	Land	transfer	for	non-agricultural	uses	has	to	
be	approved	by	the	government.	




development.	There	 is	no	market	mechanism	 for	determining	 land	prices	 for	
industrial	use	and	it	is	still	common	for	the	government	to	apply	land-use	fees,	





















The	 environment	 is	 not	 regarded	 as	 a	 conventional	 production	 factor;	
however,	compensation	for	pollution	should	be	counted	as	an	integral	part	of	





State	 Agency	 for	 Environmental	 Protection	 (SAEP),	 an	 incomplete	 count	 of	
the	costs	of	environmental	damage	amounted	to	about	3.05	per	cent	of	GDP	in	

















Despite	 potential	 problems,	 the	 estimation	 results	 reveal	 some	 important	




suggest	 that	 while	 labour	 demand	 has	 increased	 in	 recent	 years,	 migrant	
workers’	pay	has	not	kept	pace	with	 that	of	urban	workers,	especially	when	
social	welfare	benefit	contributions	are	taken	into	account.
Table 14.1 Estimated cost distortions in China, 2000–08 (per cent of GDP) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Labour 0 .1 0 .2 0 .8 1 2 2 .4 2 .7 3 .2 3 .6
Capital 4 .1 3 .9 3 .9 3 .8 3 .1 3 3 .1 3 .6 3 .4
Natural 
resources
4 .3 4 3 .7 4 .4 4 .5 6 6 .4 5 .2 3 .6
Total 8 .5 8 .1 8 .4 9 .2 9 .5 11 .4 12 .2 12 10 .6
Source:	Huang	and	Tao	(2010),	page	18.
Second,	 of	 all	 the	 distortions,	 capital-market	 distortions	 are	 by	 far	 the	 most	
important,2	contributing	about	40	per	cent	of	total	cost	distortions	on	average.	
This	helps	to	explain	the	persistent	problem	of	over-investment	in	China	and	
also	 the	 rapid	 development	 of	 capital-intensive	 industries	 despite	 continued	
job-market	pressures.
2	 Natural	 resource	 distortions	 include	 land	 distortion,	 energy	 distortion	 and	 environmental	 distortion.	
Compared	with	the	three	elements,	as	well	as	labour	distortion,	capital-market	distortions	are	the	largest.
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Third,	 natural	 resource	 distortions	 have	 fluctuated	 widely	 over	 the	 years,	
reflecting	 volatilities	 in	 components,	 energy—especially	 international	 oil	
prices—and	the	varying	responses	of	the	Chinese	authorities	to	these	changes.	
China	 has	 already	 adopted	 a	 price	 mechanism	 that	 closely	 tracks	 changes	 in	
international	 energy	 prices,	 but	 the	 authorities	 hold	 down	 domestic	 prices	
when	 international	 prices	 surge	 rapidly.	 Therefore,	 energy	 cost	 distortions	
are	sometimes	asymmetrical.	When	international	prices	are	 low,	there	is	 little	
distortion.	When	international	prices	are	high,	distortions	increase	rapidly.
Finally,	 the	 aggregate	 estimates	 of	 cost	 distortions	 show	 significant	 increases	
since	 2004—consistent	 with	 the	 observation	 that	 structural	 imbalances	 have	
worsened	during	this	period.	The	trends	of	continuous	liberalisation	and	recent	
increases	in	the	total	impact	of	cost	distortions	are	not	necessarily	contradictory.	
These	 trends	 could	 arise	 because	 of	 a	 slower	 rise	 in	 distorted	 prices	 than	
undistorted	 prices,	 despite	 loosening	 controls	 overall.	 They	 could	 also	 arise	
because	the	quantity	of	factors	has	grown	rapidly	even	though	unit	distortions	
have	 declined.	The	 moderation	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 total	 distortions	 since	 2006,	
however,	suggests	that	the	worst	of	the	imbalance	problems	are	already	behind	
us.
Structural imbalances: consequences of factor-
market distortions
We	donot	intend	to	analyse	the	various	structural	 imbalance	phenomena	one	
by	 one,	 since	 they	 in	 fact	 share	 the	 same	 root	 cause:	 asymmetrical	 market	
liberalisationleads	to	structural	problems.	
In	fact,	some	economists	have	also	realised	the	distortions	on	some	production	
factors:	Wang	Xiaolu	regards	 the	 lack	of	 social	 security	 to	be	responsible	 for	
relatively	 low	 incomes,	 and	hence,	 the	 low	consumption	of	 the	 labour	 force,	
Zhang	Xiang	blames	the	weakness	in	financial	system	reform	for	the	economic	
structural	 imbalances,	 while	 Xu	 Xiaonian	 blames	 the	 strict	 controls	 on	 the	
service	sector.
We,	however,	think	it	is	not	a	problem	that	can	be	traced	to	a	single	market	or	




Such	 a	 production	 subsidy	 improves	 the	 international	 competitiveness	 of	
China’s	products	and	promotes	exports,	resulting	in	trade	surpluses.	Close	to	70	
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per	cent	of	Chinese	GDP	is	externallyoriented	(exports	plus	imports),	compared	
with	20–30	per	cent	 for	 the	United	States	 and	Japan.	 In	 fact,	our	 factor-cost	
distortion	 estimates	 provide	 a	 reasonably	 good	 fit	 with	 the	 current	 account	
balance	during	the	past	nine	years	(Figure	14.7,	bottom	right).





analysed.	Thus,	 it	 has	 been	 almost	 impossible	 for	 the	 government	 to	 control	
the	 over-investment	 problem.	 The	 estimated	 factor-cost	 distortionfor	 capital	
estimates	 shows	 a	 proper	 fit	 with	 the	 contribution	 of	 secondary	 industry	 to	
GDP	growth	(see	Figure	14.7,	upper	right).	When	potential	investment	returns	





While	 cost	 distortions	 have	 been	 positive	 for	 production,	 investment	 and	
exports—that	 is,	 they	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 subsidy	 equivalents	 for	 producers,	
exporters	and	 investors—correspondingly,	 these	distortions	are	equivalent	 to	




has	 been	 accompanied	 by	 rising	 labour-market	 distortions	 (see	 Figure	 14.7,	
upper	left).
Distorted	incentives	have	significantly	inflated	investment	and	export	activities.	








1970s,	China	has	quickly	 transformed	 from	a	 large	 and	poor	 economy	 into	 a	
globally	 influential	 economic	 power.	 Structural	 risks	 have,	 however,	 also	
increased	significantly.	Premier	Wen	and	other	senior	leaders	have	repeatedly	
pointed	 out	 that	 the	 existing	 growth	 pattern	 is	 unstable,	 unbalanced	 and	
unsustainable.	
In	 fact,	 the	government	has	 tried	 to	 address	 the	problems	of	 growth	quality	





government	 has	 been	 reluctant	 to	 do	 anything	 drastic	 to	 change	 the	 course	
of	 the	economy.	More	 importantly,	 the	paramount	value	of	 social	 stability	 in	
Chinese	policy	thinking	probably	also	discourages	any	policy	change	that	might	
threaten	social	order.
In	 order	 to	 alleviate	 the	 existing	 structural	 risks,	 the	 authorities	 need	 to	
change	 their	policy	course.	 It	 is	 critical	 to	understand	 that	 the	 root	 cause	of	
the	 imbalances	 and	 inefficiency	 problems	 is	 factor-market	 distortions.	 Such	
distortions	 have	 artificially	 increased	 profits	 from	 manufacturing	 production	
and	 quickly	 turned	 China	 into	 a	 global	 manufacturing	 centre	 through	 the	











Labour-market	 liberalisation	 is	 a	 fundamental	 way	 to	 stimulate	 consumption	
and	such	liberalisation	is	already	in	progress.	The	government	has	planned	to	
make	new	breakthroughs	in	reforming	the	Household	Registration	System	and	






financial	 system,	however,	needs	 to	 cater	 better	 for	 the	needs	 of	 the	private	
sector,	which	will	be	 the	backbone	of	 the	Chinese	economy.	 In	addition,	 the	
exchange	rate	regime	should	at	least	be	more	flexible,	even	if	it	is	still	too	early	
for	an	absolutely	free-floating	exchange	rate	regime.	
Clearly	 defined	 landownership	 in	 the	 countryside	 could	 reduce	 distortions	
to	 land	use.	Collective	ownership	 is	vague,	creating	room	for	corruption	and	
hindering	the	modernisation	of	the	rural	economy.	In	the	cities,	the	government	
should	 at	 least	 stay	 out	 of	 the	 direct	 negotiation	 of	 land	 prices	 and	 private	
property	development.
The	market	should	determine	energy	prices.	Fluctuations	of	energy	prices	cause	








(SOEs)	 and	 then	 redistribute	 the	 gains	 to	 broader	 society.	 More	 thoroughly,	
the	state	 sector	 should	gradually	give	up	much	of	 its	monopoly	power	or	be	
privatised.	
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The	 complete	 liberalisation	 of	 factor	 markets	 and	 the	 elimination	 of	 cost	




The Chinese government’s policy to adjust the economic 
structure
















•	 nine	 central	 government	 groups	 inspecting	 investment	 projects	 in	 steel,	
cement,	 aluminium,	 government	 office	 buildings	 and	 training	 centres,	
urban	fast	trains,	golf	courses,	conference	and	exhibition	centres,	logistics	
parks,	large	shopping	centres	and	development	zones











•	 increasing	 one-year	 base	 lending	 rate	 by	 0.27	 percentage	 point	 to	 5.58	







June 2005 – June 2006
From	May	2005,	the	value	added	of	industrial	production	began	to	decelerate.	
Year-on-year	growth	of	 industrial	profits	 slowed	by	more	 than	20	percentage	
points.	Loan	growth	also	weakened	substantially.
1) Industrial policy




•	 localising	 production	 of	 certain	 important	 products,	 including	 large	
nuclear	power	equipment	and	novel-type	craft
•	 implementing	 restructuring	 measures	 for	 11	 industries	 including	 steel,	
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•	 setting	up	a	 system	of	 targets	 for	 energy	conservation	and	 reduction	of	
pollutant	emissions
•	 conducting	a	number	of	circular	economy	pilots.






•	 lowering	or	abolishing	export	 tax	rebates	 for	high	energy	consumption,	
high	pollutant	and	resource-intensive	industries.
2) Project approval
•	 new	 policy-tightening	 controls	 over	 new	 investment	 projects	 and	
construction	projects	list	
•	 raising	capital	requirements	for	certain	construction	projects
•	 central	 government	 approval	 required	 for	 all	 local	 government	 projects	
with	investment	of	more	than	CNY50	million.
3) Loan control
•	 publishing	 ‘Regulations	on	strengthening	control	of	 investment	 in	fixed	
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•	 planning	 for	 revitalisation	 of	 10	 industries,	 closing	 26	 megawatt	 small	
power	generators,	16.9	million	 tonnes	of	 steel	production	capacity,	74.2	
million	tonnes	of	cement	production	capacity,	and	so	on




















•	 announcing	 CNY4	 trillion	 fiscal	 stimulus	 package	 in	 October	 2008;	
spending	 on	 investment,	 consumption,	 imports	 and	 exports,	 real	 estate	
and	stock	markets
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Cai Fang and Meiyan Wang
Introduction
It	is	universally	acknowledged	by	economists	that	agricultural	shares	in	aggregate	





what	 changes	 are	 indicative	 in	 the	 transformations.	 In	 China,	 there	 is	 little	
agreement	on	the	way	these	transformations	take	place	from	either	a	theoretical	
or	an	empirical	perspective,	for	the	following	reasons.
First,	 the	 explanations	 and	 predictions	 of	 development	 economics	 vary.	 For	





Second,	 there	 have	 been	 dissimilarities	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 pattern	 of	 these	
transformations	among	countries	and	across	time,	which	have	made	it	difficult	
to	determine	any	stylised	facts	about	the	two	types	of	transformations.	While	
Japan,	 Korea	 and	 some	 other	 countries	 accomplished	 their	 modernisation	






understanding	 the	 potential	 for	 changing	 situations	 in	 labour	 demand	 and	
supply.	This	is	particularly	relevant	in	China’s	case.
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The	 reality	 and	 dynamics	 of	 China’s	 rural	 labour	 shift,	 and	 of	 its	 turning	
point	 in	 particular,	 can	 be	 observed	 through	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 of	
Lewisian	development	economics.	Equally	important	is	to	apply	the	theory	of	




economic	 growth	 has	 been	 underpinned	 by	 a	 rapid	 demographic	 transition	












this	 population	 structural	 change	 and	 strong	 economic	 growth	 has	 been	
reflected	in	the	recent	phenomena	of	rising	wages	and	a	shortage	of	unskilled	
migrant	workers.
Setting	 the	Lewis	 turning	point	 as	 a	milestone	of	development,	 a	 theoretical	






the	consequences	of	China’s	demographic	 transition	will	be	 further	 revealed,	
as	the	working-age	population	stops	growing	in	2015	and	the	total	population	





1	 This	 is	 true	not	only	for	China	but	for	 the	world,	as	 is	 implied	by	the	fact	 that	Chinese	workers	were	
chosen	as	‘People	of	the	Year	2009’	by	Time	magazine.
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This	chapter	is	organised	as	follows.	The	next	section	explains	the	implications	
of	 the	 Lewis	 turning	 point	 for	 the	 labour	 supply	 and	 hence	 for	 economic	
growth.	Investigating	the	trends	of	rural-to-urban	migration	and	more	general	
labour	 market	 changes	 shows	 that	 agriculture	 no	 longer	 serves	 as	 a	 pool	 of	
surplus	 labour;	 rather	 rural	 workers’	 migration	 to	 and	 settlement	 in	 urban	
areas	 has	 become	 irreversible	 and	 inevitable.	The	 next	 section	 discusses	 the	
outdated	policy	implications	of	the	Todaro	paradox	in	the	circumstances	of	the	
Lewis	 turning	point.	This	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	no	 reason	 to	expect	a	come-
and-go	pattern	of	rural	labour	migration	and	that	the	appropriate	policy	choice	
is	 to	 push	 forward	 with	 urbanisation	 by	 transforming	 migrant	 workers	 into	
urban	 residents.	 The	 subsequent	 section	 shows	 the	 urgency	 and	 feasibility	
of	 including	 migrant	 workers	 in	 the	 urban	 social	 security	 system	 from	 the	
viewpoint	of	government	policy	orientation.	The	chapter	concludes	with	some	
policy	suggestions.	
The irreversibility of rural–urban migration
There	has	been	much	disagreement	about	whether	(or	when)	China	has	reached	




when	 the	 growth	 of	 labour	 demand	 exceeds	 the	 growth	 of	 labour	 supply—
and	hence	the	wage	rate	of	unskilled	workers	begins	to	rise—is	the	first	Lewis	










period	 bridging	 them—or	 it	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 a	 new	
historical	trend	in	the	course	of	economic	development	(Minami	1968).	In	this	
regard,	while	2004	was	a	significant	year	signalling	the	turning	point,	the	longer	
period	around	 it	 is	 the	 focus	of	 this	 study.	 In	what	 follows,	we	examine	 the	
different	characteristics	of	the	labour	market	before	and	after	the	turning	point.	
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During	the	stage	long	before	the	Lewis	turning	point,	since	there	was	a	large	





stage	absorbed	 the	 transferred	 labour	 force	only	marginally	and	sporadically,	
and	 the	urban	 authorities	 frequently	dispelled	migrant	workers	when	urban	





massive	 and	 unremitting	 outflow	 of	 workers.	 Such	 outflow,	 given	 its	 large	
scale	 and	 steady	 growth,	 has	 accelerated	 agricultural	 mechanisation	 and	



















As	 a	 result	 of	 falling	 labour	 inputs	 and	 rising	 physical	 capital	 inputs	 in	
production,	Chinese	agriculture’s	capital–labour	ratio—which	is	denoted	by	the	
ratio	of	physical	inputs	to	labour	inputs—has	risen	rapidly	since	2004	(Figure	
15.1).	 According	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 induced	 technological	 changes	 (Hayami	
and	 Ruttan	 1980),	 this	 labour-saving	 tendency	 during	 the	 rapid	 process	 of	
agricultural	 mechanisation	 is	 the	 natural	 result	 of	 the	 ultimate	 abatement	 of	
the	 surplus	 labour	 force	 in	 agriculture.	 It	 is	 hardly	 surprising	 that	 the	 total	





Figure 15.1 Changes in the ratio of physical to labour inputs in Chinese 
agriculture
Source:	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	various	years,	Compilation of Farm Product Cost-
Income Data of China,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.








constant.	 In	 2009,	 nearly	 one-third	 of	 urban	 employees	 were	 rural	 migrants	















Table 15.1 Numbers and growth rates of migrant workers and the urban 
employed
Year Migrant workers Urban employed
Number(million) Annual growth 
(%)
Number(million) Annual growth 
(%)
2001 84 .0 7 .0 239 .4 3 .4
2002 104 .7 24 .7 247 .8 3 .5
2003 113 .9 8 .8 256 .4 3 .5
2004 118 .2 3 .8 264 .8 3 .3
2005 125 .8 6 .4 273 .3 3 .2
2006 132 .1 5 .0 283 .1 3 .6
2007 137 .0 3 .7 293 .5 3 .7
2008 140 .4 2 .5 302 .1 2 .9
2009 145 .0 3 .3 313 .1 3 .6
Source:	 Data	 for	 2001–08	 from:	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (NBS)	 various	 years,	 China Statistical 
Yearbook,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing;	Department	of	Rural	Surveys	various	years,	China Yearbook of 
Rural Household Survey,	National	Bureau	of	Statistics,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.	Data	for	2009	from	
National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	2010,	The Report on the Implementation of the 2009 Plan 
for National Economic and Social Development and on the 2010 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development,	The	Third	Session	of	the	Eleventh	National	People’s	Congress,	Beijing.







in	 the	 labour	 demand	 of	 urban	 and	 non-agricultural	 sectors	 no	 longer	 cause	






agricultural	 and	 agricultural	 employment	 showed	 drastically	 fluctuating	 and	
positive	growth	rates,	because	the	 labour	force	continued	to	grow.	While	the	
rural	surplus	labour	force	faced	the	pressure	of	transfer	and	the	constraints	of	





significantly	 and	 negatively	 correlated.	 During	 the	 period	 1998–2008,	 the	
correlation	coefficient	between	the	growth	rate	of	non-agricultural	employment	
and	 the	growth	rate	of	one	year	 lagged	agricultural	employment	was	–0.748,	
with	 declining	 agricultural	 employment	 in	 most	 years.	 The	 most	 significant	
change	 happened	 in	 2004	 when	 the	 high	 growth	 rate	 of	 non-agricultural	








The end of the ‘Todaro dogma’ 
Michael	 Todaro	 is	 widely	 known	 for	 his	 profound	 research	 on	 internal	
migration	in	developing	countries.	His	most	influential	theory	is	the	so-called	
‘Todaro	 paradox’	 (Todaro	 1969;	 Harris	 and	 Todaro	 1970).	 He	 argues	 that	
it	 is	 the	 differential	 of	 expected	 wages	 between	 the	 rural	 and	 urban	 sectors	
that	 encourages	 rural	 workers	 to	 migrate.	 Since	 the	 urban	 expected	 wage	 is	
adjusted	by	the	urban	unemployment	rate,	the	paradox	is	this:	efforts	made	by	
the	government	to	reduce	the	unemployment	rate	will	increase	the	difference	
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of	 expected	 wages	 between	 rural	 and	 urban	 sectors	 and	 thus	 motivate	 more	
migration,	which	in	turn	can	lead	to	more	unemployment.	A	further	implication	
is	 that	 any	efforts	made	 to	 improve	 the	 status	of	migrants	working	 in	urban	
areas	 can	 encourage	 more	 migration,	 thereby	 deteriorating	 the	 potential	 for	









and	pull	 forces	between	 the	 rural	 and	urban	 sectors,	 and	 especially	 through	
strengthening	 the	 role	of	 rural	 areas	 in	absorbing	surplus	workers.	From	the	




As	 mentioned	 previously,	 the	 Chinese	 economy	 is	 already	 inthe	 stage	 of	




workers	 frequently	 returned	 to	 their	 rural	 homes	 and	 their	 contracted	 land	





longer	 follows	a	 come-and-go	pattern,	 this	mechanism	 for	 risk	alleviation	no	
longer	exists.	
The	 employment	 adjustment	 of	 Chinese	 migrant	 workers	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	
global	 financial	 crisis	 resonates	 with	 international	 experience.	 After	 a	 short	
break	 during	 the	 Chinese	 New	 Year	 period	 in	 early	 2009,	 migrant	 workers	
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afterwards.	 This	 evidently	 suggests	 that	 the	 management	 mode	 of	 labour	
migration	based	on	the	Todaro	dogma	and	the	conventional	wisdom	of	a	come-
and-go	pattern	no	longer	characterise	the	new	stage	of	development.
In	 contrast	 with	 the	 period	 before	 the	 Lewis	 turning	 point,	 when	 urban	
governments	 regularly	 drummed	 out	 migrant	 workers	 each	 time	 their	 cities	
had	 employment	 pressure	 (Cai	 et	 al.	 2001),	 during	 the	 years	 2008–09,	 as	
countermeasures	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 negative	 impacts	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 on	
employment,	 urban	 administrators	 relaxed	 the	 restriction	 on	 ambulatory	
pitchmen,	 which	 helped	 migrant	 workers	 shift	 their	 jobs	 to	 the	 informal	
service	sector	in	the	first	place.	Then,	as	the	government-led	stimulus	plan	was	
implemented,	and	since	 the	structure	of	 investment	had	become	more	biased	
towards	 infrastructure	 and	 services,	 more	 and	 diversified	 job	 opportunities	
were	created	(Cai	et	al.	2010).	
This	is	very	similar	to	Japan’s	experience	in	that,	after	the	arrival	of	its	Lewis	
turning	 point,	 the	 massive	 outflow	 of	 rural	 workers	 who	 settled	 and	 found	
jobs	in	urban	areas	in	the	1960s	has	never	been	reversed,	despite	upsurges	and	
recessions	in	the	urban	economy	since	then.	During	urban	economic	downturns	
in	 the	 country,	 workers	 originating	 from	 rural	 areas	 have	 not	 returned	 to	
agricultural	production.	 Instead,	 in	coping	with	each	of	 the	economic	crises,	




and	work	permanently	 in	urban	areas	can	conflict	with	 the	 reality	 that	 they	
lack	legitimate	urban	residential	identities.	When	urban	enterprises	encounter	
difficulties,	 migrant	 workers	 are	 the	 first	 group	 of	 employees	 to	 be	 affected.	
Therefore,	while	being	vulnerable	in	job	and	wage	security	and	inadequately	
covered	 by	 social	 safety	 nets,	 they	 also	 suffer	 the	 worst	 labour	 relations.	
According	to	a	survey	conducted	in	2009	(Ru	et	al.	2009:7–8),	labour	dispute	
cases	accepted	and	heardby	courts	had	increased	by	30	per	cent	in	the	country	
as	 a	whole	 and	by	40	 to	150	per	 cent	 in	 coastal	provinces.	Migrant	workers	








is	 attributed	 overwhelmingly	 to	 migrant	 workers	 becoming	 secular	 residents	
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in	 urban	 areas.	 Such	 a	 rapid	 urbanisation	 rate,	 however,	 is	 more	 statistical	
than	 material	 under	 the	 unique	 circumstance	 of	 China’s	 hukou	 (household	
registration)	 system.	The	 difference	 between	 statistical	 and	 real	 urbanisation	
suggests	that	while	farmers	have	turned	to	migrant	workers	and	have	counted	
as	urban	residents,	they	are	not	real	citizens	in	urban	areas.
In	 the	 planning	 period,	 when	 strict	 hukou	 control	 prevented	 spontaneous	












for	more	 than	one	year	as	usual	 residents	of	 that	urban	area.	After	 the	1990	
census,	 the	National	Bureau	of	 Statistics	 adjusted	 all	data	between	1982	 and	
1990	based	on	 the	 criterion	of	one-year	 residence.	The	fifth	National	Census	
shortened	permanent	residence	to	six	months—that	is,	those	rural	migrants	who	
lived	in	cities	for	more	than	six	months	were	considered	urban	usual	residents,	




Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 the	 statistically	 defined	 urban	
population	is	still	engaged	in	agricultural	activity,	Chan	(2009)	claims	that	China’s	
urbanisation	 level	 is	 overestimated	 by	 10	 per	 cent.	 Although	 urbanisation	
involves	a	shift	from	agricultural	to	non-agricultural	activities,	it	is	more	typically	
characterised	by	population	concentration	and	industry	agglomeration.	Hence,	
the	 engagement	 of	 fractional	 urban	 residents	 in	 agriculture	 is	 not	 sufficient	
evidence	 to	 conclude	 that	 urbanisation	 is	 overestimated.	 Because	 the	 hukou	
system	 is	 a	 unique	 institutional	 arrangement	 of	 China’s	 and	 there	 are	 ample	
welfare	 implications	behind	 it,	 it	 is	more	meaningful	 to	understand	Chinese-
style	urbanisation	within	the	context	of	the	hukou	system	and	its	public	service	
content.	
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Figure 15.3 Usual urban population versus non-agricultural hukou population 












The	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 share	of	 the	population	with	non-agricultural	
hukou,	 especially	 in	 recent	 years,	 is	 an	 indication	 of	 hukou	 reform	 progress.	









through	 narrowing	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 ‘usual’	 urban	 population	 and	
real	urban	residents.
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This	urbanisation	pattern	is	an	atypical	one	in	terms	of	equal	access	to	public	
services.	 Those	 migrant	 workers	 and	 their	 accompanying	 family	 members,	
though	 counted	 as	 usual	 urban	 residents,	 are	 not	 fully	 covered	 by	 social	
security	and	more	widely	by	other	forms	of	social	protection.	They	do	not	enjoy	
equal	entitlements	to	public	services	such	as	subsidised	housing	and	children’s	
elementary	 education.	This	 incomplete	 urbanisation	 has	 depressed	 the	 effect	
of	urbanisation	on	economic	growth	and	social	development.	More	concretely,	
because	migrant	workers	without	urban	residence	identity	still	consider	their	






Requisite conditions for equalising access to 
public services 
One	of	 the	 changes	brought	 about	by	 the	Lewis	 turning	point	 is	manifested	
in	the	government’s	policy	orientation	towards	labour	migration.	The	Chinese	
central	 government	 has	 been	 conceptualised	 as	 a	 typical	 developmental	 or	
entrepreneurial	state	(Oi	1999;	Walder	1995),	while	Chinese	local	governments	




Local	 governments	 have	 various	 ways	 of	 trying	 to	 reach	 their	 development	










Although	 there	 has	 been	 extensive	 debate	 about	 the	 Tiebout	 model,	 this	
hypothesis	 does	 provide	 a	 powerful	 tool	 for	 our	 analysis	 of	 the	 incentive	
compatibility	of	local	governments	in	making	policies	towards	migrant	workers,	
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as	 they	 recognise	 the	 increasing	 importance	 of	 migrant	 workers	 to	 local	
economic	development.	 In	 the	development	of	 a	dual	 economy	characterised	
by	an	unlimited	 supply	of	 labour,	 any	number	of	workers	demanded	can	be	
met	without	a	noticeable	 increase	 in	 the	wage	rate—namely,	 the	 labour	 force	
does	not	become	a	bottleneck	limiting	economic	growth.	Therefore,	the	main	
arena	in	which	local	governments—even	of	a	developmental	type—intervene	
in	 economic	development	 is	not	 in	 labour	markets	but	 in	 attracting	physical	
capital	inflows.	
After	the	Chinese	economy	reached	its	Lewis	turning	point,	and	labour	shortages	







For	 example,	 adjusting	 the	 level	 of	minimum	wages	 is	 a	mechanism	 that	has	
been	 used	 frequently	 in	 recent	 years	 by	 local	 governments	 to	 intervene	 in	
wage	setting.	The	minimum	wages	scheme	has	been	put	into	practice	since	The	
Regulation	on	Minimum	Wages	in	Enterprises	was	issued	in	1993	and	the	Labour	












3	 Cai	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 depict	 in	 detail	 the	 trends	 of	 increases	 in	 migrant	 workers’	 wages,	 which	 we	 take	 as	
representative	of	market-determined	wage	rates	of	unskilled	workers.
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growth rates of 
sample cities
Average MWR 
growth rates of 
involved cities
1996 129 32 3 .6 (7 .2) 14 .4 (7 .2)
1997 142 80 7 .6 (8 .0) 13 .5 (5 .9)
1998 209 31 2 .4 (6 .4) 15 .9 (7 .7)
1999 227 152 16 .9 (14 .2) 25 .3 (9 .4)
2000 255 79 8 .8 (15 .9) 28 .7 (15 .8)
2001 274 122 9 .2 (16 .8) 20 .7 (20 .0)
2002 286 167 9 .8 (11 .4) 16 .8 (10 .3)
2003 286 77 4 .4 (8 .3) 16 .3 (7 .7)
2004 286 186 15 .6 (16 .6) 24 .0 (14 .9)
2005 286 132 10 .9 (15 .5) 23 .6 (14 .9)
2006 286 253 18 .4 (14 .4) 20 .7 (13 .6)
2007 286 154 10 .8 (14 .3) 20 .0 (13 .9)
2008 286 200 13 .6 (11 .9) 19 .4 (9 .4)
MWR	minimum	wage	rate
Note:	Standard	deviations	are	in	parentheses.
Source:	 Authors’	 calculations	 based	 on	 Institute	 of	 Population	 and	 Labour	 Economics	 n.d.,	 Urban 



















The	 general	 concerns	 about	 including	 migrant	 workers	 in	 the	 urban	 social	
security	system	have	been	threefold.	First,	authorities	have	long	been	concerned	
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with	the	burden	of	migrants’	participation	on	the	affordability	of	social	security	
funds.	 Second,	 as	 for	 the	 migrant	 workers’	 and	 employers’	 incentives	 to	
participate	 in	 the	 programs,	 the	 fact	 that	 not	 all	 social	 security	 schemes	 are	
portable	and	transferable	across	regions	has	deterred	migrant	workers	and	their	
employers	from	participating,	since	migrant	workers’	employment	is	not	stable.	






of	 social	 pooling	 was	 required	 to	 be	 compensated	 by	 individual	 account	
collection.	That	caused	a	problem	of	empty	individual	accounts,	and	the	system	
is	 indeed	a	pay-as-you-go	 type	with	only	a	nominal	 fullyfunded	component.	
The	 problem	 of	 inadequacy	 of	 the	 social	 pooling	 accounts	 is	 twofold.	 First,	
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municipal	 level	 in	 some	 regions	 until	 2007.	The	 low	 levels	 of	 social	 pooling	
have	restricted	the	portability	of	basic	pensions	and	prevented	highly	mobile	
migrant	 workers	 from	 transferring	 their	 pension	 contributions.	 As	 a	 result,	
when	a	migrant	worker	changes	his	workplace,	he	has	to	surrender	his	pension	




In	 order	 to	 tackle	 this	 problem,	 the	 central	 government	 has	 recently	 issued	
‘Interim	Measures	on	the	Transfer	of	Continuation	of	Basic	Pension	for	Urban	






insurance	 program.	While	 the	 Employment	 Contract	 Law	 came	 into	 effect	 in	





might	 cause	 circumstances	 in	 which	 migrant	 workers	 contribute	 less	 to	 and	
benefit	 more	 from	 the	 program.	 As	 discussed	 earlier,	 the	 Todaro	 dogma	 is	
preventing	 an	 accurate	 understanding	 of	 migrant	 workers’	 real	 status	 in	 the	
labour	market.	
The	current	unemployment	insurance	program	requires	a	minimum	contribution	
period	 of	 one	 year	 and	 warrants	 a	 period	 before	 benefiting	 of	 one	 to	 two	
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Table 15.3 Duration of migrating work and mobility of migrant workers 
(numbers, per cent) 










<1 362 11 4 .00 3 .89
1–3 658 20 0 .87 0 .76
3–5 454 14 0 .50 0 .42
5–8 475 15 0 .34 0 .27
>8 1268 39 0 .18 0 .14
Total 3217 100 0 .82 0 .75
Source:	Zhang,	X.,	Tian,	M.,	Liu,	F.,	Gao,	Y.,	Chen,	L.	and	Hu,	X.	2009,	Survey	report	of	migrant	workers’	
pension	 system,	 International	 Conference	 on	 Migrant	 Workers’	 Pension	 System,	 Ministry	 of	 Human	
Resources	and	Social	Security,	Beijing,	15–16	September.
Since	2003,	the	revenue	of	the	unemployment	insurance	fund	has	significantly	




been	 accumulated.	 It	 is	 such	 an	 overrun	 that	 causes	 an	 asymmetry	 between	





In	 fact,	 as	 local	 governments	 have	 begun	 to	 recognise	 the	 need	 to	 increase	
social	protection	 to	 increasingly	 scarce	workers,	 local	government	authorities	
for	 labour	and	social	security	have	tended	to	flexibly	adjust	the	contribution	





of	 the	 temporary	 flexibility,	 local	 governments	 in	 some	 regions—especially	
those	where	labour	shortages	had	been	strongly	felt	before	the	financial	crisis	
occurred—increased	 the	 social	 security	 coverage	 of	 migrant	 workers	 by	
debasing	the	contribution	rates	during	the	period.
Moreover,	 one	 can	 observe	 a	 host	 of	 phenomena	 that	 had	 rarely	 happened	
before	the	shortage	of	ordinary	workers	became	widespread	across	the	country.	
First,	local	governments	in	labour-migration	destinations	have	tried	to	establish	
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formal	 coordination	 mechanisms	 with	 their	 counterparts	 in	 labour-sending	
regions	in	order	to	help	local	enterprises	secure	a	stable	supply	of	labour.	Second,	
some	 municipal	 governments	 have	 relaxed	 certain	 criteria—such	 as	 the	 size	
of	purchased	housing,	 the	 length	of	 employment	 contracts	 and	accumulative	
years	of	contributing	to	social	security	programs—for	migrants	to	obtain	urban	








interesting	 case	 for	 studies	 of	development	 in	 a	dual	 economy.	The	 fact	 that	
China’s	development	of	a	dual	economy	is	passing	through	the	Lewis	turning	
point	has	 injected	new	life	 into	 the	economic	development	 theory	coined	by	
Arthur	 Lewis.	 The	 application	 of	 other	 relevant	 paradigms	 in	 development	
economics	 to	 the	 China	 case	 helps	 us	 to	 assess	 the	 stage	 of,	 and	 to	 identify	
challenges	and	opportunities	facing,	China’s	socioeconomic	development.
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 Lewis	 turning	 point,	 migrant	 workers	 have	
become	an	indispensable	source	of	 labour	for	urban	sectors—in	other	words,	
non-agricultural	sectors’	demand	for	migrant	workers	has	become	unvarying,	
or	 rigid.	 Since	 agriculture	 no	 longer	 provides	 a	 pool	 of	 surplus	 labour	 and	
labour	migration	no	longer	demonstrates	a	come-and-go	pattern,	there	is	a	need	









services—such	 as	 social	 security,	 migrant	 children’s	 compulsory	 education	
and	 entrance	 to	 higher	 education	 and	 subsidised	 housing—and	 while	 there	
has	 been	 some	 hukou	 reform	 in	 some	 cities,	 there	 has	 not	 been	 a	 significant	
breakthrough	overall.	The hukou	system	is,	however,	significant	only	because	
of	its	affiliation	with	various	urban	public	services	that	favour	residents	with	




will	 change	 their	 function	 to	 focus	more	on	 equal	public	 services	provision.	
When	non-hukou	migrant	workers	and	their	accompanying	families	can	enjoy	
more	 equal	 rights	 to	 urban	 basic	 public	 services,	 the	 hukou	 per	 se	 becomes	
less	meaningful.	That	is,	real	hukou	reform	can	be	embodied	in	the	process	of	
transforming	farmers-turned-workers	into	migrants-turned-residents.
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After	 three	 decades	 of	 rapid	 growth,	 the	 Chinese	 economy	 is	 now	 at	 the	
crossroads	heading	to	the	next	phase	of	development.	While	China’s	economic	











of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 examine	 China’s	 indigenous	 innovation	 capacity	 and	 to	




perspective,	 before	 discussing	 the	 implications	 for	 sustainable	 growth	 in	 the	
country.
China’s innovation capacity and achievements 
China	has	adopted	an	active	science	and	technology	development	program	since	
the	 foundation	of	 the	People’s	Republic	 in	1949.	The	program	has	 long	been	
biased	 towards	 technological	advancement	 in	defence-related	sectors.	Science	
1	 General	surveys	of	China’s	research	and	development	sectors	are	available	 in	Gao	and	Jefferson	 (2007);	
OECD	 (2009);	 and	 Zhang	 et	 al.	 (2009).	 Wei	 and	 Liu	 (2006)	 and	 Jin	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 also	 cover	 research	 and	
development	marginally.
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and	technology	as	important	sources	of	economic	growth	more	generally	have	








•	 give	 priority	 to	 technological	 development	 in	 11	 major	 sectors	 such	 as	
energy,	water	resources	and	environmental	protection	in	the	coming	15	years
•	 further	 improve	the	national	 intellectual	property	rights	 (IPR)	system	and	
strengthen	the	enforcement	of	IPR	protection	laws	and	regulations
•	 encourage	 enterprises	 to	 play	 the	 key	 role	 in	 innovation	 through	 their	
involvement	in	state	projects	and	the	provision	of	tax	incentives	and	other	
financial	support	
•	 boost	 investment	 in	 science	 and	 technology;	 by	 2020,	 China’s	 research	
and	development	 expenditures	will	 account	 for	 about	 2.5	per	 cent	 of	 the	
country’s	gross	domestic	product	(GDP)
•	 by	2020,	derive	60	per	cent	or	more	of	its	economic	growth	from	technological	
progress;	 the	numbers	of	patents	granted	 to	 and	 total	 citations	of	 journal	
articles	by	Chinese	nationals	are	expected	to	be	ranked	among	the	top	five	
in	the	world.
To	 provide	 an	 assessment	 of	 China’s	 indigenous	 innovation	 capacity,	 several	
indicators	can	be	considered.	The	most	important	factor	underlying	indigenous	




cent—twice	 as	 fast	 as	 the	 growth	 of	 China’s	 GDP.3	 As	 a	 result,	 research	 and	
development	expenditure	as	a	proportion	of	GDP	(or	research	and	development	
intensity)	in	China	rose	from	0.71	per	cent	in	1990	to	1.62	per	cent	in	2009	(Figure	
16.1).	The	 same	 figure	 also	 illustrates	 that	 China’s	 research	 and	 development	
personnel	increased	from	about	670	000	(full-time	equivalent)	people	in	1992	to	
1.9	million	in	2008.	This	growth	was	particularly	rapid	in	recent	years,	with	an	
2	 The	2020	program	was	 released	by	 the	State	Council,	People’s	Republic	of	China,	on	9	February	2006	
(<www.gov.cn>).
3	 The	 average	 growth	 rate	 of	 research	 and	 development	 expenditure	 is	 calculated	 using	 data	 from	 NBS	
(2009,	2010)	and	YST	(2009).





Figure 16.1 China’s research and development intensity and personnel, 1990–
2009
	Sources:	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2009,	China Statistical Yearbook 2009,	Chtina	Statistics	Press,	
Beijing;	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2010,	2009 Statistical Communiqué of National Economic and 
Social Development,	National	Bureau	of	Statistics,	Beijing;	YHT	2009,	China Statistical Yearbook of High 
Technology Industry 2009,	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	and	Ministry	of	Science	and	Technology,	China	
Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
With	 the	 expansion	 of	 research	 and	 development	 inputs,	 China’s	 innovation	
capability	 and	 outcomes	 have	 increased	 too.	 For	 example,	 the	 numbers	 of	
domestic	 patent	 applications	 and	 registrations	 grew	 from	 69	 535	 and	 41	 881	




2010).	 In	addition,	 it	 is	 reported	that	 the	number	of	publications	by	Chinese	
scientists	and	engineers	 increased	 from	65	000	 to	208	000	between	1995	and	
2007.4
There	 are	 considerable	 variations	 among	 the	 Chinese	 regions.	 Among	 the	 31	
administrative	 regions	 in	 China,	 research	 and	 development	 intensity	 varied	
from	less	than	0.5	per	cent	in	six	regions	to	more	than	2	per	cent	in	four	regions	
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in	Tibet	 to	9833	 in	Beijing.	Table	16.1	also	 shows	 that	 the	number	of	patent	
registrations	per	million	people	was	between	32	in	Tibet	and	1296	in	Shanghai	
in	2008.	In	general,	large	disparities	exist	between	the	coastal	regions	and	the	
rest	of	 the	country	 (that	 is,	 the	central	and	western	regions).	Furthermore,	 if	
the	number	of	patent	registrations	per	1000	scientists	and	engineers	is	defined	
as	 an	 indicator	 of	 research	 and	 development	 performance	 then,	 in	 general,	
provincial-level	 performance	 and	 inputs	 are	 positively	 related—as	 expected	
and	as	depicted	in	Figure	16.3.	The	figure	also	highlights,	however,	two	clear	
outliers,	 with	 Beijing	 underperforming	 and	 Zhejiang	 achieving	 an	 excellent	
performance	in	2008	at	least.	





















Sources:	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2009,	China Statistical Yearbook 2009,	China	Statistics	Press,	
Beijing;	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2010,	2009 Statistical Communiqué of National Economic and 
Social Development,	National	Bureau	of	Statistics,	Beijing;	Ministry	of	Science	and	Technology	(MST)	2010,	
China Science & Technology Statistics,	Ministry	of	Science	and	Technology,	Beijing,	<www.most.gov.cn>
Table 16.1 China’s regional research and development statistics, 2008






patents per million 
population
Coastal mean 1 .96 2830 601
Beijing 5 .25 9833 1047
Shanghai 2 .59 4212 1296
Tianjin 2 .45 3293 577
Jiangsu 1 .92 1887 579
Zhejiang 1 .60 2067 1034
Liaoning 1 .41 1538 247
Guangdong 1 .41 2186 650
Shandong 1 .40 1408 283
Fujian 0 .94 1345 220
Hebei 0 .67 535 79
Middle mean 0 .85 731 84
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Hubei 1 .31 1103 147
Anhui 1 .11 655 71
Heilongjiang 1 .04 1168 120
Hunan 1 .01 604 96
Jiangxi 0 .97 540 52
Shanxi 0 .90 974 67
Jilin 0 .82 1085 109
Henan 0 .66 583 97
Guangxi 0 .46 426 46
Hainan 0 .23 172 40
Western mean 0 .81 597 80
Shaanxi 2 .09 1352 117
Sichuan 1 .28 768 164
Chongqing 1 .18 995 170
Gansu 1 .00 593 40
Ningxia 0 .69 694 98
Guizhou 0 .57 257 46
Yunnan 0 .54 357 44
Inner Mongolia 0 .44 647 55
Qinghai 0 .41 377 41
Xinjiang 0 .38 366 70
Tibet 0 .31 161 32
Sources:	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2009,	China Statistical Yearbook 2009,	China	Statistics	Press,	
Beijing;	YST	(2009).
Innovation at the firm level
Chinese	 enterprises	 have	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 promoting	 growth	 in	
the	 country’s	 innovation	 capacity.	 Since	 the	 mid	 1990s,	 Chinese	 enterprises	
have	become	the	leading	players	in	research	and	development	investment	and	
execution	(NBS	2009).	By	2008,	they	were	accounting	for	more	than	70	per	cent	




















Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	2009,	China Statistical Yearbook 2009,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing;	YST	2009,	
China Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology 2009,	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	and	Ministry	of	
Science	and	Technology,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
Figure 16.4 China’s research and development expenditure shares and 
sources of funds, 2008
										
				Expenditures	shares		 	 	 								Sources	of	fund
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about	 firm-level	 innovation	 activities	 was	 collected	 over	 a	 three-year	 period	
(2004–06).	The	survey	covered	all	large	and	medium	firms	and	a	sample	of	small	
firms.7	Among	the	299	995	firms	surveyed,	there	were	2674	large	firms	(0.9	per	






rates	 were	 pharmaceuticals	 (63.7	 per	 cent),	 instruments	 and	 office	 machines	





income	on	 innovation.	Though	this	figure	 is	 larger	 than	China’s	research	and	






















9	 The	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	(NBS)	released	a	circular	to	introduce	the	Catalogue for High-technology 
Industrial Statistics Classification	in	July	2002	(<www.stats.org.cn>).
10	 See	Wu	(2010)	for	a	more	detailed	presentation	and	discussion.




In	Equation	16.1,		 *Y 	is	a	 latent	variable	 that	has	a	value	of	unity	or	zero	 for	
the	 first	 two	 models	 (that	 is,	 the	 determinants	 of	 innovation	 and	 choice	 of	
research	 and	 development	 strategy	 models)	 and	 measures	 firm-level	 research	
and	development	intensity	in	the	third	model	(that	is,	the	intensity	of	research	
and	development	spending	model).	The	lagged	variables	(X)	capture	the	effects	
of	 the	age	and	size	of	each	firm,	 its	 level	of	 liability	or	debt	burden,	 level	of	











•	 INVEST	 takes	 the	value	of	1	 if	 a	firm	has	 long-term	 investment	and	zero	
otherwise.
Other	 independent	 variables—namely,	 the	 Z	 variables	 in	 Equation	 16.1—are	









calculation	 is	 based	 on	 the	 four-digit	 classification	 of	 Chinese	 industrial	
sectors
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three	 north-eastern	 provinces	 and	 western	 China,	 with	 the	 north-eastern	
provinces	being	chosen	as	the	reference	region12




to	 the	 results	 of	 Model	 1,	 large	 or	 old	 firms	 are	 more	 likely	 than	 others	 to	
invest	 in	 innovation.	 Exporters	 and	 capital-intensive	 firms	 also	 have	 higher	
probabilities	of	spending	on	research	and	development—as	are	firms	with	long-
term	investments,	intangible	assets	and	better	performance	(in	terms	of	labour	
productivity).	The	probability	 of	 innovation	 tends	 to	 increase	 over	 time	 and	








Table 16.2 Econometric estimation results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables Coefficients p-values Coefficients p-values Coefficients p-values
Intercept –2 .2088 0.000 –1 .3537 0.000 0 .1013 0.025
AGE 0 .0098 0.000 0 .0087 0.000 0 .0024 0.000
AGE2 –0 .00005 0.000
SIZE 0 .0000 0.051 0 .0000 0.000 0 .0000 0.543
EXP 0 .3319 0.000 0 .2535 0.000 0 .0321 0.000
DEBT –0 .1763 0.000 –0 .2149 0.001 –0 .6026 0.000
TECH 0 .0001 0.000 0 .0000 0.009 0 .0000 0.832
12	 Specifically,	China’s	 31	 administrative	 regions	 are	partitioned	 into	 six	groups	 and	 represented	by	 six	
dummy	 variables:	 REG1	 (Beijing,	Tianjin,	 Hebei	 and	 Shandong),	 REG2	 (Shanghai,	 Jiangsu	 and	 Zhejiang),	
REG3	(Guangdong,	Fujian,	Guangxi	and	Hainan),	REG4	(Shanxi,	Anhui,	Jiangxi,	Hubei,	Hunan	and	Henan),	
REG5	 (Liaoning,	 Jilin	 and	 Heilongjiang)	 and	 REG6	 (Inner	 Mongolia,	 Ningxia,	 Tibet,	 Xinjiang,	 Gansu,	
Guizhou,	Qinghai,	Shaanxi,	Sichuan,	Yunnan	and	Chongqing).
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EFF 0 .0000 0.011 0 .0000 0.771 –0 .0001 0.000
INTANG 0 .2223 0.000 0 .1789 0.000 –0 .0358 0.000
INVEST 0 .4580 0.000 0 .3566 0.000 0 .2252 0.000
HERFINDAHL 3 .0130 0.000 2 .6715 0.000 3 .8713 0.000
HERFINDAHL2 –9 .6779 0.000 –8 .3931 0.004
Region dummies yes yes yes
Ownership 
dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes no yes
Seudo-R 0 .1480 0 .0842 0 .6091
Sample size 59640  27102  13446





The	estimated	coefficients	 (not	reported	 in	 the	 table)	of	 the	dummy	variables	
also	 show	 that	 firms	 engaged	 in	 manufacturing	 pharmaceuticals,	 machinery,	
















cent	 in	 the	coastal	 area.	These	findings	about	 the	 role	of	SOEs	 in	 innovation	
suggest	that	privatisation	is	not	always	conducive	to	innovation	(at	least	before	
China’s	private	firms	can	play	a	more	prominent	role	in	innovation).





















their	 capital	 ages	 (Model	3,	Table	16.2);	 the	estimated	 turning	point	 is	 about	
25	years.	Since	the	average	age	of	the	firms	in	the	sample	is	17,	most	Chinese	
enterprises	are	 still	on	 the	upward	 (left)	 side	of	 the	 inverted-U	shape.	As	 for	
the	relationship	between	competition	and	research	and	development	intensity,	
there	is	no	evidence	of	an	inverted	U-shaped	relation,	as	argued	by	Aghion	et	
al.	 (2005)	 and	Tingvall	 and	Poldahl	 (2006).	 Instead	 it	 is	 shown	 in	Table	 16.2	
that	research	and	development	intensity	and	competition	are	negatively	related.	















that	 China	 is	 facing	 a	 dilemma.	While	 the	 need	 for	 further	 economic	 reform	
calls	for	the	withdrawal	or	privatisation	of	SOEs,	China’s	private	firms	are	not	






Among	 the	world’s	major	 spenders	on	 research	and	development,	China	was	
ranked	third	 in	2007—behind	only	the	United	States	and	Japan	(Table	16.3).	
It	should	be	pointed	out,	however,	that	there	is	still	a	large	gap	between	China	
and	 the	 world’s	 top-two	 research	 and	 development	 investors.	 For	 example,	
in	 2007,	 China’s	 total	 research	 and	 development	 spending	 was	 about	 28	 per	












(PPP$ billion in 2000 





US 311 .4 66 .2 28 .3 5 .5 1 .426
Japan 124 .6 77 .7 15 .7 6 .7 0 .938
China 87 .1 70 .4 24 .6 5 .1 1 .736
Germany 58 .7 68 .0 27 .8 4 .3 0 .506
France 35 .6 52 .0 38 .2 9 .8 0 .372
United 
Kingdom
33 .3 46 .5 30 .0 23 .4 0 .349
PPP	=	purchasing	power	parity
Note:	Research	and	development	personnel	figures	for	the	United	States	are	2006	data.
Sources:	 Research	 and	 development	 expenditure	 and	 personnel	 data	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 OECD	 online	
database	(<www.oecd.org>).	
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the	global	 trend	and	is	biased	towards	 investment	 in	 ‘development’	research.	
As	discussed	above,	 this	 could	have	 long-term	 implications	 for	 the	country’s	
innovation	capacity	building.	For	 instance,	an	emerging	trend	is	that,	among	
the	patents	granted,	only	22.7	per	cent	belonged	to	the	‘inventions’	category	








universities	 (NBS	2009).	Thus,	China’s	potential	 in	 research	and	development	
human	resources	will	undoubtedly	be	the	largest	 in	the	world	in	the	coming	
14	 This	is	based	on	data	from	the	OECD	online	database	(<www.oecd.org>).
15	 These	 numbers	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 Annual Statistics of Science and Technology,	 National	 Bureau	 of	
Statistics	of	China	(www.stats.gov.cn).
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decades.	 The	 country’s	 comparative	 advantage	 in	 human	 resources	 is	 also	
reflected	in	the	research	and	development	cost	structure.	Labour	compensation	
accounted	 for	 about	 25	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 research	 and	 development	 costs	 in	
2007,	 which	 was	 much	 lower	 than	 that	 in	 many	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	







Figure 16.6 Research and development spending shares (basic and applied 
research) in selected economies 
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Aircraft and spacecraft 
Electronic and telecommunication equipments 
Computers and office equipments 
Medical equipments and meters 
Sources:	YHT	2002,	China Statistical Yearbook of High Technology Industry 2002,	National	Bureau	of	
Statistics	and	Ministry	of	Science	and	Technology,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing;	YHT	2008,	China 
Statistical Yearbook of High Technology Industry 2008,	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	and	Ministry	of	
Science	and	Technology,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
Table 16.4 High-technology sector exports in selected economies, 2007
Countries Percentage of manufactured 
exports
World shares (%)
China 29 .7 18 .6
United States 28 .5 12 .7
Germany 14 .2 8 .6
Japan 19 .0 6 .7
South Korea 33 .4 6 .1
Singapore 46 .4 5 .8
France 18 .9 4 .5
Netherlands 25 .7 4 .1
Malaysia 51 .7 3 .6
United Kingdom 19 .5 3 .5
Mexico 17 .1 1 .8
Philippines 68 .9 1 .6
Brazil 11 .9 0 .5
India 5 .3 0 .3
Russian Federation 6 .9 0 .2
Source:	World	Bank	2010,	World Development Indicators,	The	World	Bank,	Washington,	DC.
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Implications for future economic growth
A	 precise	 assessment	 of	 the	 contribution	 of	 innovation	 to	 China’s	 growth	
is	 technically	 and	 conceptually	 challenging.	 The	 empirical	 literature	 is	
dominated	 by	 growth-accounting	 exercises	 and	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 analysis	




decade	of	 this	century.	The	same	figure	for	more	 industrialised	economies	 is,	
however,	 much	 higher.	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 Dougherty	 and	 Jorgenson	









industrialised	 economies	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 innovation	 capacity	 measured	 using	
various	criteria	such	as	the	number	of	patents	registered,	scientific	publications	
and	citations	and	hi-tech	commodity	exports.	The	driving	forces	for	the	catch-
up	are	 the	 increasing	research	and	development	 inputs	 in	capital	and	human	








intensity	 in	 the	 high-tech	 sector	 is	 lagging	 behind	 the	 major	 players	 in	 the	
world	(Table	16.5).	In	four	of	the	five	high-tech	sectors	(the	exception	being	the	
aircraft	and	spacecraft	sector),	there	is	a	huge	gap	in	research	and	development	
intensity.	 Even	 in	 the	 aircraft	 and	 spacecraft	 industry,	 China’s	 research	 and	
development	intensity	was	about	half	that	in	Germany,	France	and	the	United	
Kingdom	in	2007	(Table	16.5).	
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Table 16.5 High-technology sector research and development intensity in 
selected economies, 2006 (per cent)





3 .4 10 .2 11 .0 7 .6 9 .9 7 .0 2 .4 9 .3
High-tech sector 
otal
5 .7 39 .8 28 .9 21 .5 31 .9 26 .6 11 .1 21 .3
Pharmaceuticals 4 .7 46 .2 37 .1 23 .9 33 .4 42 .3 5 .0 6 .3
Aircraft and 
spacecraft




6 .4 43 .3 13 .4 28 .8 50 .9 23 .9 11 .6 25 .1
Computers and 
office equipment
3 .8 34 .7 n .a . 14 .9 27 .7 1 .4 8 .4 14 .2
Medical equipment 
and meters
5 .2 48 .3 31 .9 13 .6 19 .0 7 .8 6 .7 10 .3
n.a.	not	available
Sources:	 YHT	 2008,	 China Statistical Yearbook of High Technology Industry 2008,	 National	 Bureau	
of	 Statistics	 and	 Ministry	 of	 Science	 and	Technology,	 China	 Statistics	 Press,	 Beijing;	YHT	 2009,	 China 
Statistical Yearbook of High Technology Industry 2009,	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	and	Ministry	of	Science	
and	Technology,	China	Statistics	Press,	Beijing.
Second,	 with	 the	 expansion	 of	 research	 and	 development	 activities	 it	 is	
important	 not	 to	 neglect	 the	 quality	 of	 research	 and	 development	 in	 China.	
The	preceding	sections	presented	evidence	of	 relative	declines	 in	 investment	
in	basic	and	applied	research	in	recent	years.	This	is	also	reflected	in	the	small	
share	 of	 ‘invention’	 patents	 among	 total	 domestic	 patents	 in	 China.	 If	 this	
trend	 continues,	 China’s	 long-term	 capacity	 in	 innovation—and	 hence	 the	
sustainability	of	economic	growth	in	the	future—could	be	compromised.	
Third,	 the	 role	 of	 privately	 owned	 enterprises,	 including	 foreign	 firms,	 in	
innovation	 should	 be	 strengthened	 through	 more	 stringent	 enforcement	 of	
intellectual	property	rights	protection	laws	and	regulations	and	the	provision	
of	 incentives	via	appropriate	 innovation	policies.	As	shown	 in	 the	preceding	
sections,	the	enterprise	sector	plays	the	leading	role	in	innovation	in	the	world’s	
major	 economies.	 Although	 China’s	 privately	 owned	 firms	 are	 expanding	
rapidly,	 in	 terms	 of	 innovation,	 they	 are	 lagging	 behind	 their	 state-owned	
counterparts,	 not	 to	 mention	 privately	 owned	 firms	 in	 other	 countries.	This	
could	 be	 due	 to	 institutional	 constraints	 in	 China	 such	 as	 limited	 access	 to	
finance	and	government	grants	for	non-SOEs.
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Finally,	 there	 is	 considerable	 regional	 disparity	 in	 innovation.	This	 not	 only	
contributes	 to	 China’s	 overall	 regional	 disparity,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 detrimental	 to	
the	 diffusion	 of	 knowledge	 and	 technology	 within	 China.	 There	 should	 be	










An	 important	 development	 in	 recent	 years	 is	 the	 expanded	 role	 of	 Chinese	
enterprises	 in	 innovation.	 Chinese	 firms	 are	 now	 the	 dominant	 investors	 in	
research	and	development	in	the	country.	In	terms	of	innovation-related	firm	





SOEs	 are	 under	 pressure	 to	 privatise.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 non-SOEs	 (including	
foreign	and	indigenous	private	firms)	are	not	ready	to	take	risks	associated	with	
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China’s health system and 











1950–79.	 Due	 to	 its	 efficient	 public	 finance	 system	 and	 ‘step-up,	 step-down’	
delivery	mechanisms,	China’s	public	health	system	was	a	world	leader	in	terms	
of	its	high	levels	of	‘bang	for	your	buck’.	
The	 second,	 post-collectivisation	 period	 (approximately	 1980–2003)	 saw	 the	
Chinese	 system	 remain	 efficient	 compared	 with	 other	 developing	 countries	
of	 comparable	 per	 capita	 income.	 Yet	 it	 was	 highly	 inequitable	 in	 terms	 of	
access.	The	end	of	the	collective	within	China	has	seen	a	constantly	high	rate	
of	 cost	 inflation,	 caused	 largely	 by	 physician-induced	 demand	 and	 the	 over-






of	 the	 Harmonious	 Society	 Program,	 saw	 considerable	 debate	 about	 how	 to	
reform	China’s	health	system.	The	introduction	of	the	New	Cooperative	Medical	
Scheme	 (NCMS)	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 ‘Cover	 the	 countryside’	 campaign	
of	public	finance	in	2003	also	led	to	far	greater	public	funds	being	introduced	






The	 first	 camp	 looks	 largely	 at	 using	 demand-side	 strategies	 based	 on	 social	
health	 insurance	 schemes	 to	 increase	 the	 funds	 available	 in	 the	 system.	The	
other	camp	concentrates	on	increasing	spending	to	develop	a	Chinese	system	
based	 on	 publicly	 funded	 outpatient	 institutions	 acting	 as	 a	 gatekeeper	 and	
referrer	to	public	hospitals—similar	to	Britain’s	National	Health	Service	(NHS).	
Each	of	these	reforms	appear	to	be	insufficient.	An	institutional	model	reveals	
some	 of	 the	 problems	 facing	 the	 Chinese	 government.	 Increases	 in	 public	
spending	 appear	 to	 be	 unable	 to	 change	 the	 flawed	 incentives	 that	 exist	 for	
individual	 providers.	 Issues	 remain,	 stemming	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 supervision,	
coordination	 and	 governance	 that	 hinder	 the	 imposition	 of	 social	 welfare	
objectives	from	the	central	government,	in	spite	of	the	addition	of	greater	funds.	
The	most	recent	health	plan,	released	in	2009,	has	made	some	progress	towards	
resolving	 the	 theoretical	 conundrums	 facing	 the	 Chinese	 health	 sector,	 but	
leaving	 structural	problems.	The	effectiveness	of	 the	next	20	years	of	 reform	
looks	most	likely	to	be	determined	by	how	effectively	the	Chinese	government	
addresses	the	structural	problems	and	flawed	incentives	hindering	the	system.
History of the Chinese health sector 
There	 are	 three	 distinct	 phases	 of	 healthcare	 provision	 in	 China.	 The	 first	
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Many	authors	argue	that	the	structural	features	of	China’s	public	health	system	
were	 instrumental	 to	 China’s	 excellent	 health	 outcomes.1	 Under	 this	 system,	




institutions	 supervised	 township	 and	 village	 facilities	 and	 provided	 referral	
services,	training	and	high-level	tertiary	care.












(around 1 million patients)













Training + tech support
Training + tech support
Training + tech support Training + tech support
Training + tech support
Training + tech support
1	 See,	for	example,	Bloom	and	Tang	(2000);	Liu	(2004);	and	Smith	(1974).
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By	 the	 mid-1970s,	 China	 had	 established	 an	 effective	 rural	 health	 system,	
supported	 by	 institutional	 arrangements	 including	 a	 network	 of	 appropriate	
facilities	 and	 personnel,	 social	 financing	 of	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 health	
expenditure	and	mechanisms	to	coordinate	service	providers	and	to	encourage	
health	workers	 to	act	 in	 the	community’s	 interest	 (Chernichovsky	1995).	The	
incentives	in	this	three-tier,	‘step-up,	step-down’	system	were	highly	effective,	
encouraging	high	levels	of	primary	care.	
Similarly,	 in	 urban	 areas	 an	 efficiently	 organised	 and	 managed	 system	 was	




in	 rural	 areas,	 factory	 workers	 were	 given	 work	 points	 for	 performing	 basic	
primary	 healthcare	 tasks	 and	 for	 referring	 patients	 upwards	 when	 required.	






















a	 shift	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 health	 services.	 Social	 sector	 development	 including	
health	care	became	low	on	the	public	policy	agenda.	
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In	 spite	 of	 this—although	 somewhat	 unsurprisingly	 given	 China’s	 economic	
growth—the	 health	 status	 of	 China’s	 people,	 measured	 by	 broad	 population	
health	 indicators,	 continuously	 improved.	 Life	 expectancy	 at	 birth	 increased	




standards,	 relatively	 comprehensive.	 The	 coverage	 rates	 of	 access	 to	 safe	









with	 the	 hospital	 system	 appeared	 to	 be	 related	 largely	 to	 cost	 inflation	 and	
access.	
This	shift	seemed	to	be	the	result	of	a	broader	shift	of	strategy,	based	on	the	















Thus,	 before	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Harmonious	 Society	 campaign,	 China’s	
public	 spending	 on	 health	 care	 was	 far	 lower	 than	 that	 of	 most	 developing	
2	 Based	on	the	three	national	household	health	surveys	done	in	1993,	1998	and	2003;	see	Ministry	of	Health	
(2004).
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countries	 (Figure	 17.2).	 This	 financial	 structure	 created	 significant	 shortfalls	





available	 to	 the	 system.	 A	 World	 Bank	 (1997)	 survey	 estimated	 that	 overall	
government	 subsidies	 to	 total	 hospital	 operating	 costs	 amounted	 to	 no	 more	
than	15	per	cent.	This	has	had	enormous	ramifications	for	hospitals	and	doctors.
Even	 nominally	 fully	 funded	 public	 health	 institutions	 have	 suffered	 from	
severe	budget	shortages.3At	the	beginning	of	the	1980s,	all	of	the	public	health	
institutions’	revenue	was	from	government	budgets,	yet	by	1992	the	contribution	
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Central	 to	 understanding	 how	 and	 why	 this	 system	 developed	 when	 it	 did	
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Following	 the	 end	 of	 the	 communes,	 a	 system	 of	 fiscal	 responsibility	 was	
introduced	 in	 the	 early	 1980s,	 which	 lasted	 until	 1994	 (Wong	 2007).	 This	
reform	pertained	mainly	to	the	relationship	between	the	central	and	provincial	















the	 Chinese	 taxation	 system.	 The	 central	 government	 increased	 its	 revenues	
more	than	twofold	(Wong	2007:7).	These	gains	in	revenue	came,	however,	from	
passing	shortages	in	funding	down	to	lower	levels—as	shown	in	Figure	17.5.
This	 is	 significant	 for	 public	 health	 as	 these	 lower	 levels	 of	 government	 are	
then	mandated	to	pay	for	social	goods.	Figure	17.5	demonstrates	which	level	of	
government	is	responsible	for	each	social	good.	It	clearly	shows	that	distribution	
of	 revenues	 is	 not	 proportional	 to	 the	 allocation	 of	 mandates.	 Each	 level	 of	
government	 has	 therefore	 been	 under	 progressively	 more	 pressure	 to	 raise	
revenues	to	fund	social	programs.	This	puts	considerable	pressure	on	the	finances	





vertical	 inequities	 in	spending	to	the	detriment	of	service	providers	at	 lower	
levels,	particularly	within	disadvantaged	areas.
Figure 17.5 Changes in tax revenues versus expenditures, 1993–2004 (per cent)
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Gaps	 in	 spending	 power	 are	 critical	 to	 understanding	 health	 care	 in	 China.	
A	 lack	 of	 taxation	 revenue	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 fund	 healthcare	 providers,	
healthcare	 policies	 or	 bodies	 to	 regulate	 healthcare	 provision.	 As	 Chou	 and	
Wang	 (2009:694)	 show,	 government	 budget	 deficits	 have	 a	 significant	 long-











979)	 note,	 transfers	 often	 reinforce	 rather	 than	 reduce	 horizontal	 revenue	
disparities.	The	more	economically	successful	a	province	is,	the	more	likely	it	is	
to	benefit	from	tax-based	transfer	methods.




China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development
372
rural	areas.	Larger	and	better-equipped	facilities	can	generate	more	profits	and	




Gong	 et	 al.’s	 (1997)	 study,	 for	 example,	 showed	 that	 more	 than	 80	 per	 cent	
of	qualified	doctors	 sampled	 from	eight	Chinese	provinces	 left	poor	 counties	
for	more	lucrative	positions	in	urban	facilities.	As	a	result,	while	about	three-
quarters	of	Chinese	people	live	in	rural	areas,	only	about	one-third	of	medical	
professionals	 work	 there.	 This,	 when	 combined	 with	 the	 higher	 skill	 levels	
present	in	urban	hospitals,	makes	it	difficult	for	rural	areas	to	assure	the	same	
quality	of	standards	as	those	present	in	urban	areas—as	shown	in	Figure	17.6.
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The negative cycle of Chinese health care
The	 Chinese	 health	 system	 has	 reacted	 to	 these	 structural	 problems	 and	 has	
developed	 flawed	 incentives	 for	 medical	 providers.	 On	 the	 supply	 side,	 the	








the	 average	 urban	 disposable	 income	 (Ministry	 of	 Health	 2009;	 NBS	 2009).	
These	high	medical	bills	often	contribute	directly	to	poverty.	Thus,	farmers	and	
workers	alike	avoid	healthcare	institutions.	
Yet	 healthcare	 institutions—underfunded	 by	 the	 public	 purse—also	 suffer	
from	revenue	shortages.	Their	best	staff	often	leave	for	higher-level	institutions.	
They	 have	 incentives	 to	 raise	 prices,	 employ	 more	 high-tech	 machinery	 and	
oversupply	medical	care.	Yet	then,	as	noted	above,	poor	citizens	have	an	even	
greater	disincentive	not	to	seek	medical	care,	and	thus	the	cycle	continues.
This	 then	 exacerbates	 the	 shortage	 of	 effective	 demand	 that	 exists	 because	
people	are	unable	to	afford	health	care.	Underfunded	public	health	providers	









Many	 regions	 suffer	 acute	problems	of	 inadequate	 supply.	Many	more	 areas,	
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This	price	barrier	 affects	 access	 to	health	 care.	Those	who	are	unable	 to	pay	
remain	 ill,	 often	 becoming	 even	 more	 ill,	 necessitating	 even	 more	 expensive	
tertiary	 care.	This	 leads	 to	 a	 dynamic	 whereby	 patients,	 if	 unable	 to	 obtain	
access	providers	as	a	low-cost	patient,	return	as	a	high-cost	patient,	leading	to	
both	access	and	cost-inflation	problems.6







The	 reforms	 in	 demand-side	 policy	 seek	 to	 break	 the	 cycle	 described	 above	
through	altering	the	effective	demand	for	health	care.	By	providing	subsidised,	
government-organised	 social	 health	 insurance,	 the	 government	 reduces	 the	
risk	of	catastrophic	medical	expenses	and	tries	to	make	necessary	health	care	
affordable	through	risk	pooling.	The	aim	at	initiation	was	to	expand	the	programs	
to	 cover	 all	 citizens	within	10	years.	Although	 the	programs	 still	 do	not	yet	
provide	universal	coverage,	the	program	has	been	expanding	rapidly	into	rural	




Although	 the	 reimbursement	 rates	 differ,	 urban	 and	 rural	 social	 health	
insurance	(SHI)	schemes	use	co-contributions.	In	rural	areas,	funding	is	divided	
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The	 bulk	 of	 reimbursement	 by	 the	 NCMS	 is	 for	 inpatient	 expenses,	 even	 in	
counties	where	outpatient	expenses	are	covered.8
Reform effectiveness






8	 A	 2006	World	 Bank	 survey	 noted	 that	 in	 the	 27	 counties	 for	 which	 data	 were	 available,	 the	 share	 of	
reimbursements	accounted	for	by	inpatient	care	varied	from	100	per	cent	to	66	per	cent,	depending	on	the	
coverage	mode	(Wagstaff	2007).
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healthcare	utilisation	 than	 the	uninsured	 (Jackson	et	 al	 2005).	 	Wagstaff	and	
Lindelow	 (2008),	utilising	a	number	of	data-sets,	find	 that	 the	BMI	 in	urban	
areas	has	increased	the	utilisation	rate.
A	number	of	problems	remain.	The	 inpatient	 focus	of	 the	 insurance	schemes	
means	 that	 the	 system	 of	 health	 security	 is	 geared	 towards	 more	 expensive	








There	 is	 a	 notable	 theoretical	 gap	 here,	 which	 is	 that	 a	 causal	 relationship	
between	health	insurance	and	health	outcomes	requires	health	institutions	to	
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the	 structural	problems	of	urban–rural	 and	 inter-provincial	divides	will	 also	
continue,	and	hence	we	will	also	expect	to	see	similarly	inequitable	outcomes	
stemming	from	these	divides.	
There	 is	 some	 research	 currently	 emerging	 on	 these	 matters.	 Yip	 and	 Hsiao	
(2009),	 using	 the	 data	 from	 the	 2003	 Health	 Services	 Survey	 and	 their	 own	
data,	report	that	government	spending	in	urban	areas	is	five	to	six	times	higher	
than	in	rural	areas.	Demand-side	spending	drives	much	of	this:	city	hospitals	
absorbed	 50	 per	 cent	 of	 supply-side	 subsidies	 in	 2002	 and	 county	 hospitals	
9	per	cent;	THCs,	in	contrast,	received	just	7	per	cent.	
Moreover,	 inherent	 regressive	 biases	 remain	 within	 the	 current	 demand-side	







This	 reinforces	 the	 fact	 that	 spending	 is	 often	 distributed	 unequally	









to	have	 sufficient	 authority	 and	 skills	 for	 fund	 collection	 and	 risk	 transfer.13	
Yet	 in	 the	NCMS	program	there	 is	a	distinct	 lack	of	 funding	for	 institutional	
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(Hu	 2004:2).	 The	 problem	 here	 is	 that	 the	 management	 costs	 for	 the	 poorer	













total	 health	 spending	 in	 rural	 areas.14	 Hence,	 coverage	 of	 medical	 expenses	
tends	to	be	shallow,	many	services	are	not	covered	or	are	covered	only	partially,	
deductibles	are	high,	ceilings	are	low	and	co-insurance	rates	are	high.
It	 is	 further	 revealed	 by	 a	 number	 of	 studies	 that	 the	 NCMS	 has	 not	 been	
effective	in	improving	healthcare	access	and	reducing	the	financial	burden	of	
disease,	as	expected,	for	the	poor.	Compared	with	the	high-income	insured,	the	
low-income	 insured	utilised	 less	health	care	and	received	 less	reimbursement	
from	the	NCMS	(Mao	2006).	
How structural problems hinder reform
The	current	inequities	in	funding	do	not	affect	just	the	provision	of	services;	
they	 also	 affect	 the	 incentives	 for	 institutions.15	The	 impacts	 of	 the	demand-
side	reforms	outlined	above	provide	an	excellent	case	study.	The	administrative	
responsibilities	 for	 the	 NCMS	 fund	 are	 fairly	 clearly	 outlined.16	 The	 central	
government—in	a	quest	 to	 improve	social	welfare	and	general	health	 service	
provision—commits	 funds	 and	 gives	 targets	 to	 provinces.	 Provincial-level	
14	 Zhang	(2005:20)	uses	2004	calculations;	Wagstaff	et	al.	 (2009)	make	similar	assumptions	for	2007.	The	
data	 themselves	 each	 year	 are	 available	 from	 <http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles//business/htmlfiles/
zwgkzt/pwstj/index.htm>
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responsibilities	largely	amount	to	target	setting	and	analysis,	and	they	decide	





compensation	 and	 the	 proportion	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 compensation’	 (Zhongguo	






















Similarly,	 in	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 they	 face	 funding	 shortages,	 THC	
administrators’	expected	behaviour	for	more	difficult	cases	 is	 to	contain	THC	
costs	by	encouraging	physicians	to	transfer	patients	to	hospitals	at	the	county	
or	municipal	 level.	This	utilisation	mode,	however,	gives	THCs	 lesser	 income	
from	the	absence	of	more	complex	cases	that	act	as	a	de	facto	subsidy.	
In	 this	 way,	 the	 behaviour	 of	THC	 administrators	 and	 township	 government	
officials	 is	 aligned.	 As	 the	 township	 government	 officials	 are	 measured	 for	
17	 Provincial	governments	are	required	to	 ‘establish	CMS	essential	drug	 list,	 formulate	survey	basis	and	
analyse	hospital	admissions,	fiscal	balances	and	fund	payouts’,	balance	the	books	and	‘strive	to	improve	the	
level	of	benefit	for	the	farmers	of	the	Senate’	(Zhongguo	Weishengbu	2006).	
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effectiveness	through	ensuring	that	THCs	do	not	become	bankrupt,	they	have	


















being	voluntary—yet	 there	 is	no	 incentive	 for	government	 administrators	 to	
take	account	of	service	delivery,	in	spite	of	the	healthcare	system	being	public.
















there	 are	 generally	 soft	 budget	 constraints	 only,	 extra	 staff	 is	 useful	 for	 the	





government	 can	 similarly	 be	 used	 for	 purchasing	 or	 upgrading	 expensive	














patient	 and	 doctor	 makes	 it	 difficult	 for	 individuals	 to	 discipline	 providers	
one-on-one.	Moreover,	as	patients	have	no	say	in	the	running	of	the	NCMS	or	




Due	 to	 pushing	 the	 risks	 back	 onto	 the	 patient,	 and	 not	 having	 effective,	








alternative	 available	 to	 the	 patient—the	 village	 doctor—but	 as	 these	 doctors	 are	 unregulated	 and	 do	 not	
officially	access	public	funds	they	have	been	left	out	of	this	model	for	the	sake	of	maintaining	reader	interest.
19	 Based	 on	 Hirschman’s	 classic	 characterisation	 of	 consumer	 options	 for	 public	 providers	 (Hirschman	
1970:17–37	outlines	the	model).
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their	 skills	 through	 greater,	 publicly	 funded	 training	 and	 are	 expected	 to	
also	 upgrade	 the	 skills	 of	 village	 doctors	 within	 the	 area.	 At	 higher	 tiers	 of	
treatment,	public	health	insurance	schemes	such	as	the	NCMS	and	BMI	should	
be	 ‘enhanced’	 and	 this	 enhanced	 funding	 should	 be	 used	 to	 provide	 social	
health	insurance	cover	for	hospitalisation	costs.
There	 are	 two	 major	 problems	 with	 this	 proposed	 strategy	 of	 reform.	 The	
first	relates	to	cost.	The	total	revenue	of	public	healthcare	providers	in	China	
at	 the	time	was	equal	 to	about	one-seventh	of	 total	government	expenditure,	
and	 China	 lacked	 the	 fiscal	 capacity	 to	 introduce	 full	 supply.21	 Rather,	 these	












20	 Gu	 (2009:124)	 has	 far	 more	 on	 the	 internal	 politics	 of	 this,	 although	 his	 preference	 for	 demand-side	
reforms	is	clear.	
21	 Gu	(2009:125)	does	the	calculations,	based	on	Ministry	of	Health	(2007)	and	NBS	(2007).
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Over	 and	 above	 this,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 commitment	 by	 the	 central	
government	 to	 ‘lead’	 healthcare	 reforms	 on	 the	 supply	 side.	 It	 promises	 to	
‘rationally	determine	 the	payment	 criteria	 for	drugs,	healthcare	 services	 and	
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The	 scope	 and	 proportion	 of	 reimbursement	 for	 outpatient	 expenses	 will	 be	
expanded.	 In	 rural	 areas,	 county	 governments	 are	 mandated	 to	 reimburse	 a	
higher	amount	of	NCMS	funds.24




compensation	mechanism	 is	 through	SHI	 reimbursement,	 although	providers	
will	be	forced	to	sign	a	‘designated	insurance	contract’.	Similarly,	‘efforts	will	
be	made’	to	transfer	ownership	of	public	hospitals	to	non-public	institutions.	
Finally,	 governance	 reforms	 are	 promised.	 These	 reforms	 include	 trying	




institutions	 and	 providers	 of	 healthcare	 services’.	 This,	 if	 done	 effectively,	
would	undoubtedly	be	a	major	step	forward.
Future paths and conclusions
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A	 shift	 such	 as	 this	 will	 also	 require	 the	 Chinese	 government	 to	 clarify	 its	
own	 political	 structure	 and	 strategy	 at	 a	 number	 of	 levels.	 For	 example,	 the	
responsibilities	 for	 the	 current	 insurance	 schemes	 at	 the	 central	 government	
level	 itself	 are	 divided	 between	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	




thinks	 that	 it	 will	 ‘provide	 rational	 subsidies	 to	 rural	 doctors	 for	 providing	
public	health	services’,	yet	the	local	(most	probably	county)	government	will	








of	 Chinese	 governance.	 As	 Barry	 Naughton	 (2010)	 observed	 so	 perceptively	
about	 the	 2010	 National	 People’s	 Congress,	 the	 current	 central	 government	
line	following	the	global	financial	crisis	is	the	effect	of	what	Wen	Jiabao	called	
‘macro-control’.	Macro-control	is	defined	as	continuing
to	 make	 use	 of	 both	 market	 mechanisms	 and	 macro-control,	 that	 is,	
at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 we	 keep	 our	 reforms	 oriented	 toward	 a	 market	
economy,	let	market	forces	play	their	basic	role	in	allocating	resources,	
and	 stimulate	 the	 market’s	 vitality,	 we	 must	 make	 best	 use	 of	 the	
socialist	 system’s	 advantages,	 which	 are	 making	 decisions	 efficiently,	
organizing	effectively,	and	concentrating	resources	to	accomplish	large	
undertakings.	(Wen	2010)
















True	 supply-side	 reforms	 would	 embrace	 sector	 neutrality.	 The	 government	
would	need	to	eliminate	the	high-cost/low-cost	patient	distinction,	decide	the	
ownership	status	of	health	 institutions	and	examine	reform	of	 the	 incentives	
for	local	bureaucrats.	Similarly,	attempts	would	need	to	be	made	to	secure	far	
higher	levels	of	funding	for	township	and	county	governments	to	act	as	effective	
monitors,	 measurers	 and	 regulators	 and	 to	 secure	 greater	 funding	 for	 public	
health	providers	to	ensure	more	efficient	‘gatekeeping’.	There	would	need	to	be	
horizontal	and	vertical	 intergovernmental	fiscal	 reform	 in	order	 to	ameliorate	




The	 other	 option	 for	 the	 next	 20	 years	 is	 to	 truly	 embrace	 demand-side	
reform.	Making	demand-side	 institutions	such	as	 the	BMI	or	NCMS	agencies	
accountable	to	the	populations	they	serve	(and	that	fund	them)	would	create	
huge	 incentives	 for	 improving	 service	 delivery.	 This	 would	 be	 particularly	
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The	 Chinese	 central	 government	 has,	 however,	 shown	 a	 considerable,	 and	
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